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Abstract 
This thesis studies three related issues regarding recent banking reforms in emerging 
markets, namely mergers and acquisitions (M&As), foreign bank entry and productivity 
change. First of all, we analyse 84 banking M&A transactions in Asian and Latin 
American emerging markets between 1998 and 2005. Two event study methodologies 
that use the OLS market model and GARCH model are applied to examine the value 
effects of these transactions on bank shareholders. The results suggest that these 
transactions are moderately successful as targets' shareholders gain significant abnormal 
returns, whereas acquirers, on the other hand, tend not to lose value. When we take 
account of time-varying beta using the GARCH model approach this provides 
statistically similar findings to the OLS market model. However, different event study 
methodologies tend to yield different results in terms of the determinants of value 
creation. Secondly, we also examine the impact of foreign bank entry on banking 
competitive conditions in Argentina, Brazil, China and India between 2000 and 2006. We 
use the Lerner index to measure banking sector competition. As well as using a fixed 
effects estimator, the generalised method of moments (GMM) dynamic panel data 
estimator is applied to obtain the Lerner index in order to mitigate possible 
misspecifications due to long-run equilibrium assumption imposed by the fixed effects 
estimator. Our results tentatively suggest that the Lerner index estimated using the 
dynamic procedure is the preferred measure of competitive conditions. Using a dynamic 
panel regression model, we then examine the impact of foreign bank presence and other 
bank and country specific factors on banking competition. Overall, our results show that 
foreign bank entry does not appear to significantly influence banking sector competition. 
We also suggest that there well may be a limit to the competitive influence of foreign 
banks over the short-term. Finally, we investigate the productivity change in these four 
emerging market banking systems over the period 2000-2006. We employ a parametric 
approach to examine banks' optimisation processes (cost minimisation and profit 
maximisation); and then decompose the total gross changes of variable costs and profits 
to measure the cost and alternative profit productivity change respectively. The results 
show that all these banking systems suffered a slight decrease in cost productivity (apart 
from India) but also enjoyed profit productivity gains over the same period. This 
suggests that banks in the countries under study focused more on revenue generation 
compared to cost minimisation over the period. We also find some evidence that banks 
may have also exerted their market power to improve their profit productivity. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General background 
Traditionally, banking systems in the emerging economies were associated with stringent 
regulations in areas like interest rates, bank activities, geographical scope of the 
operations, bank entry and lack of competition and efficiency (Hawkins and Mihaljek, 
2001). However, during the last two decades, emerging banking systems have undergone 
some dramatic changes in both external environments as well as internal organisations. 
These changes have been driven by deregulation of domestic financial markets 
undertaken by governments, advances in information technologies and various financial 
crises (Hawkins and Mihaljek, 2001). 
There was evidence from advanced economies, notably US that deregulation was a 
major cause of improved competition and efficiency in banking and then led to 
substantial and beneficial real effects on economy in the late 1970s and 1980s (Strahan, 
2002). Under such influences, deregulation has also taken place in banking systems in 
Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe and Asia. Generally speaking, deregulation 
measures included opening the banking sector to non-bank financial institutions and 
foreign investors, removal of interest rate ceilings and privatisation of state-owned 
banks 1. These measures, to certain extent, intensified the competition within the 
emerging banking systems indicated by lowered overall operational costs as well as 
profitability (Claessens and Laeven, 2003; Martinez Peria and Mody, 2003). There was 
also an important change in the ownership and structure of the banking systems. On one 
hand, there was an increase of investment from private sectors in the banking systems as 
more new financial institutions were set up by domestic and foreign investors or some 
state-own banks were privatised. On the other hand, due to an increasingly competitive 
environment, some domestic banks experienced difficulties and became the targets of 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As), which, therefore, initiated the consolidation process. 
Advances in information technologies have considerably improved the processing of 
1 See Megginson (2005) for a review of the bank privatisation literature and a list of privatised banks. 
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information, which is one of the core functions of banks (Hawkins and Mihaljek, 2001). 
Consequently, banks in advanced markets as well as emerging markets have changed the 
way how they do business. First of all, new technologies have created more efficient 
communication systems, which enable banks to operate in larger geographic spans. For 
example, foreign banks were able to enter emerging markets and oversee the operations 
from their home countries. Therefore, cross-border M&As or domestic 
expansions/consolidation were facilitated by such improvement. Secondly, new 
technologies have provided banks with alternative distribution channels other than 
traditional 'brick and mortar' branch channel. Emergences of ATMs, telephone banking 
and internet banking have helped banks increase their market share, cut down operation 
costs and generate more revenues, which further contribute to a more competitive system 
(Berger and Mester, 2003). Thirdly, new information technologies have accelerated the 
process of financial innovation. More and more sophisticated financial products such as 
derivatives have been provided to meet customers' new demands, which have also been 
increasingly used in emerging markets. Fourthly, advances in information technologies 
have driven cross-border M&As as foreign banks' advantage in technologies have 
become one of key factors why banks in emerging markets engage in a cross-border 
M&A transaction (Williams and Liao, 2008). 
During much of the 1990s, most Asian, Latin American and East and Central European 
countries were directly or indirectly hit by financial crises in the region or from 
elsewhere. As a result, large number of banks became insolvent. One of the direct 
consequences of the banking crises in emerging markets has been changes in the 
structure of bank ownership. Governments often stepped in to intervene either by 
encouraging sound banks to acquire ailing banks or foreign takeovers or by nationalising 
banks in distress temporarily then returning them to private ownership (Hawkins and 
Mihaljek, 2001). 
Overall, all these changes were expected to improve the competition and efficiency of 
emerging banking systems and contribute to economic growth. While during the 
financial crises, changes were expected to recapitalise the troubled banking system and 
stabilise the financial sector. 
12 
1.2 Aims of the study 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, major banking systems in Latin America and Asia 
underwent large scale deregulation. However, these programmes were all ended abruptly 
by various financial crises. In Latin America, Mexican currency collapse of 1995 not 
only caused financial meltdown in Mexico, but also had contagious effects on 
neighbouring countries' economy. Asian financial crisis took place in 1997 and plunged 
five South East Asian economies (Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, Thailand and the 
Philippines) into depression. Then in 1998, Brazil, facing its own financial crisis, 
devalued its currency, which in tum further worsened its neighbour Argentina's economy. 
Two years later, after several years' poor economic performance and despite several 
times' financial assistance from international financial organisations, in particular IMF, 
Argentina experienced its severe run on the banks and social upheaval. 
As a result of these crises, there has been a large number of government-led M&As and 
nationalisation processes as well as closing down insolvent banks during the crises that 
were aimed to stabilise the banking systems and the whole economy. There has also been 
a wave of domestic and cross-border market-driven M&As after the financial crises that 
considerably reduced the number of banks, which increased excessively prior to the 
financial crises (Hawkins and Mihaljek, 2001). However, there have been only a handful 
of studies that examine banking M&As in emerging markets and the results are mixed. 
For example, Williams and Liao (2008) use an event study to analyse cross-border M&A 
transactions between acquiring banks from developed countries and acquired banks in 
emerging markets. Generally, they find that acquiring and acquired bank shareholders 
both earn positive abnormal returns upon the M&A announcements and acquired bank 
shareholders in the emerging markets benefit more than those of acquiring banks. In 
contrast, Crouzille et al. (2008) apply an event study that uses a GARCH modelling 
framework and finds that M&A announcements tend to be associated with negative stock 
returns in relatively less developed banking systems. In order to enhance the extant 
literature, the first aim of our study is to examine whether bank M&As during and after 
the major financial crises (between 1998 and 2005) are successful (value-creating) 
within and across twelve Asian and Latin American markets. Specifically, we carry out 
event study analyses around the M&A announcement dates and calculate cumulative 
abnormal returns to bank shareholders in emerging markets. By doing so, we examine 
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how banking M&As are valued by stock markets in emerging markets and how value is 
distributed between acquiring and acquired bank shareholders. According to studies of 
banking M&As in advanced markets and in accordance with expectations, acquired bank 
shareholders may gain more returns but there might be a transfer of wealth from acquired 
banks to acquiring banks. From a public policy perspective, the results may help examine 
whether the consolidation process benefit both sides of bank shareholders and then in 
tum the banking system. Moreover, we are also interested in what are determinants that 
positively drive value changes. Experiences from advanced markets may be useful to 
decide the possible determinants, but different results may be expected due to specific 
characteristics of emerging markets. The significant driving factors may help bank 
supervision authorities/market participants in the emerging markets to prove/engage in 
the types of M&A transactions in order to maximise the value created for shareholders. 
As deregulation took place, foreign banks have played an increasingly important role in 
many emerging markets after restrictions on foreign bank entry were relaxed or removed. 
In some countries, banking systems were further opened to foreign investors after 
financial crises in order to obtain much needed capital (and access to international capital 
markets), information technologies and management expertises. Two biggest emerging 
markets in Asia, China and India, however, are different examples in terms of the process 
of foreign bank entry as both countries have only recently relaxed their foreign bank 
entry restrictions as part of these countries' commitments to accession of the WT02. 
Therefore, it is interesting to study the foreign bank entry process in countries like 
Argentina and Brazil on one hand, which started such process much earlier and foreign 
bank presence is more dominant; and countries like China and India on the other hand, in 
which foreign bank entry is still at its early stage. More importantly, concerns have been 
raised regarding the effects of foreign bank entry on competitive conditions, in other 
words, whether foreign banks have improved the competition in emerging markets as 
banking systems in emerging markets tend to be less competitive than in advanced 
markets (Hawkins and Mihaljek, 2001). The existing literature generally finds that 
foreign bank entry and less entry and activity restrictions significantly improve market's 
:2 While major policy barriers have been lifted, some restrictions still remain as both countries implement the 
opening-up of the banking sector in a phased manner .. \or example, in India, before March ~0~9, foreign ban~s' 
acquisition of shareholdings was only permitted by IndIa s central ba~k - Reserve Ban~ o~ I~dla m selected IndIan 
p ivate sector banks. Acquisition of a controlling stake has to be phased m and the overall IS lImIted to 74 percent (RBI, 2~05). In China, on the other hand, since 11 th December, 2006, the authorit.ies have remov~d the. geographical and 
customer restriction of RMB business on foreign banks. However, they requIre three years (mcludmg two profitable 
years) waiting period for new foreign banks to obtain an RMB license (CBRC, 2007). 
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competitiveness (Claessens and Laeven, 2003; Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007). Yeyati 
and Micco (2007), however, find that foreign bank entry seems to have not improved 
competition in eight Latin American countries between 1993 and 2002. Therefore, 
another aim of this thesis is to re-examine this issue by using a more recent data set 
(between 2000 and 2006). We measure the competitive conditions of these four banking 
systems first by estimating the Lerner index of each bank, which measures individual 
bank's ability to price over marginal cost of whole banking system. Then we test the 
impact of foreign bank presence on market's competitive conditions. The study of this 
issue, therefore, will first help policymakers to evaluate the recent trend of market 
competition, which may have improved as a result of various deregulation measures and 
advances in information technologies etc. Moreover, as promoting foreign direct 
investment among other policy initiatives was expected to improve the competition and 
the majority studies have found this strong and positive relationship, we expect to draw 
similar conclusions. The impact may be less significant, however, for two newly opened 
emerging markets, China and India, compared to Argentina and Brazil due to their lower 
level of foreign bank presence. 
Finally, we are interested to see whether overall bank performance measured by bank 
productivity has been improved in emerging markets in recent years. The study of bank 
productivity is important because productivity is a summary performance measure 
(Nakane and Weintraub, 2005). Therefore, productivity analysis may be relevant to 
market participants involved in banking M&As or bank competition authorities. 
Moreover, low productivity measures, to certain extent, can be used by bank supervision 
authorities as a monitoring instrument. Bank productivity studies are also useful as 
existing literature suggests that improvement in bank productivity benefits the economic 
growth (Levine, 1997). Academic literature regarding bank productivity in emerging 
banking markets mainly employs non-parametric methodologies (except for Nakane and 
Weintraub, 2005 that use a parametric methodology to study bank productivity in Brazil) 
and finds mixed results. For example, while Bhattacharyya et al. (1997) and Sathya 
(2001) find that there is a marginal increase in productivity in India, Kumbhakar and 
Sarkar (2003) and Galagedera and Edirisuriya (2005) find no evidence of significant 
productivity change over various sample periods. On the other hand, Kumbhakar and 
Wang (2007) and Koutsomanoli-Filippaki et al. (2009) both find positive productivity 
change in China and Central and East European countries respectively. In this study, we 
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again study four major emerging markets - Argentina, Brazil, China and India between 
2000 and 2006 using a parametric methodology (Berger and Mester, 1999, 2003) to 
measure the productivity change in their banking systems. Despite of less desirable 
macroeconomic environment in Argentina and Brazil in the early years of period under 
study, we expect that banks may, to certain extent, still enjoy positive productivity 
change over the seven years period due to continuous financial liberalisation and 
technology improvement. As far as China and India are concerned, large proportion of 
banking systems are still dominated by least efficient state-owned banks (Bonin and 
Huang, 2002; BIS, 2004), the improvement of productivity (if there is any) may not be as 
significant as in Argentina and Brazil. Moreover, we, probably for the first time, also 
study if banks exert their market power in these emerging markets to improve their cost 
minimisation and profit maximisation process, which may be more likely to occur in 
emerging markets. 
1.3 Methodology and data 
In this study, different methodologies and datasets will be used to address policy 
implications and achieve research aims abovementioned. First of all, a traditional event 
study approach based on the ordinary least square (OLS) market model has been tested 
and proposed by Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) and Dodd and Warner (1983) and 
widely applied to study shareholder value change in various industries due to specific 
events. In order to examine whether banking M&As in Asian and Latin American 
emerging markets create value for bank shareholders, we use a market model event study 
(Beitel et aI., 2004). However, this market model approach does not take into account the 
time-varying volatility of the share prices in the past, which may affect the detection of 
the abnormal returns of the shares during the announcement of M&As. Therefore, we use 
an alternative event study methodology using GARCH modelling framework proposed 
by Frame and Lastrapes (1998), which relaxes the constant beta assumption imposed by 
market model event study. Moreover, we use a multivariate cross-sectional regression 
model to examine the determinants of banking M&A abnormal returns in emerging 
markets. In terms of the dataset, we identify 84 banking M&A transactions in Asian and 
Latin American emerging markets between 1998 and 2005. Transactions details are 
collected from Thomson ONE Banker database, while bank accounting data are 
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extracted from Bankscope. 
The second main aim of this study is to measure the competitive conditions in four 
emerging markets - Argentina, Brazil, China and India, then investigate whether there is 
a positive impact of foreign bank presence on these banking systems' competition. We 
use the Lerner index to measure banking competition based on Maudos and Perez (2003). 
First of all, we need to estimate marginal cost as the Lerner index measures the bank's 
ability to price over banking industry's marginal cost. When estimating marginal cost of 
banking systems, we use standard fixed effect estimator to estimate the trans-logarithmic 
functions as well as a dynamic panel data estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991) in order 
to relax the long-term equilibrium assumption imposed by fixed effect estimator. Then 
we directrly test the impact of foreign bank/investor shareholding on the competition. 
The data sample of this topic consists of 1106 bank-year observations from these four 
markets from 2000 to 2006. Bankscope provides data for the estimation of the Lerner 
Index. When analysing the impact of foreign bank entry on competition, we also use data 
from World Bank, IMF, The Heritage Foundation, Central Banks and individual banks' 
websites. 
Finally, we use the same dataset from the second topic to estimate bank productivity 
change in Argentina, Brazil, China and India between 2000 and 2006. We follow Berger 
and Mester (1999, 2003) to estimate whether there are positive cost productivity and 
alternative profit productivity change. Then we use the Lerner Index estimated in the 
second topic and other market power indicators including market share and 
concentration ratio to test whether banks exploit their market power to improve their 
productivity, in particular profit productivity as banks are also becoming increasingly 
profit maximisation oriented (Hawkins and Mihaljek, 2001). 
1.4 Structure of the study 
This thesis is structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 examInes the consolidation progress in emerging banking systems. More 
specifically, we analyse the shareholder value effects of 84 banking M&A transactions in 
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twelve Asian and Latin American emerging markets between 1998 and 2005. Two event 
study methodologies that use the OLS market model and GARCH model are applied 
separately in order to test whether different assumptions relating to beta alter the amount 
of shareholder value effects detected. Then we examine the determinants of such value 
change~ again also to test the consistency of results derived from two event study 
methodologies. 
In Chapter 3, we examine the impact of foreign bank entry on banking competitive 
conditions in Argentina, Brazil, China and India between 2000 and 2006. First of all, we 
use the Lerner index to measure banking sector competition. As well as using a fixed 
effects estimator, the generalised method of moments (GMM) dynamic panel data 
estimator is applied to obtain the Lerner index in order to mitigate possible 
misspecifications due to long-run equilibrium assumption imposed by the fixed effects 
estimator. We then examine the impact of foreign bank presence and other bank and 
country specific factors on banking competition using a dynamic panel regression model. 
Chapter 4 investigates productivity change in four emerging market banking systems, 
namely Argentina, Brazil, China and India, over the period 2000-2006. We employ a 
parametric approach that follows Berger and Mester (1999, 2003) to examine banks' 
optimisation processes (cost minimisation and profit maximisation); and then decompose 
the total gross changes of variable costs and profits into change in business conditions 
and cost and alternative profit productivity changes respectively, which are further driven 
by change in best practice and inefficiency. We also investigate whether banks may have 
also exerted their market power to improve their productivity. 
Chapter 5 concludes this thesis. We provide a summary of the main results and examine 
to what extent these results contribute to the existing literature. Finally, this chapter 
provides an overview of the main policy implications and limitations of this thesis and 
presents suggestions to guide further research. 
18 
CHAPTER TWO: Banking Mergers and Acquisitions in 
Emerging Markets - Experience of Asia and Latin America 
19 
Banking Mergers and Acquisitions in Emerging Markets 
- Experience of Asia and Latin America 
Abstract 
This chapter analyses 84 banking M&A transactions in Asian and Latin American 
emerging markets between 1998 and 2005. Two event study methodologies that use the 
OLS market model and GARCH model are applied to examine the value effects of these 
transactions on bank shareholders. The results suggest that these transactions are 
moderately successful as targets' shareholders gain significant abnormal returns, whereas 
acquirers, on the other hand, tend not to lose value. When we take account of 
time-varying beta using the GARCH model approach this provides statistically similar 
findings to the OLS market model. However, while the different event study 
methodologies tend to yield the same general results in terms of shareholder value 
creation they differ in explaining its determinants. Future studies that examine the 
determinants of value creation in bank M&A's should use GARCH or similar modelling 
frameworks to cross-check the robustness / consistency of their findings. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Over the last decade or so, mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have taken place in various 
emerging markets that have had a significant impact on these banking systems. In 
contrast to developed countries' experiences, the consolidation trend in emerging 
banking markets were mainly triggered by financial crises3. Various emerging markets 
were affected by financial crises since the middle of the 1990s that resulted in 
widespread bank insolvencies. In order to tackle these problems and prevent further 
damage to the respective economies, governments stepped in to restructure their banking 
systems. Among all the rescue efforts, government-led mandatory M&As were regarded 
as efficient and least costly (Hawkins and Mihaljek, 2001) - either healthy banks were 
encouraged to take over ailing banks or small and medium-sized banks merged to form 
larger banks. For example, in Latin American countries such as Mexico after 1995, or 
Asian countries including South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia after 1998, 
governments all played a leading role in promoting domestic M&A activities (Hawkins 
and Mihalj ek, 2001). 
In addition, governments needed extra capital to recapitalise their troubled financial 
institutions in the aftermath of the aforementioned crises. Also better management skills, 
modem technologies, as well as access to international capital markets were considered 
necessary to improve performance and stability of banking sectors. Therefore, 
restrictions on the foreign ownership of domestic banks in various emerging markets 
were gradually relaxed, and in some cases, completely removed, leading to foreign 
acquisition in many emerging banking systems (Hawkins and Mihaljek, 2001). 
Banks from developed countries have also been attracted by the growth potential that 
emerging markets could offer. For instance, in 1999 the ratio of M3 (liquid liabilities) to 
GDP (a measure of financial depth and an indicator of the overall size of financial 
intermediary activities), was only 28% in Latin America, compared to 77% in the euro 
area and 71 % in the US (Sebastian and Hernansanz, 2000). Moreover, as far as 
profitability is concerned, intermediation margins are generally higher in emerging 
markets than those in developed countries. Claessens et al. (2001) compare the net 
interest income over total assets in different countries. They find that it was on average 
3 There is some evidence (e.g. Mueller, 1989) that suggests banks tend to conduct M&As when macroeconomic 
conditions are healthy in developed countries. 
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5.760/0 in Latin America (as high as 9.9% in Argentina and 6.6% in Brazil) between 1988 
and 1995, compared to only 2.80/0 for OECD countries during the same period. The 
relatively low value of banks in emerging markets also helped foreign banks penetrate 
into these markets quickly. Sebastian and Hernansanz (2000) note that it would cost US$ 
2285 million to acquire a 1 % share of German deposit market in 1999. The same share in 
Argentina and Mexico in the same year would cost only US$ 196 million and US$ 205 
million, respectively. Williams and Liao (2008) also suggest that Asian banks were sold 
to foreign acquirers during the restructuring and privatisation at relatively lower prices 
compared to Latin American banks. 
Needless to say, foreign banks' active involvement has to be understood in a broader 
context (Paula, 2003). In Europe, prior to the creation of Economic Monetary Union and 
the introduction of the euro in 1999, European banks foresaw the forthcoming 
competition and consolidation within the European Union4. Banks from Germany, Spain 
and the Netherlands expanded into Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia 
to seek more profits, diversify their risks, and overall enhance their competitiveness. At 
the same time, in contrast to their European counterparts, US banks did not expand 
overseas as rapidly. Although they had a longer history of doing business in some 
emerging markets, deregulation of the financial systems in the US actually motivated 
these banks to prioritise expansion in their own domestic markets rather than elsewhere. 
In Latin America, as an example, US banks have been mainly focusing on wealthy 
customers and pursuing an organic growth strategy (Paula, 2003). 
In 2005, in Central and Eastern Europe, foreign banks controlled over 50% of the 
banking systems in terms of total assets. In Latin America, this figure was about 38%. 
Asia, on the other hand, appeared to be at the early stage in terms of the openness to 
foreign competition, with less than 10% of the banking assets controlled by foreign 
investors (Berger, 2007; IMF, 2007). Nevertheless, while foreign investments in Central 
and Eastern European and Latin American banking sectors have started to slow downs, 
Asian emerging markets continue to attract foreign direct investment inflows to their 
4 Some researchers (e.g. Kregel, 2002; Berger et aI., 2001), however, observe that bank M&As within the EU have not 
occurred on a scale as large as formally expected recently due to barriers including distance, different languages, and 
regulatory structures and so on that still exist and offset. the ~otent.ial gains from consol~dation. 
5 In Central and Eastern Europe, financial sector foreIgn dIrect mvestment (FSFDI) mflows have generally slowed 
down recently and mainly targeted countries that have recently gained EU membership (such as Bulgaria and 
Romania). In Latin America, FSFDI suddenly dropped in 2002 after almost eight years of increase since the 1994 
Mexican crisis (Domanski, 2005). 
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banking sectors. In particular, China and India have gradually relaxed their foreign bank 
entry restrictions recently as part of these countries' commitments to accession of the 
WT06. 
Banks in Singapore and Hong Kong have expanded their business beyond their borders 
as well. Take the three largest Singaporean banking groups as an example (namely 
Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation, United Overseas Bank and the Development 
Bank of Singapore). Due to competitive home markets, and neighbouring countries (e.g. 
Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand) banks' inability to serve their own 
economies after the Asian crisis, these institutions have made major investments to 
acquire other banks in the region (Molnar, 2003). 
The experience of Brazil, the largest country in Latin America, is also an interesting case. 
In some ways, Brazil had similar experiences to other Latin American countries. After 
the 1995 banking crisis, the government changed legislation7 to allow foreign banks to 
take over problematic banks (e.g. Bamerindus was acquired by HSBC, and the Spanish 
bank BBVA acquired Economico). However, banking consolidation within the country 
has also been driven by government's privatization of state-owned banks8 and by the 
three largest domestic private banks' (Bradesco, Itau and Unibanco) efforts to acquire 
small and medium-sized private banks to compete in various parts of the country 
(Hawkins and Mihaljek, 2001). Other foreign take-over activities, in particular, Banco 
Santander Central Hispano's (BSCH) US$15 billion acquisition of Brazil's large 
state-owned bank Banespa in late 2000, have further intensified the consolidation 
process (Gelos and Rold6s, 2002). 
Given the widespread restructuring that has occurred in many emerging banking systems 
this chapter aims to contribute to the debate by studying the value effects of 84 banking 
M&A transactions on shareholders in twelve emerging markets (namely Argentina, 
6 While major policy barriers have been lifted, some restrictions still remain as both countries implement the 
opening-up of the banking sector in a phased manner .. ~or example, in India, before March ~0~9, foreign ban~s' 
acquisition of shareholdings was only permitted by IndIa s central ba~k - Reserve Ban~ o~ I~dIa m selected IndIan 
private sector banks. Acquisition of a controll\~g stake has to be phased m an?the overall IS limIted to 74 perc~nt (RBI, 
2005). In China, on the other hand, since 11 December, 2006, the authont.les have remov~d the. geographIcal and 
customer restriction of RMB business on foreign banks. However, they reqUlre three years (mcludmg two profitable 
years) waiting period for new foreign banks to obtain an RMB license (CBRC, 2007). 
7 Legislative Intent no. 311 of 23 rd August 1995 gave the President authority to permit foreign bank entry (Central 
Bank of Brazil). 
8 The programme of incentives for the rest~ct~rin.g of the State public financial system (PROES) was propose~ in 
A ust 1996. Under this programme, the pnvatlzatiOn was financed by federal government (Central Bank of BraZil). ug , 23 
Brazil. Chile, Columbia, Hong Kong9 , Indonesia, Malaysia, Peru, Singapore, South 
Korea. Thailand and the Philippines) between 1998 and 2005. It is thought to be an 
important issue for policy makers and market participants alike from emerging markets 
to help them evaluate various restructuring and consolidation progresses in the banking 
sector (Hawkins and Mihaljek, 2001). This chapter makes a contribution to the extant 
literature of M&As in three main respects. Firstly, to our knowledge, it is possibly the 
first study to examine both domestic as well cross-border banking M&As in major 
emerging markets. Secondly, as well as the traditional event study methodology using 
the OLS market model, an alternative methodology using the GARCH approach has also 
been used to study abnormal returns from bank M&A announcements. The underlying 
reason for using both methodologies is to examine whether the use of time-varying 
volatility imposed by the GARCH model yields different results compared to those 
obtained using the OLS market model. Finally, two sets of cumulative abnormal returns 
from different event studies are used separately as dependent variables to examine what 
drives the change of shareholders' value and indirectly test whether the determinants of 
abnormal returns resulted from M&A announcements differ according to the event study 
methodologies used. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides a literature 
review of both M&A studies in developed and emerging markets. Section 2.3 describes 
the data sample, outlines the methodologies and presents the results. Finally, Section 2.4 
is the conclusion. 
9 Hong Kong is a special administrative region of the People's Republic of China. 
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2.2 Motives of banking M&As - a brief survey 
There has been a substantial empirical literature that focuses on bank M&As and the bulk 
of this literature aims to examine the causes and consequences of the banking 
I'd . to conso 1 atlon process . Typically, causes of banking M&As are generally related to 
value maximising and non-value maximising motives (Berger et aI., 1999). 
2.2.1 Value maximising motives for bank M&As 
In terms of value maximising motives, those related to efficiency gains and market 
power considerations are the most often mentioned in the literature. 
• Operational efficiency gains 
Studies have suggested that operational efficiency gains or synergy is the most important 
value-creating motive for banking M&As (Berger et aI., 1999). One strand of literature 
examines efficiency improvements by comparing pre- and post -merger levels of 
accounting ratios or more complex frontier (cost or profit) efficiency measures. The 
evidence of operational efficiency gains induced by bank mergers in the US using these 
types of approaches is ambiguous during the 1980s and early 1990s (Berger et aI., 1999), 
but recent studies seem to suggest some efficiency gains can be found after M&As. For 
example, Kwan and Wilcox (2002) study bank mergers during the 1990s in the US and 
find evidence of cost improvements when taking specific accounting rules into account. 
Knapp et aI. (2006) also find significant profit gains up to five years after bank holding 
companies' mergers between 1987 and 1998. There is also evidence that focused deals in 
terms of the products merging banks offer or geography merging banks operate in tend to 
enhance banks' efficiency. Cornett et al. (2006) find revenue efficiency gains for these 
types of deals. Hannan and Pilloff (2006) find that cost efficient banks tend to acquire 
relatively inefficient banks, which suggests potential efficiency gains. Recent evidence 
from outside the US (mainly European countries) is also consistently positive. For 
instance, Huizinga et aI. (2001) study 53 European bank M&As. between 1994 and 1998 
and find cost and profit efficiency improvements. Various other studies on European 
banks also suggest that focused deals (Altunbas and Ibanez, 2007) or bank-to-bank M&A 
10 This topic has been documented in a number of review papers (e.g. Berger et ai., 1999; Pilloff and Santomero, 1997; 
Amel et al., 2004; Jones and Critchfield, 2005). 
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(Diaz and Azorfa, 2004) appear to out-perform other types of deals. 
Another strand of the literature uses event study methodology to measure 
bidders/targets/or the combined entities stock market reactions to M&A announcements 
(Berger et aI., 1999). The results from US studies in the 1990s mainly report negative 
returns for acquirers and combined entities (e.g. Amihud et aI., 2002; DeLong, 2001; and 
Pilloff and Santomero, 1997). The more recent US literature finds mixed results. For 
example, Olson and Pagano (2005) and DeLong and De Young (2007) find positive 
abnormal returns as a result of M&A announcements and the latter note that market 
reactions (as well as performance improvements) tend to be associated with the number 
of mergers that took place prior to the announcements, suggestive of spill-over effects. In 
contrast, Knapp et ai. (2005) find significant negative returns to shareholders. 
A number of recent event studies examining the shareholder wealth effects in European 
bank mergers generally show positive value creation. For example, Cybo-Ottone and 
Murgia (2000) document significant positive increases in both acquiring and acquired 
bank shareholder value in their analysis of 54 relatively large European bank mergers 
between 1989 and 1997. Beitel et ai. (2004) find that, although acquiring banks' 
cumulative abnormal returns are not significantly different from zero, the results for the 
combined entities are positive and significant. Schmautzer (2006) also finds that target 
shareholder gains outweigh acquirer's losses in the case of cross-border deals involving 
European, US and other banks, in particular when relatively cost efficient banks are 
acquired. Ekkayokkaya et ai. (2007) use an event study approach to examine bidder 
returns involving European bank M&A. They find that bank/non-bank deals result in 
positive abnormal returns and value enhancement was greater for pre-Euro (1999) 
transactions. 
In contrast to the majority of event studies abovementioned that use a market model to 
calculate expected returns, Frame and Lastrapes (1998) and Lepetit et ai. (2002) use a 
GARCH modelling framework to control for time-varying volatility and examine the 
value effects of bank M&As in the US and EU respectively. Overall, their findings 
suggest positive value creation in both markets in the 1990s. 
There appears to be a rather limited literature that focuses on the value effects of banking 
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M&A in emerging markets. For example, Harade (2005) utilizes a non-parametric 
frontier framework (Data Envelopment Analysis-DEA) to measure the productive 
efficiency of Korean banks, which took part in consolidation programmes after the 1997 
financial crisis. The results show that in general, mergers between domestic banks and 
foreign participation have improved the efficiency of the Korean banking sector. The 
DEA approach is also applied by Sufian (2004) to study the efficiency effects of bank 
M&As in Malaysia. The government's programme of consolidating its whole banking 
sector, including 54 banks pre-crisis, into only ten banking groups resulted in efficiency 
improvement for small and medium-size banks. Basu et al. (2004) find positive and 
significant efficiency improvement for M&A deals in Argentina between 1995 and 2000. 
In addition, they also find a reduction of insolvency risk. However, the results further 
show that while mergers and privatisation contribute to an increase in returns, bank 
acquisitions had a negative effect on performance. The possible explanation may be that, 
as noted by Basu et al. (2004), healthy banks were encouraged by the government to 
acquire non-viable banks that resulted in a decline in post-deal performance. Williams 
and Liao (2008) use an event study approach to analyse 74 cross-border M&A 
transactions between acquiring banks from developed countries and acquired banks in 
EME (emerging market economies) in Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America and 
Asia during 1998 and 2005. Overall, the main finding is that acquiring and acquired bank 
shareholders both earn positive abnormal returns upon the M&A announcements and 
acquired bank shareholders in the EME benefit more than those of acquiring banks. In 
contrast, Soussa and Wheeler (2006) find negative abnormal returns for acquiring bank 
shareholders from various developed markets when these banks bid for banks in 
emerging markets between 1990 and 2003. Finally, Crouzille et al. (2008) also apply a 
GARCH modelling framework to investigate the shareholder value effects of M&A 
announcements in South East Asia during 1993 and 2003. They find that M&A 
announcements tend to be associated with negative share returns during the financial 
crisis and in relatively less developed banking systems. 
• Market power considerations 
M&As can be a means for banks to increase their market power by taking over their rival 
banks' market share, therefore increasing local market concentration. The possible 
consequence of enhanced market power is price fixing (including interest rates and fees 
etc). On the one hand, this possibility of exerting market power to set prices may 
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encourage banks to consolidate in order to increase profits. On the other hand, such 
actions can raise policy concerns about the adverse effects that a concentrated market can 
bring about. In particular, households and small businesses, who normally do not rely on 
national or international markets, often find that a concentrated local banking market 
mean higher costs of funds and lower returns on deposits (Berger and Hannan, 1989 and 
1997). In general, however, the effects of market power on pricing are found to be quite 
small in the US (Berger and Hannan, 1997; Berger, 1995).The underlying reason may be 
that local markets have become more contestable recently, i.e. geographical barriers have 
been gradually removed due to deregulation and technology has empowered banks to 
offer products in a greater distance. As such it may be less likely for banks to increase 
market power in local markets (Berger et al., 1999). In addition, the refusal of the 
authorities to allow some major M&As that would have had an impact on local market 
competition may explain the limited effects being observed. In contrast, the findings of 
De Guevara et al. 's (2005) study of market power in EU banking (using the Lerner index) 
suggest that despite a consolidation process having taken place the market power of 
banks did not change. 
2.2.2 Non-value maximising motives for bank M&As 
Other bank M&A literature focuses on non-value maximising motives such as utility 
maximisation and exploiting safety net subsidies or systemic risk considerations. This 
literature focuses (as far as we can ascertain) solely on US and European bank M&A. 
• Utility maximising motives for bank M&As 
Banks engage in M&As because managers may wish to maximise their own utility at the 
expense of shareholders. Managers may wish to increase bank's size by merging if their 
pay and benefits are linked to bank growth, or if they can enjoy a 'quiet life' where banks 
have greater market power to resist any pressure forcing them to improve performance 
(Berger and Hannan, 1998). According to Roll's hubris hypothesis (1986, 1988), 
managers may be over-confident in their own ability and as such they overbid or overpay 
for targets, which leads to value destruction or no performance improvements. 
As far as we can ascertain, only studies on US bank M&As focus on these utility 
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maximising motives, for example, Bliss and Rosen (2001) find that there is a relationship 
between CEO remuneration increase and asset growth due to mergers (or internal growth) 
for a sample of 32 large (assets over US$1 billion) US banks between 1986 and 1995. 
Using a similar sample, Anderson et al. (2004) find that CEO post-merger compensation 
is positively associated with shareholders' value creation at the announcement date. 
Hughes et al. (2003) find that bank holding companies that have higher levels of 
managerial ownership tend to engage in performance destroying M&As. Hagendorff et 
al. (2007) also find results consistent with non-value maximization motives for US bank 
mergers in the 1980s and 1990s. 
• Safety net subsidies and systemic risk 
Banks may exploit safety net subsidies when they grow larger, irrespective of the 
performance implications, if they are viewed as 'Too-Big-To-Fail' (TBTF) (Kane, 2000; 
Stern and Feldman, 2004; Mishkin, 2006). Again, as far as we can ascertain, the only 
studies that examine TBTF subsidies relate to the consolidation process in the US. Some 
studies examine the existence of safety net subsidies of large banks. For example, Shull 
and Hanweck (2001) suggest that as the top 10 largest US banks paid less for funds than 
smaller banks and operated with lower capitalisation rates this may indicate implicit 
TBTF guarantees. Some other studies, on the other hand, gauge the merger premiums 
paid for mega-targets in M&A deals as an indicator of safety net subsidies. For example, 
Schmid and Walter (2006) find significant premiums paid in mega-conglomerate (over 
US$100 billion) deals. Brewer and Jagtiani (2007) also find higher premiums paid when 
targets are larger than a critical size. 
Another concern about the effects of consolidation is that it may increase systemic risk. 
Such risk occurs when a large financial institution become insolvent, other banks or 
financial firms may suffer financial losses or even insolvencies and in the end there may 
be system-wide panic and a macroeconomic disruption. De Nicolo and Kwast (2002) 
study a sample of large US banking institutions between 1988 and 1999 and find that 
there is an increase in the correlations of stock returns. However, they argue that 
systemic risk may have increased but not particularly as a result of the consolidation 
process. Regarding European banking, Uhde and Heimeshoff (2007) find that banking 
sector concentration levels lead to increased instability measured by the Z-score 
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indicator of risk II. although profitability is improved at the same time. Baele et al. (2007) 
study the franchise values of European banks between 1989 and 2004 and find that when 
banks diversify more into non-interest income business, banks' stock returns become 
more correlated with the market potentially suggesting a heightened systemic risk. 
In order to contribute to the extant bank M&A literature, in particular regarding emerging 
markets, we study the value effects of M&As in twelve emerging markets by using two 
event study approaches between 1998 and 2005 and also examine what factors explain 
the change of shareholders' value. 
11 ' vI'ewpoint the Z-score initially measures the probability of a bank going insolvent when the From an economiC , " h' h 
b mes lower than the value of debt. Hence, a higher (lower) Z-score Imphes a lower ( Ig er) value of assets eco , 
probability of insolvency risk (Laeven and Levme, 2006), 30 
2.3 Methodology, data and results 
2.3.1 Methodology 
In this section, the two event study methodologies used to analyse the stock market 
reactions to emerging market M&A announcements are studied. First a traditional event 
study methodology using the market model is described. Moreover, the potential 
problems related to the assumption of a constant beta are discussed. An alternative 
approach is then introduced that uses the GARCH modelling framework in order to 
capture time-varying volatility of beta. Finally, a cross-sectional regression model IS 
presented to examine the factors that may determine the shareholder value changes. 
2.3.1.1 Event study methodology using the market model 
The traditional event study methodology based on the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
market model is proposed and tested in several papers (e.g. Brown and Warner 1980, 
1985; Dodd and Warner 1983), and has been widely applied by researchers to examine 
the value effects of M&As in various industries. Beitel et al. (2004), for example, use the 
OLS market model event study approach to examine M&As in European banking. This 
study follows Beitel et al. 's methodology as follows 12: 
First of all, we choose an event window of 41 days in total 13 (20 trading days prior to 
and after the announcement date). Then an estimation period of 250 days is chosen14, 
which starts 30 trading days prior to the announcement date lS . Next, an OLS regression 
model is used as follows to explain how company share returns are dependent on share 
market returns based on the past 250 share trading days 16: 
12 The methodology applied by Beitel et ai. (2004) has few modifications compared to the original work by Brown and 
Warner (1980, 1985) and Dodd and Warner (1983). For example, the length of event window and estimation period is 
different. These changes, however, have been proven not to yield significantly different results as discussed later. 
13 Although almost all event studies show that CAR in the shorter event windows tend to be more significant than 
those in longer event windows, there is no clear-cut definition how long the event window should be to capture 
abnormal returns. In particular, the information leakage issue in these emerging markets remains ambiguous, it seems 
necessary to use an event window as wide as 41 days as suggested by Beitel et ai. (2004). 
14 Dodd and Warner (1983) use various estimation periods (from a minimum of 24 monthly returns to 48 monthly 
return data), and find that the general conclusions are unchanged. Brown and Warner (1985) further reduce the length 
of the period to 239 days and allow at least a minimum of 30 days returns within the period. They do not find that this 
measure reduces the possibility of detecting daily excess returns. Beitel et ai. (2004), however, use an estimation 
period of 250 days instead. 
15 Ten trading days gap between the event window and estimation period is expected to avoid any unusual returns 
caused by information leakage when esti~ating e.xpected returns (Beitel et aI., 2004). . . 
16 These estimated parameters are not adjusted m the presence of non-synchronous tradmg, which as suggested by 
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(1) 
where R jt is the firm's daily share j 's returns; R mt is the market returns 17. 
Secondly, for share j on day t (during the event or within the event window), the 
abnormal returns (AR) are obtained by subtracting the expected share returns R jt from 
the observed share returns R. . Jt • 
(2) 
where R jt is the observed returns including any dividend payments and other rights of 
share j on each day t within the event window; R jt is the expected returns of share 
j by applying market model parameters cx j and ~j from equation (1); R mt is the 
observed returns of the market for event day t. 
In this study, an event window T has 41 days in total (T = [-20,+20] where the event 
day is day 0). Within the event window, different sub-event windows e.g. [-1,+1] , 
[-20,0] etc. are also analysed to see the pattern of occurrences of cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR)18. 
For any event window[-t p +t 2 ], CAR is the sum of the sample means of AR: 
1 n 
CAR[tl:t2] = L -'LARjt 
[tl:t2] n j=1 
(3) 
We estimate the share reactions of targets and bidders separately. However, when two 
Scholes and Williams (1977) and Dimson (1979) may result in misspecification of event study methodologies when 
using daily data and the OLS market model. Brown and Warner (1985) in their paper show that the Scholes-Williams 
procedures and Dimson aggregated coefficients method, which have taken non-synchronous trading into account, 
produce similar results to the OLS market model. 
17 Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) do n~t find any signi.fic~nt differ~nces be~w~en using th,e market index and using a 
specific industry index such as banking mdex or financial !ndustIJ:' mde~, Slm~lar comparIsons have been conducted 
prior to the estimation in this paper a~d th~ results a~e consistent ~Ith their findl,ng, 
III The choice of sub-event windows IS arbitrary, which could be either symmetrIcal centred on the announcement date 
like [-1,+ I], or asymmetrical, in particular, solely focus on pre-announcement period plus announcement date like 
[-200] in order to capture possible effects of information leakage, 
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partners in a M&A transaction are both listed, we also estimate the effects on 
shareholders of both partners on a combined base as suggested by Houston and Ryngaert 
( 1994): 
AR - ARB,t·MVB,t +ARG,t·MVG,t 
C,t - MV B,t + MV G,t (4) 
The abnormal returns of a combined entity AR are the sum of bidder and target C,t 
abnormal returns AR B,I and ARG,I weighted by their own market capitalisation value 
MV B,t and MV G.t' which are observed on the day prior to the first day of the event 
window i.e. t = _2119. 
In our study, the statistical significance of both AR and CAR is tested by following the 
approach used by Beitel et aI. (2004) in order to see whether there are any significant 
shareholder value effects. For example, for N banks, AR of day 0, test statistic is given as 
below: 
1 N 
-IARiO 
N i=1 (5) 1 
l [ [ ( JJ 2]J ') 1 N 1 -51 -51 AR. ~ - I - I AR· - I 11 N i=1 249 1=-300 11 1=-300 250 
However, this standard event study methodology has been found not to take into account 
time-varying volatility of beta as the OLS market model assumes a constant beta 
according to equation (1). Consequently, the null hypothesis of no abnormal returns from 
the M&As may be rejected too often if betas are time-varying (see Fabozzi and Francis, 
1978; Bos and Newbold, 1984). In order to solve this problem, some researchers (Frame 
and Lastrapes, 1998; Lepetit et aI. 2002; Crouzille et aI., 2008) have applied the 
generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model (Bollerslev, 
1986), which accounts for conditional heteroscedasticity in the asset return series and 
allows the beta to be time varying. The next section, in turn, presents the second event 
19 Similar to share's value, acquirer's and target's market capitalisation might also be affected by the announcement of 
M&A during the event. That is why we choose the last day's market capitalisation before the event window. Therefore. 
it acts as a benchmark in order to reflect the share value change of the combined entity (Houston and Ryngaert, 1994). 
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study methodology using the GARCH model, which is also applied in this study to see if 
the results from the event study using the GARCH model differ from the ones from the 
traditional event study approach. 
34 
2.3.1.2 Event study methodology using the GARCH model 
The second event study methodology used by this study is mainly based on the one 
developed by Frame and Lastrapes (1998) for US banking M&As. Instead of regressing 
individual bank's share returns on market returns directly, which assumes a constant beta, 
a joint probability density function of bank's share returns and market returns is 
estimated as follows: 
(6) 
Zit is a vector containing bank's share return fit and market returns fmt on day t, 
which is conditional on past realisations of the process as follows: 
where 
I t-1 = (Zit-1 ,Zit-2, ... ~ ~t=(~itJ, and Ht=(hiit ~mt h1mt h imt J h mmt 
Then the process can be parameterised as follows: 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
where the elements of Zit i.e. bank's share return fit and market returns fmt are both 
ARC 1) processes defined by Equation (8) and (9) with a bivariate GARCH process 
(Equation (10) and (11) define conditional variance of fit andfmt' and Equation (12) 
defines conditional covariance) (Bollerslev, 1986). The likelihood function using the 
algorithm of Berndt, Hall, Hall and Hausman (1974) to be maximised to estimate the 
parameters of the joint density function is: 
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(13) 
By applying the parameters from the estimation, the abnormal returns (AR) on each day 
within the event window can be calculated as the difference between the realised return 
on that day and the expected returns conditional on the realised market returns at T +k 
and past realisation up to time T (see Appendix 2.1 for the details): 
The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are the sum of the AR: 
k 
CAR iT+k = LARiT+j 
j=l 
(14) 
(15) 
Finally, AR and CAR are standardised (SAR and SCAR) to control for heteroscedasticity 
across banks (also see Appendix 2.1 for details of the parameterisation): 
SAR - AR iT+k Tk-
1 + ~ var{AR iT +k IrmT +k ' IT ) 
(16) 
CAR"T k SCAR - 1 + Tk-
1 + ~Var{CARiT+klrmT+k' IT) 
(16') 
As Frame and Lastrapes (1998) stress in their paper, the market model imposes 
restrictions such as: ail = ami = 0; Cil = C ml = Ciml = 0; and C i2 = Cm2 = Cim2 = 0, which tend 
not to hold if the data present volatility clustering or excess kurtosis. This GARCH 
model, on the other hand, is able to control for these effects when estimating the impact 
of event like M&A announcements. 
Finally, the null hypothesis that AR have zero mean is tested, using the t-distribution as 
suggested by Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991): 
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(17) 
where Y T +k is the sample mean SAR or SCAR, N is the number of transactions in the 
sample. 
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2.3.1.3 Determinants of banking M&A abnormal returns 
Based on the two event study methodologies abovementioned, the banking M&A 
abnormal returns are estimated as CAR for acquirers, targets and combined entities using 
the traditional event study OLS market model, and as SCAR for acquirers and targets 
using the GARCH modelling approach. 
In order to examine what drives the shareholders' value creation measured by CAR or 
SCAR respectively in emerging markets banking M&As, a multivariate cross-sectional 
regression model is used as follows. 
CAR = <Xo + p\PROFj + P2GEOFj + P3RSIZj + P4EPSj 
+ P5 MB j + P6 CASH j + P7 RROE j + P8RCIRj + E 
or 
SCAR = <Xo + p\PROFj + P2GEOFj + P3RSIZ j + P4EPSj 
+ P5 MB j + P6CASH j + P7RROEj + P8RCIRj + E 
(18a) 
(18b) 
where CAR = CAR for targets, acquirers, or combined entities derived from the event 
study OLS market model; or SCAR = SCAR for the targets and the acquirers using the 
GARCH modelling approach; 
PROF - ratio of net interest income of the target to its total operating income; 
GEOF - dummy variable, that takes 1 if the deal is a domestic M&A and 0 if it is a 
cross-border M&A; 
RSIZ - ratio of the logarithm of target's asset size to the logarithm of acquirer's asset 
SIze; 
EPS - earnings per share; 
MB - ratio of bank's market capitalisation to its book value; 
CASH - ratio of the percentage of cash to shares; 
RROE - ratio of target's return on equity (ROE) divided by acquirer's ROE; 
RCIR - ratio between the target's cost-to-income ratio (CIR) and acquirer's CIR; 
• PROF and GEOF - Product / Geographic focus 
Evidence shows that focused or diversifying M&A transactions can influence the 
shareholder value of acquiring banks. For example, Cornett et al. (2000) find that 
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product focus has a significant and positive effect on the acquiring banks' value creation. 
Also in the US, intrastate banking M&As often result in positive share price reactions 
and acquiring banks' share prices tend to fall upon the announcement if they are bidding 
for a bank in another state (see Hawawini and Swary, 1990; Cornett and De, 1991, 
Cornett et aI., 2000). Furthermore, Houston and Ryngaert (1994 and 1997) find that a 
higher level of overlap of acquirer's and target's geographic span is positively associated 
with higher acquiring bank's returns. In a more comprehensive study that covers 280 US 
banking M&A transactions during the same period, DeLong (2001) uses a cluster 
analysis to classify banking M&A transactions as activity-focusing or 
activity-diversifying; and geography-focusing or geography-diversifying according to 
whether the locations of two banking firms' headquarters are in the same state or not. 
Only transactions that focus on both activity and geography create value while other 
types do not. 
In this study, two variables suggested by Beitel, et al. (2004), PROF and GEOF are 
designed to classify transactions as product or geography focusing. Acquiring firms (in 
our study) are all listed banks, targets, on the other hand, can be any type of financial 
service provider2o. As a consequence, we use the ratio of net interest income of the target 
to its total operating income to see whether the acquirer focuses on traditional core 
banking business when choosing M&A targets. In terms of geographic focus, a dummy 
variable, GEOF, that takes 1 if the deal is a domestic M&A and 0 if it is cross-border is 
applied. It is expected that product focusing and geography focusing transactions add 
value to acquirer's shareholders. 
• RSIZ - Relative size of the target 
Studies have found that the size of the target in relation to the acquiring bank has an 
impact on the returns, though the findings differ. James and Wier (1987) note that if the 
relative asset size of targets are larger then bidding banks enjoy higher returns. DeLong 
(2001) also finds this result in her study. While a negative relationship between the 
relative size of the target and the acquiring bank's value-creation has been found in other 
studies (Hawawini and Swary, 1990; Zollo and Leshchinkskii, 2000; Houston and 
Ryngaert, 1994, 1997). 
20 The classification of financial service providers is defined by Thomson One Banker. 
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To test whether the size of the target affects the returns to the acquirer, variable RSIZ, a 
ratio of the logarithm of target's asset size to the logarithm of acquirer's asset size is 
anal ysed. Although the findings from previous literature in developed markets are mixed, 
it is assumed that it may be easier to manage and integrate a small financial firm and 
therefore improve its performance more rapidly. 
• EPS and MB - Pre-merger share performance of the target 
According to Jensen and Ruback (1983), if a company's share performs poorly, it will be 
more likely to be taken over and the managers will be disciplined by being replaced by 
acquirer's managers. Hawawini and Swary (1990) find that banking M&As involving 
targets with poor share performance create more value than those with targets that have a 
better record of share performance. DeLong (2001) also finds a negative relationship 
between returns from the M&As and targets' share performance compared to their peer 
group prior to the M&As. 
Two variables that measure target's pre-merger share performance are utilised as 
suggested by Beitel et al. (2004). One is earning per share (EPS), and another is the ratio 
of its market capitalisation to book value (MB). A positive relationship between targets' 
returns and these two variables are expected. 
• CASH - Method of payment 
Myers and Majluf (1984) propose a hypothesis which posits that due to information 
asymmetry stock markets view the method of payment of a M&A transaction as 
signalling the acquiring firm share's true value, i.e. if the share is overvalued, managers 
would prefer to offer common stock; while if it is undervalued, cash payment would 
appear more reasonable. Consequently, acquiring firm's share price may decrease if a 
stock offer is announced as the method of payment. The opposite situation may be that 
acquiring firm shareholders gain from a positive reaction when managers offer cash to 
acquire targets. In contrast, Wansley et al. (1983) provide a different perspective on this 
issue. They suggest that as various methods of payment have different taxation 
implications, acquiring firm will have to pay more to compensate target's tax burden 
caused by the cash offer, which creates a tax obligation for target shareholders. The 
empirical findings, however, seem to support the first hypothesis as most studies find 
that banking M&As create more value if cash is the means of payment (e.g. Travlos, 
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1987: Amihud et al. 1990; Hawawini and Swary, 1990; Houston and Ryngaert, 1994; 
DeLong. 2001 etc). 
In our study, details about the method of payment of each transaction are collected from 
Thomson ONE Banker dataset (see 2.3.2 Data sample). Then the ratio of the percentage 
of cash (CASH) to shares is used to examine the impact on value creation. According to 
the majority of findings, a higher cash ratio is likely to be related to greater value 
creation. 
• RROE and RCIR - Efficiency potential of the target 
A substantial literature supports the view that acquiring banks tend to be more efficient 
than their targets (Berger et al. 1999). It is believed that there is a process whereby 
acquiring banks transfer their superior management to targets to enhance performance. 
Therefore, efficiency difference between acquirers and targets may explain value 
creation potential. 
Several studies have documented that acquiring banks also obtain greater returns if they 
are more profitable than target banks (Hawawini and Swary, 1990; Houston and 
Ryngaert, 1994). Similarly, if the acquiring banks are more cost efficient than the target, 
they will be better off after the transaction. Pilloff (1996) observes three components of 
total costs of both target and acquiring banks, namely, personnel costs, fixed asset 
expenses and total non-interest expenses, that may be most improved after M&As. 
Pilloff (1996) shows that more performance improvement is found when these costs are 
higher for targets prior to transactions taking place. 
Our study uses two variables to capture the target's efficiency potential as suggested by 
Beitel et al. (2004). The first one RROE is the ratio of target's return on equity (ROE) 
divided by acquirer's ROE, which measures potential profitability improvement. While 
the second, RCIR, measures the cost efficiency gap, which is the ratio between target's 
cost-to-income ratio (CIR) and acquirer's CIR21. The relative ROE of two banks is 
expected to be negatively related to acquirer's abnormal returns during the M&A. The 
cost efficiency difference, on the other hand, may influence value-creation in the 
opposite direct. 
21 The cost-to-income ratio measures the costs of running a bank or other type of financial firm except interest expense 
and provisions for loan losses, as percentage of income generated before provisions for loan losses. 
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2.3.2 Data sample 
This study identifies 84 banking M&A transactions in Asian and Latin American 
emerging markets between 1998 and 2005 (see Appendix 2.2 for details). The relatively 
small size of the sample is the result of relative underdevelopment of the stock markets in 
Asia and Latin America. A large number of M&A transactions during this period can not 
be studied using event study as they involved non-listed banks. Consequently, it is 
necessary to relax the sample selection criteria as used in studies of developed banking 
markets, such as minimum deal values, where acquirers take full control of targets or that 
both acquirers and targets are listed22 . We focus on deals where the acquirer in the 
transaction is a listed banking firm in Asian or Latin American emerging markets23, 
whereas the targets can be listed or unlisted and any type of financial service provider 
(FSP such as an insurance company, asset management firm, credit institution, brokerage 
or a bank24). 
Thomson ONE Banker is the major data source which provides M&A transaction details, 
listed banking firms' daily share returns, market capitalisation and general market index 
data25. Accounting data (i.e. balance sheet and profit and loss account data) of all the 
firms (listed and non-listed banking and other financial firms), on the other hand, were 
extracted from Bankscope. 
In the Asian sample, seven countries are chosen: Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines. Among the total 56 Asian M&A 
transactions, there are 19 deals where bidders and targets are both listed; 34 where only 
bidders are listed and three where only target banking firms are listed. In other words, as 
far as the listed acquiring banking firms in these transactions are concerned, 53 deals can 
be studied. On the other hand, for the listed acquired banking firms, there are a total of 22 
deals. The Latin American sample comprises 28 deals in five Latin American countries, 
22 Some studies require minimum deal value, for example, in Houston and Ryngaert's paper (1997) target banks must 
have at least US$100 million of assets; sample deal value must exceed US$400 million (Houston et aI., 2001) or 
US$100million (Beitel et aI., 2004 and Cybo-Ottone and Murgia, 2000). 
23 There are eight M&A deals in the sample where one part comes from developed markets. We, however, only study 
emerging market's banking firms' share reactions. . . . . . 
24 In countries such as Thailand, banks often acquired shares of non-financial service firms like manufactunng and 
real estate development firms. This sample excludes these M&A transactions and focuses on M&As within the 
financial service industry only. 
25 The market indices used in our study are as follows: Argentina's MERVAL, Brazil's BOVESPA, Chile's IOPA, 
Colombia's IOBC, Hong Kong's Heng Seng index, Indonesia's JSX Composite index, Korea's KOSPI, Malaysia's 
KLCI, the Philippines' PSE All Shares index, Singapore's Straits Times index, Thailand's SET index and NYSE index 
for a Peruvian bank listed in New York, US. 
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which include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, and Peru. Only three transactions 
have both listed partners in this sub-sample, 19 transactions for only acquirers that are 
listed and six where only target firms are listed. Consequently, 22 transactions can be 
used to analyse acquirers' shareholders value changes and 9 transactions for target firms. 
Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics of the total 84 transactions. In Panel A, it can be 
seen that, on average, transaction value in Asian markets were higher than in Latin 
America except for in 2000, 2002 and 2005. In 2001, transaction value reached a peak in 
both sub-samples, most noticeably US$2.58 billion in Asian markets. In terms of the 
number of transactions, 2000 was the busiest M&A year. It can be seen that our sample 
includes more domestic M&As than cross-border deals. Finally, transactions can be 
defined as deals between two banks or a bank with a FSP as suggested by Beitel et al. 
(2004). In every year and both sub-samples, more bank-bank M&A transactions were 
identified than bank-FSP deals. 
In Panel B, the sample is further decomposed by country. In Asia, three Singaporean 
banks (as active acquirers) conducted as many as 20 acquisitions. In addition, some large 
deals that resulted in the highest average value per transaction in 2001 were also carried 
out by these banks (see Appendix 2.2). In Latin America, Brazilian banks substantially 
engaged in M&A transactions, which outnumbered any other banks in the same region. 
However, according to Appendix 2, compared to Singaporean banks, three of the largest 
Brazilian private banks (Bradesco, Itau and Unibanco) mainly focused on their domestic 
market rather than other neighbouring banking systems. The reason may be that unlike 
the fairly competitive and concentrated Singaporean banking market the large Brazilian 
private sector banks were still encouraged by the government to consolidate within their 
national market. 
43 
Table 2.1: Summary statistics of banking M&A transactions In Asian and Latin 
American emerging markets 
Panel A. 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Mean value per deal in US$, mil. 
Asia .+59.90 304.64 414.96 2588.85 103.90 666.63 298.67 42.68 
Latin America 207.75 146.70 453.17 479.15 203.74 324.68 39.90 230.33 
Full sample 291.80 290.28 434.07 2061.43 153.82 529.85 278.76 105.23 
Number of transactions 
Asia 10 10 6 5 6 12 6 
Latin America 2 10 2 5 4 3 
Total 3 11 20 8 10 10 13 9 
Domestic M&As 
Asia 0 5 8 5 2 4 6 3 
Latin America 0 6 3 3 3 
Total 0 6 14 6 5 7 7 6 
Cross-border M&As 
Asia 5 2 3 2 6 3 
Latin America 2 0 4 2 0 0 
Total 3 5 6 2 5 3 6 3 
Bank-bank M&As 
Asia 8 7 4 3 7 4 
Latin America 2 9 2 5 4 1 1 
Total 3 9 16 6 6 7 8 5 
Bank-FSpa M&As 
Asia 0 2 3 2 4 3 5 2 
Latin America 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Total 0 2 4 2 4 3 5 4 
a Financial service provider other than a bank 
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Panel B. Banking M&As by country 
Hong Kong Indonesia Malaysia Singapore South Korea Thailand Philippines 
.-\cquirers 
-1. 16 20 6 2 5 
Targets 7 8 1-1. 6 6 7 7 
Total 11 9 30 26 12 9 12 
Argentina Brazil Chile Columbia Peru 
,-\cquirers 16 2 2 
Targets 6 1-1. 2 3 2 
Total 7 30 -1. 5 3 
:\ote: Two acquirers from Japan and I target bank from China were excluded from the Asian sub-sample. Similarly, in the Latin 
Amencan sample 6 acquiring banks from Spain, US and Bermuda and 1 Portuguese target bank were not studied in this study. 
Table 2.2 summarises the financial characteristics of acquiring and target firms in these 
banking M&A deals. First of all, acquirers are on average eight times larger than targets 
in terms of asset size. Acquirers (unsurprisingly) have higher equity than their targets. 
Secondly. acquirers' assets grew in the year prior to the transaction at about 19% whereas 
the average asset growth rate of targets was negative at -2.9%. Furthermore, while 
acquirers were on ayerage profitable, targets on average were suffering financial losses 
with a -3% return on equity (ROE). Finally, with regard to cost efficiency, the acquirers 
had a lower average cost-to-income (CIR) ratio of 50% compared to the target's 70%. 
The results of the comparison, which are consistent with studies in the US and Europe 
(for example. Amel et aI., 2004; Berger et aI., 1999; Claessens et aI., 2001), suggest that 
acquirers tend to acquire less efficient targets, which are regarded as having more 
significant opportunities for performance enhancement post M&A. (Poorly performing 
firms tend to be taken over as a means of disciplining their existing management 
according to Manne (1965)). It is also worth mentioning that, in general, banks and other 
FSPs in Asia were more efficient than their Latin American counterparts in the sample. 
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Table 2.2: Characteristics of banking M&A acquiring and target firms in Asia and Latin 
America 
Characteristics Acquirers Targets Ratio Target! Acquirer 
Total assets a in US$, millions: 
Whole sample mean (N=84) 60026.80 7359.09 12.26% 
Asian sample mean (N=56) 38150.80 8264.63 21.66% 
Latin American sample mean (N=28) 105461.58 5193.66 4.92% 
Total equity a in US$, millions: 
Whole sample mean (N=84) 3013.06 476.59 15.82% 
Asian sample mean (N=56) 3211.71 515.76 16.06% 
Latin American sample mean (N=28) 2555.30 396.81 15.53% 
Growth of total assets ~ 
Whole sample mean (N=84) 19.22% -2.89% -15.03% 
Asian sample mean (N=56) 20.84% 0.33% 1.57% 
Latin American sample mean (N=28) 16.03% -9.15% -57.08% 
Return on equity a(ROE): 
Whole sample mean (N=84) 9.60% -3.43% -35.77% 
Asian sample mean (N=56) 5.61% -2.40% -42.72% 
Latin American sample mean (N=28) 17.73% -5.40% -30.44% 
Cost-to-income ~CIR): 
Whole sample mean (N=84) 50.33% 70.07% 139.22% 
Asian sample mean (N=56) 44.17% 60.29% 136.50% 
Latin American sample mean (N=28) 62.00% 87.88% 141.75% 
a Per 31 st December of the year prior to the year of announcement 
b The estimation period is the year prior to the year of announcement 
The variables used in our analysis of the determinants of abnormal returns are 
summarised in Table 2.3. PROF and GEOF both measure the acquirer's (banking firms) 
focus in an M&A transaction. PROF examines whether the acquirer wants to focus 
on/diversify its traditional banking business measured by its target's net interest income 
to total operating income. Because targets in this sample are not only banking firms, on 
average, only about 30% of their income comes from interest based business. GEOF, on 
the other hand, distinguishes whether the deal focuses on the domestic or another 
emerging market. There are 52 domestic M&As whereas 32 deals are cross-border. As 
can be seen, the majority of deals in this sample are domestic. RSIZ indicates the relative 
size of the target to its acquirer. EPS and MB, however, are both used to examine the 
target's pre-merger share performance. The target firm has to be listed, so there are 31 
transactions analysed in this case. In this sample, target firms generally do not seem to 
have very successful performance history measured by these two ratios, in particular, the 
average EPS is 0.03. CASH indicates the method of payment in the transaction, in other 
words, the proportion of the deal financed by cash. As can be seen, over 80% of 
payments were paid by acquiring banks in cash. Finally, RROE and RCIR compare 
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target's profit and cost efficiency to acquirer's respectively. Not surprisingly, targets 
pre-merger ROE on average are negative, which leads to a negative mean value of RROE, 
their costs also almost 400/0 higher than acquirers' according to the variable ReIR. The 
two aforementioned variables (again) suggest that acquirers purchase poor performing 
banks and other FS Ps 
Table 2.3: Summary of the independent variables 
Definition of the variables Mean Median Maximum Minimum 
PROF: Target's net interest incomefTarget's total operating 
0.32 0.31 0.78 -0.68 
income a 
RSlZ: Logarithm of target's total assetslLogarithm of 
0.78 0.76 l.68 0.36 
acquirer's total assets a 
EPS: Target's earnings per share (EPS) a. 0.03 0.03 3.57 -3.47 
MB: Target's average market capfTarget's book value b, 1.34 1.33 3.86 -1.45 
CASH: Payment in cash in percentage 8l.53% 100% 100% 0.00% 
RROE: Target's ROFJ Acquirer's ROE a -1.54 0.74 6.50 -60.67 
RCIR: Target's CIRI Acquirer's CIR a l.39 1.16 4.61 0.31 
GEOF: Dummy variable: 
Number of Mean value per 
transactions deal US$ Mil. 
1 = domestic transaction 52 562.82 
0= cross-border transaction 32 343.12 
a Per 31 sl December of the year prior to the year of announcement 
b The estimation period starts from 51 days prior to the announcement date and goes back a further 250 days. 
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2.3.3 Results 
2.3.3.1 Standard event study results 
Tables 2.4 to 2.6 present the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) from the standard event 
study using the OLS market model for acquirers, targets, and combined entities relating 
to the banking M&A transactions in Asian and Latin American emerging markets 
between 1998 and 2005. 
The results show that, in general, acquirers' CAR's are slightly positive in most event 
windows, but insignificantly different from zero. Shareholders of targets, however, earn 
significantly positive CAR in some event windows prior to the announcement dates. 
Presumably, this might be caused by some information leakage. When both partners are 
listed, shareholders of the combined entities also tend not to lose value in four event 
windows out of a total of seven26, the evidence, however, is not statistically significant. 
Overall, the results suggest that banking M&A in Asia and Latin America during the 
eight year period under study may result in some wealth creation for target shareholders. 
More surprisingly, there is no wealth destruction for acquirers27. These results are neither 
consistent with the majority of US studies, which mainly report negative returns for 
acquirers and the combined entities in early 1990s bank M&A studies (e.g. Amihud et aI., 
2002; DeLong, 2001; and Pilloff and Santomero, 1997) or more positive returns in later 
periods (Olson and Pagano, 2005; DeLong and DeYoung, 2007); nor are they similar to 
some recent EU studies which find strong evidence of value creation for both acquirer 
and target shareholders (e.g. Cybo-Ottone and Murgia, 2000; Campa and Hernando, 
2005 and Beitel et aI., 2004). Williams and Liao (2008) also report higher returns to 
banks in EME markets when acquired by banks from developed countries. 
26 These four event windows are [-10, 0], [-1, 0], [-1, + I] an~ [-10, + 10]. , . . . 
27 It should be noted that the results from Latin America in thiS paper are likely dnven by BraZilian banks as Brazil has 
the largest sample in Latin America. 
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Table 2.4: Acquirers' CAR from an event study using market model 
E\ cnt Window CAR in % % positive t-test p-value 
Whole sample (N=75): 
[-20,0] 0.0050 53.33% 0.49 0.6251 
[-10,0] 0.0081 50.66% 1.10 0.2724 
[ -I ,0] 0.0037 54.67% 1.18 0.2397 
[ 0 ] 0.0019 53.33% 0.88 0.3810 
[-1,+1] 0.0035 57.33% 0.91 0.3636 
[-10, +10] 0.0039 56.00% 0.53 0.5968 
[-20, +20] 0.0000 52.00% 0.00 0.9981 
Asian sample (N=53): 
[-20,0] 0.0065 50.94% 0.54 0.5873 
[-10,0] 0.0069 44.23% 0.80 0.4271 
[ -I ,0] 0.0013 52.83% 0.35 0.7255 
[ 0 ] -0.0001 50.94% -0.03 0.9786 
[-1,+1] 0.0012 50.94% 0.26 0.7913 
[-10 , +10] 0.0066 54.71% 0.55 0.5824 
[-20, +20] 0.0085 54.71 % 0.51 0.6128 
Latin American Sample (N=22): 
[-20,0] 0.0013 59.09% 0.07 0.9472 
[-10,0] 0.0112 63.63% 0.81 0.4214 
[-1,0] 0.0095 59.09% 1.60 0.1104 
[ 0 ] 0.0068 59.09% 1.62 0.1055 
[-1,+1] 0.0090 68.18% 1.24 0.2164 
[-10, +10] -0.0027 59.09% -0.14 0.8884 
[-20,+20] -0.0206 45.45% -0.77 0.4446 
Note: This table shows the results from a standard event study that uses the OLS market model analysing banking M&A acquiring 
firms' cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) in 12 emerging markets. Total 75 acquirers' CAR results are shown in the first section 
followed by 53 acquirers' in Asian sub-sample and 22 acquirers' in Latin American sub-sample. Tests for significance are according 
to Brown and Warner (1980, 1985), and show whether CAR are significantly different from zero. 
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Table 2.5: Targets' CAR from an event study using market model 
Ewnt Window CAR in % a % positive t-test p-value 
Whole sample (N=31): 
[-20,0] 0.0593 ** 61.29% 2.25 0.0252 
[-10,0] 0.0451 ** 61.29% 2.37 0.0186 
[-1,0] 0.0116 70.97% 1.43 0.1543 
[ 0 ] 0.0139 ** 58.06% 2.42 0.0161 
[ -I , + I ] 0.0140 67.74% 1.41 0.1603 
[-10, +10] 0.0341 58.06% 1.30 0.1961 
[-20 . +20] 0.0316 54.83% 0.86 0.3910 
Asian sample (N=22): 
[-20,0] 0.0704 ** 59.09% 1.99 0.0476 
[-10,0] 0.0574 ** 63.63% 2.24 0.0258 
[-1,0] 0.0040 72.72% 0.37 0.7143 
[ 0 ] 0.0097 50.00% 1.26 0.2105 
[-1,+1] 0.0051 63.63% 0.38 0.7031 
[-10, +10] 0.0418 63.63% 1.18 0.2384 
[-20, +20] 0.0401 54.54% 0.81 0.4185 
Note: This table shows the results from a standard event study that uses the OLS market model analysing banking M&A target firms' 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) in 12 emerging markets. Total 31 targets' CAR results are shown in the first section followed by 
22 targets' in Asian sub-sample. Latin American targets' CAR results are not shown due to the small size of the sample (only 9 target 
firms). Tests for significance are according to Brown and Warner (1980, 1985), and show whether CAR are significantly different 
from zero. 
a *=signifIcant at the 10% level, **=significant at the 5% level. 
Table 2.6: Combined entities' CAR from an event study using market model 
Event Window CAR in % % positive t-test p-value 
Whole sample (N=22): 
[-20 , 0 ] -0.0056 50.00% -0.36 0.7198 
[-10,0] 0.0041 45.45% 0.36 0.7156 
[ -I ,0] 0.0003 63.63% 0.07 0.9471 
[0] -0.0001 45.45% -0.04 0.9685 
[ -1 ,+1 ] 0.0012 50.00% 0.20 0.8410 
[-10, +10] 0.0072 45.45% 0.46 0.6433 
[-20, +20] -0.0350 31.82% -1.61 0.1076 
Note: This table shows the results from a standard event study that uses the OLS market model analysing cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) of the combined entities when the acquirer and the target in a transaction are both listed. Total 22 transac~io~s.' CAR 
results are shown. Tests for signiflcance are according to Brown and Warner (1980, 1985), and show whether CAR are sIgmfIcantly 
different from zero. 
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2.3.3.2 Event study using the GARCH model results 
Before we use the GARCH model to estimate abnormal returns, it is necessary to 
conduct a two-step LM test to diagnose whether the time series our sample (each firm's 
returns and market index's returns) present any conditional heteroscedasticity (the details 
of the LM test are illustrated in the Appendix 2.3). We find that in a total of 212 time 
series 41.04% reject the null hypothesis at the 5% significance level implying that 
GARCH effects are present, which, therefore, suggests that the GARCH modelling 
framework seems appropriate to reflect these effects when calculating abnormal returns 
during M&A events. 
Table 2.7 and 2.8 report standardised cumulative abnormal returns (SCAR) from event 
studies using the GARCH model for acquirers and targets respectively for banking M&A 
transactions in Asian and Latin American emerging markets between 1998 and 2005. 
According to Table 2.7, SCAR remains negative in most of the event windows, but still is 
insignificantly different from zero with the exception of significant losses of Latin 
American acquirers for the event window [-20, +20]. 
As far as the targets from these emerging markets are concerned, the results from the 
event study using the GARCH model also show that shareholder value benefits from the 
announcement of the M&A as shown in Table 2.8. In particular, in the narrower event 
windows (lldays, 6 days, and 1 day), SCAR are positive and significantly different from 
zero. Furthermore, comparatively, the absolute values of the SCAR are higher than the 
CAR reported in Table 2.528 . 
28 In the standard event study, each share's AR are standardised by being divided by the standard deviation of its return 
d . the estimated period, before being averaged to calculate the sample's AR. In the GARCH model event study, UrIng .. f h h I I I h er all shares' AR are averaged first then divided by the standard deviatIOn 0 t e woe samp e past returns. n a s:~~~ CAR from the standard methodology are also standardised, therefore, it is possible to compare SCAR with CAR 
directly. 
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Table 2.7: Acquirers' SCAR from an event study using the GARCH model 
Event Window SCAR in % a % positive t-test p-value 
Whole sample (N=75): 
[-20,0] 
-0.0297 46.67% -0.71 0.4778 
[-5 , 0 ] 0.0074 49.33% 0.23 0.8221 
[0 ] 0.0261 53.33% 0.49 0.6277 
[ -5 , +5 ] 
-0.0059 48.00% -0.16 0.8745 
[-20, +20] 
-0.0499 44.00% -0.98 0.3326 
Asian sample (N=53): 
[-20,0] 
-0.0051 50.94% -0.09 0.9247 
[-5 , 0 ] 
-0.0091 45.28% -0.25 0.8042 
[ 0 ] 
-0.0039 52.83% -0.06 0.9498 
[ -5 , +5 ] 
-0.0059 49.06% -0.14 0.8907 
[-20, +20] 
-0.0027 49.06% -0.04 0.9667 
Latin American Sample 
(N=22): 
[-20,0] -0.0890 36.36% -1.50 0.1490 
[-5 ,0] 0.0470 59.09% 0.68 0.5046 
[ 0 ] 0.0985 54.55% 0.91 0.3729 
[ -5 , +5 ] -0.0060 45.45% -0.08 0.9387 
[-20, +20] -0.1636 * 31.82% -2.04 0.0542 
Note: This table shows the results from an event study that uses the GARCH model to analyse banking M&A acquiring firms' 
standardised cumulative abnormal returns (SCAR) in 12 emerging markets. Total 75 acquirers' SCAR results are shown in the first 
section followed by 53 acquirers' in Asian sub-sample and 22 acquirers' in Latin American sub-sample. Tests for significance are 
according to Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991), to show whether SCAR are significantly different from zero 
a *=significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 2.8: Targets' SCAR from an event study using the GARCH model 
E\'ent Window SCAR in % a % positive t -test p-value 
Whole sample (N=31 ): 
[-20,0] 0.1217 58.06% 1.19 0.2435 
[-5 , 0 ] 0.2265 ** 70.97% 2.29 0.0291 
[ 0 ] 0.3116 ** 61.29% 2.37 0.0241 
[ -5 ,+5 ] 0.2050 ** 67.74% 2.74 0.0102 
[-20 . +20] 0.0122 51.61 % 0.11 0.9114 
Asian sample (N=22): 
[-20,0] 0.1217 58.06% 1.19 0.2435 
[-5 , 0 ] 0.1993 63.64% 1.54 0.1376 
[ 0 ] 0.1663 ** 54.55% 2.37 0.0273 
[ -5 , +5 ] 0.2018 * 63.64% 2.03 0.0554 
[-20, +20] 0.0122 51.61 % 0.11 0.9114 
Note: This table shows the results from an event study that uses the GARCH model analysing banking M&A target firms' 
standardised cumulative abnormal returns (SCAR) in 12 emerging markets. Total 31 targets' SCAR results are shown in the first 
section followed by 22 targets' in Asian sub-sample. Latin American targets' SCAR results are not shown due to the small size of the 
sample (only 9 target firms). Tests for significance are according to Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991), to show whether SCAR 
are significantly different from zero. 
a *=significant at the 10% level, **=significant at the 5% level. 
The SCAR from the event study using the GARCH approach do seem to offer some 
interesting insights. There are more negative SCAR's for the acquirers and slightly more 
significant SCAR's for the targets, which presumably is due to fact that the volatility of 
past asset returns are taken into account in the modelling framework. Nevertheless, the 
results in terms of wealth creation are broadly in line with the OLS market model 
results29 . 
29The GARCH modelling framework also suffers from some drawbacks, for example, it doesn't offer a solution to 
measuring cumulative abnormal returns of the combined entities and it is not as flexible as the .stand~d met?odology 
h choosing various event windows. In the standard event study, once the whole event WIndow IS deCIded, any wb~n t windows can be chosen within this event window (41 days in this paper). According to the GARCH 
su even . . d"d II -I' h I (-I' d II' g framework, however, each event window has to be tested each tIme In IVI ua y lor t e samp e lor 
mo e lIn when the event window is [-20, +20], k=41, [-5, +5], on the other hand, implies k=ll, they will be two 
examp e, . I' . f h I I . 
separate estimation processes), which will inevitably Increase the comp Ication 0 t e ca cu ations. 
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2.3.3.3 Determinants of banking M&A abnormal returns - a cross-sectional 
regression model analysis 
In this section, we use regression analysis to examine the determinants of banking M&A 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and standardized cumulative abnormal returns 
(SCAR) using the model outlined in equation (18). We, however, use different sets of 
variables when analysing the determinants of M&A value creation of acquirers and 
targets in order to reflect each side's different motives in a M&A transaction (e.g. product 
focus of a deal seems more relevant to acquirers' shareholders rather than targets') and 
we also focus more on the acquirers' results as acquiring banks are relatively larger and 
therefore their value creation process may have a greater impact on shareholders of 
combined entities post-merger. 
Table 2.9 shows the results of seven regressions. The dependent variables are acquirers' 
CAR from seven event windows previously estimated using the OLS market model. As 
can be seen, two independent variables (PROF and GEOF) that measure whether the 
acquirer focuses on/diversifies its traditional banking business or markets geographically 
appear to be insignificantly related to the shareholder value change. The relative size of 
the target (RSIZ), however, exerts some significantly positive influence, in particular 
when using the CAR[-I, +1] event window as the dependent variable. In other words, 
acquiring banks gain higher returns if the target is larger compared to acquirers. This 
finding is consistent with James and Wier (1987) and DeLong (2001). The variable that 
measures the impact of method of payment on the value of acquirers (CASH) also 
appears to be positive and significant. Therefore, cash payment is more favoured by 
acquiring banks' shareholders in Asian and Latin American markets. This is in line with 
most developed markets' experiences (e.g. Travlos, 1987; Amihud et al. 1990; Hawawini 
and Swary, 1990; Houston and Ryngaert, 1994; DeLong, 2001 etc). Finally, two 
variables (RROE and RCIR) are used to indicate the extent to which the target's 
efficiency influences the value creation process, as far as the acquiring banks are 
concerned. Contrary to findings from developed markets (e.g. Hawawini and Swary, 
1990; Houston and Ryngaert, 1994; Pilloff, 1996), acquiring banks in Asian and Latin 
American markets tend to gain abnormal returns if the targets are relatively more 
profitable measured by RROE or more cost efficient measured by RCIR. As a result, this 
finding may cast some doubts over the variability of some transactions in emerging 
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Inarkets, of which acquirers were encouraged by the authorities to take over poorly 
performing targets. 
Tables 2.10a and 2.10b both focus on targets' CAR estimated using the standard OLS 
model event studies. Earning per share (EPS) is shown to be positively related to target 
firms' pre-merger share performance. Moreover, EPS seems to have more explanatory 
power compared to the ratio of the market capitalization to book value (MB) given the 
relatively higher t-values. The relative size of the target to acquirer has a positive and 
significant influence over targets' CAR. Therefore, when a banking M&A transaction 
involving a relatively large target, both acquiring and target firms tend to gain positive 
abnormal returns during the announcement period. Other independent variables, 
however, do not yield any statistically important results. 
We then repeat the above approach by using the SCAR of acquirers and targets estimated 
by the GARCH model event studies as dependent variables while the independent 
variables remain the same. Table 2.11 shows the results when acquirers' SCAR from five 
event windows are used as the dependent variables. As can be seen, cross-border 
transactions measured by a dummy variable (GEOF) seem to create more value for 
acquirers' shareholders. The product focus variable (PROF), on the other hand, appears 
insignificant. The significant and positive explanatory power of the relative size of the 
target (RSIZ), however, disappears in these estimations. Moreover, the method of 
payment variable (CASH) shows more inconsistency compared to our previous results. 
In four out of five event windows (namely, SCAR[ -20, 0], SCAR[ -5, 0], SCAR[O], and 
SCAR[ -20, +20]), CASH appears to be significantly negative, which suggests that share 
offerings are more favourable for acquiring banks and in turn may support the taxation 
explanations detailed by Wansley et al. (1983). 
Finally, Tables 2.12a and 2.12b report results where EPS (earning per share) and MB 
(market to book ratio) separately along with other three variables are included in our two 
regression models with SCAR estimated from the GARCH model as the dependent 
variables. The results show that the relative size of target (RSIZ) is significantly positive 
which suggests that a relatively large target tends to bring abnormal returns to targets' 
shareholders, and also EPS is positively and significantly related to SCAR which 
suggests that a good share performance will create greater abnormal returns for targets. 
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Comparing the two sets of results (CAR or SCAR as dependent variables), there are 
mixed results. As far as the acquiring banks are concerned, when using CAR as the 
dependent variable, the focus/diversification of a deal does not make an impact on 
shareholders' value; cash payment is a preferred payment method and acquirers tend to 
gain if they are comparatively more profitable and efficient compared to their targets. On 
the other hand, when using SCAR as the dependent variable, geographically diversified 
transactions (i.e. cross-border M&As in our study) and share purchase appears to bring 
greater abnormal returns to acquirers' shareholders. In terms of the targets' shareholders' 
value, there are greater abnormal returns if targets are relatively larger compared to their 
acquirers when using either CAR or SCAR as the dependent variables. However, there is 
evidence when using SCAR as the dependent variable that if the targets' pre-merger 
share performance is relatively good, the targets' shareholders gain greater returns as a 
consequence of M&As. Overall, therefore, these findings suggest that while different 
event study methodologies tend to yield the same general results in terms of shareholder 
value creation they differ in explaining its determinants. 
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Table 2.9: Cross-sectional regressions (N=75) using acguirers' CAR from the OLS model event studies as de.Qendent variables 
Dependent variables: CAR[-20,0] CAR[-IO,O] CAR[-I,O] CARr 01 CAR[-I,+I] CAR[ -10,+ 10] CAR[-20,+20] 
PROF Product focus -0.07436 -0.04935 0.00593 0.00306 0.00025 -0.02691 -0.05144 
(-1.75) (-1.44 ) (0.35) (0.22) (0.0 I) ( -0.62) ( -0.84) 
GEOF Dummy: I-Domestic -0.02362 -0.00871 0.00245 -0.00101 0.00422 0.00506 -0.01720 
O-Cross border (-1.47) (-0.67) (0.38) (-0.19) (0.48) (0.31 ) ( -0.74) 
RSIZ Relative asset size -0.02125 0.01766 0.02026 -0.00459 0.03772 0.02983 0.01727 
(-0.56) (0.58) (1.33 ) ( -0.37) (1.83 )* (0.78) (0.32) 
CASH Cash ratio 0.04630 0.03933 0.00603 0.00235 0.00969 0.02238 0.04161 
(2.08)** (2.19)** (0.67) (0.32) (0.80) (0.99) ( 1.29) 
RROE Relative ROE 0.00221 0.00106 0.00050 0.00000 0.00056 0.00165 0.00431 
(2.50)** (1.48) ( 1.39) (0.00) (l.l6) ( 1.83) (3.37)** 
RCIR Relative CIR -0.00535 -0.01632 -0.00189 -0.00051 -0.00016 -0.00499 -0.00505 
( -0.55) (-2.06)** ( -0.48) ( -0.16) (-0.03) (-0.50) (-0.36) 
Constant 0.03370 0.00735 -0.01749 0.00395 -0.03590 -0.02358 -0.00730 
R-sq (adjusted) 13.40% 6.90% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 11.60% 
F-value 2.91 ** -1.92* 0.84 0.09 0.79 0.77 2.63** 
Note: This table shows the results from seven cross-sectional regressions. The dependent variables are acquiring firms' seven cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) previously estimated from the standard OLS market model 
event studies. Six independent variables, on the other hand, are used to indicate what factors that may explain acquiring firms' share value creation. 
t-values in parentheses; *=significant at the 10% level, **=significant at the 5% level 
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Table 2.10a: Cross-sectional regressions (N=31) using targets' CAR from the OLS model event studies as dependent variables 
Dependent variables: CAR[ -20,0] CAR[ -10,0] CAR[ -1,0] CAR[ 0 ] CAR[ -1,+ I] CAR[ -10,+ 10] CAR[ -20,+20] 
GEOF 
CASH 
RSIZ 
EPS 
Constant 
Dummy: I-Domestic 
O-Cross border 
Cash ratio 
Relative asset size 
Earning per share 
R-sq (adjusted) 
F-value 
0.05989 
(0.86) 
0.11832 
( 1.34) 
0.07100 
(0.56) 
0.05594 
( 1.29) 
-0.11640 
0.00% 
0.86 
0.08880 0.00526 
( 1.57) (0.27) 
0.09933 0.00260 
( 1.39) (0.10) 
0.06610 0.08229 
(0.65) (2.31 )** 
0.05609 0.00551 
( 1.59) (0.45) 
-0.12280 -0.05849 
6.10% 8.90% 
1.49 1.73 
-0.01037 -0.00050 0.03735 0.01861 
(-0.73) (-0.02) (0.66) (0.19) 
0.00595 0.00794 0.05678 0.04990 
(0.33 ) (0.21 ) (0.80) (0.41 ) 
0.07740 0.12386 0.06670 0.09770 
(3.00)** (2.33)** (0.65) (0.56) 
0.00541 0.02431 0.03603 0.04942 
(0.61) (1.33) (1.03 ) (0.83) 
-0.04848 -0.08966 -0.07906 -0.09160 
15.30% 9.20% 0.00% 0.00% 
2.35* 1.76 0.54 0.25 
Note: This table shows the results from seven cross-sectional OLS regressions. The dependent variables are target firms' seven cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) previously estimated from the standard OLS market model 
event studies. Four independent variables, on the other hand, are used to indicate what factors that may explain target firms' share value creation. Earning per share (EPS) as one of the independent variables is estimated in this 
table to explain whether target ftrms' pre-merger share performance may contribute to positive CAR. Another alternative variable, the ratio of market capitalization to book value (MB), is estimated instead in Table 2.1 Ob. 
t-values in parentheses; *=significant at the 10% level, **=signiftcant at the 5% level 
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Table 2.10b: Cross-sectional regressions (N=31) using targets' CAR from the OLS model event studies as deEendent variables 
Dependent variables: CAR[-20,0] CAR[-IO,O] CAR[-I,O] CAR[ 0] CAR[-I,+I] CAR[-IO,+IO] CAR[-20,+20] 
GEOF Dummy: I-Domestic 0.06763 0.09397 0.00545 -0.01082 0.00307 0.02980 0.00940 
O-Cross border (0.91 ) ( 1.54) (0.27) (-0.72) (0.10) (0.50) (0.09) 
CASH Cash ratio 0.10825 0.08670 0.00104 0.00380 0.00376 0.03804 0.02530 
(1.20) ( I.l7) (0.04) (0.21 ) (0.10) (0.52) (0.21) 
RSIZ Relative asset size 0.01010 0.01060 0.07751 0.07407 0.09695 0.05440 0.07840 
(0.07) (0.09) (2.05)** (2.70)** ( 1.69) (0.49) (0.42) 
MB Market value/Book value 0.03860 0.03301 0.00255 0.00111 0.01722 -0.00264 -0.00117 
(0.79) (0.82) (0.19) (0.11 ) (0.84) (-0.07) ( -0.02) 
Constant -0.12650 -0.12560 -0.05786 -0.04605 -0.09460 -0.05000 -0.05490 
R-sq (adjusted) 0.00% 0.00% 8.30% 14.10% 5.60% 0.00% 0.00% 
F-value 0.59 0.79 1.68 2.23* 1.45 0.26 0.08 
Note: This table shows the results from seven cross-sectional OLS regressions. The dependent variables are target firms' seven cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) previously estimated from the standard OLS market model 
event studies. Four independent variables, on the other hand, are used to indicate what factors that may explain target firms' share value creation. The ratio of market capitalization to book value (MB) as one of the independent 
variables is estimated in this table to explain whether target finns' pre-merger share performance may contribute to positive CAR. Another alternative variable, Earning per share (EPS), is estimated instead in Table 2. lOa. 
t-values in parentheses; *=significant at the 10% level, **=significant at the 5% level 
59 
Table 2.11: Cross-sectional regressions (N=75) using acguirers' SCAR from the GARCH model event studies as de2endent variables 
Dependent variables: SCAR[ -20,0] SCAR[-5,0] SCAR[ 0] SCAR[-5,+5] SCAR[-20,+20] 
PROF Product focus 0.32300 0.07480 0.05700 0.05620 0.31520 
(lAO) (0.39) (0.18) (0.25) ( 1.08) 
GEOF Dummy: I-Domestic -0.19467 -0.05704 -0.09680 -0.10879 -0.25050 
O-Cross border (-2.22)** (-0.79) (-0.82) (- 1.28) ( -2.27)** 
RSIZ Relative asset size 0.31110 0.01270 0.15050 0.11350 0.28210 
( 1.52) (0.08) (0.54) (0.57) ( 1.09) 
CASH Cash ratio -0.32600 -0.23705 -0.29700 -0.10810 -0.3 I 350 
(-2.69)** (-2.38)** (-1.81)* (-0.92) ( -2.05)** 
RROE Relative ROE -0.00051 -0.00423 -0.00777 -0.00081 0.00156 
(-0.10) ( -1.07) (-1.19) (-0.17) (0.26) 
RCIR Relative CIR -0.00507 -0.01176 -0.10515 0.00899 0.04627 
(-0.10) (-0.27) (- 1.46) (0.17) (0.69) 
Constant 0.02450 0.21600 -0.01380 0.03510 -0.00999 
R-sq (adjusted) 10.50% 2.10% 1.50% 0.00% 5.65% 
F-value 2044** 1.26 1.19 0043 1.74 
Note: This table shows the results from five cross-sectional regressions. The dependent variables are acquiring firms' five standardised cumulative abnormal returns (SCAR) previously estimated from the GARCH model 
event studies. Six independent variables, on the other hand, are used to indicate what factors that may explain acquiring firms' share value creation. 
t-values in parentheses; *=significant at the 10% level, **=significant at the 5% level 
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Table 2.12a: Cross-sectional regressions (N=31) using targets' SCAR from the GARCH model event studies as dependent variables 
Dependent variables: SCAR[ -20,0] SCAR[-5,0] SCAR[ 0] SCAR[-5,+5] SCAR[-20,+20] 
GEOF Dummy: I-Domestic -0.04340 -0.02730 -0.36860 -0.18700 -0.19820 
O-Cross border (-0.18) (-0.12) (-1.21 ) (-1.11) (-0.77) 
CASH Cash ratio 0.19310 -0.03740 0.13230 -0.09990 -0.10530 
(0.63) (-0.13 ) (0.34) (-0.47) (-0.32) 
RSIZ Relative asset size 0.49970 0.94230 1.13770 0.79250 0.43920 
(1.l4) (2.32)** (2.05)** (2.60)** (0.95) 
EPS Earning per share 0.26150 0.16570 0.06920 0.09580 0.28590 
( 1.73)* (1.19) (0.36) (0.91) ( 1.79)* 
Constant 
-0.39680 -0.47190 -0.55360 -0.26070 -0.13980 
R-sq (adjusted) 0.00% 8.50% 3.10% 9.70% 1.50% 
F-value 0.98 1.70 1.24 1.81 1.12 
Note: This table shows the results from five cross-sectional regressions. The dependent variables are target firms' five standardised cumulative abnormal returns (SCAR) previously estimated from the GARCH model event 
studies. Four independent variables, on the other hand, are used to indicate what factors that may explain target firms' share value creation. Earning per share (EPS) as one of the independent variables is estimated in this table 
to explain whether target firms' pre-merger share performance may contribute to positive SCAR. Another alternative variable, the ratio of market capitalization to book value (MB), is estimated instead in Table 2.12b. 
t-values in parentheses; *=significant at the 10% level, **=significant at the 5% level 
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Table 2.12b: Cross-sectional regressions (N=31) using targets' SCAR from the GARCH model event studies as dependent variables 
Dependent variables: SCAR[-20,0] SCAR[-5,0] SCAR[ 0] SCAR[-5,+5] SCAR[-20,+20] 
GEOF Dummy: I-Domestic -0.08750 -0.00980 -0.39980 -0.20810 -0.28890 
O-Cross border ( -0.33) (-0.04) (-1.25) (-I .17) (-1.02) 
CASH Cash ratio 0.06760 -0.07250 0.08010 -0.15080 -0.28400 
(0.21 ) (-0.25) (0.21 ) ( -0.70) (-0.83) 
RSlZ Relative asset size 0.38680 0.77350 I.I4970 0.76180 0.40700 
(0.79) ( 1.77)* (1.96)* (2.33)** (0.79) 
MB Market value/Book value 0.00450 0.10240 -0.04160 -0.00930 -0.08850 
(0.03) (0.66) ( -0.20) ( -0.08) ( -0.48) 
Constant -0.21660 -0.48630 -0.45070 -0.18060 0.17780 
R-sq (adjusted) 0.00% 5.10% 2.80% 6.80% 0.00% 
F-value 0.21 1.41 1.21 1.55 0.34 
Note: This table shows the results from five cross-sectional OLS regressions. The dependent variables are target firms' five standardised cumulative abnormal returns (SCAR) previously estimated from the GARCH model 
event studies. Four independent variables, on the other hand, are used to indicate what factors that may explain target firms' share value creation. The ratio of market capitalization to book value (MB) as one of the independent 
variables is estimated in this table to explain whether target firms' pre-merger share performance may contribute to positive SCAR. Another alternative variable, Earning per share (EPS), is estimated instead in Table 2. 12a. 
t-values in parentheses; *=significant at the 10% level, **=significant at the 5% level 
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2.4 Conclusions 
A substantial number of banking M&As in emerging markets have taken place since the 
mid-1990s triggered by factors like financial turbulence, the active involvement of banks 
from developed markets as well as the expansion of institutions from various mature 
emerging economies like Singapore and Hong Kong. In order to investigate the 
shareholder wealth effects of such a trend, this study uses a sample of 84 banking M&A 
transactions from seven Asian and five Latin American emerging markets between 1998 
and 2005. We first apply a standard event study methodology using the OLS market 
model to measure value changes upon the announcement of banking M&As. We find 
little evidence that acquiring banks lose value, whereas targets' shareholders can earn 
significant abnormal returns from the announcement of a deal. In order to relax the 
restrictions of a constant beta, we repeat the event study using a GARCH modelling 
approach. In general, although there are more negative SCAR for the acquirers and 
slightly more significant SCAR for the targets compared to the CAR from the OLS 
market model event study, the results from using the GARCH methodology are generally 
similar. 
Following the event study analysis, we use a regressIon approach to explain the 
determinants of abnormal returns captured by CAR from the 0 LS market model event 
study or SCAR from the GARCH model event study. If CAR from the OLS model event 
studies are used as dependent variables, it is found that if a transaction involves a 
relatively large target more value will be created for both acquirer and target 
shareholders. Like their developed markets counterparts, cash payment is regarded as 
favourable by acquirers' shareholders. Also acquirers tend to gain greater returns if they 
acquire more efficient targets in emerging markets. On the other hand, the model that 
examines the determinants of SCAR derived from the GARCH model event study 
suggests that acquirers' shareholders prefer not only cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions, but also share offers as a payment method. Moreover, the relative size and 
pre-merger efficiency of targets have a significant influence on shareholders' returns. 
Overall, whether the time-varying volatility of betas is taken into account or not when we 
examine the value effects of banking M&As, the results are broadly the same - there is 
some evidence of value creation for target shareholders whereas acquirers experience no 
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loss in value. However, when the two types of abnormal returns (those derived from the 
OLS event study and those obtained from the GARCH modelling framework) are used as 
the dependent variables to examine the factors explaining wealth effects, the results yield 
inconsistent findings. Generally, this suggests that the event study methodology chosen 
can significantly influence factors that determine value creation in bank M&As. As such, 
we recommend that future studies that examine the determinants of shareholder value 
creation resulting from bank M&As should use GARCH or similar modelling 
frameworks to cross-check the robustness / consistency of their findings. 
64 
CHAPTER THREE: The Impact of Foreign Entry on 
Competition: New Evidence from Emerging Banking Systems 
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The Impact of Foreign Entry on Competition: New Evidence from 
Emerging Banking Systems 
Abstract 
This study examines the impact of foreign bank entry on banking competitive conditions 
in Argentina, Brazil, China and India between 2000 and 2006. We use the Lerner index to 
measure the banking competition. As well as using a fixed effects estimator, the 
generalised method of moments (GMM) dynamic panel data estimator is applied to 
obtain the Lerner index in order to mitigate possible misspecifications due to long-run 
equilibrium assumption imposed by the fixed effects estimator. Our results tentatively 
suggest that the Lerner index estimated using the dynamic procedure is the preferred 
measure of competitive conditions. Using a dynamic panel regression model, we then 
examine the impact of foreign bank presence and other bank and country specific factors 
on banking competition. Overall, our results show that foreign bank entry does not 
appear to significantly influence banking sector competition. We also suggest that there 
well may be a limit to the competitive influence of foreign banks over the short-term. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Since the early 1990s, the landscape of emerging markets' banking sectors has changed 
dramatically. In particular, financial sector foreign direct investment mainly conducted 
by banks has accelerated30 (BIS 2004). Since 1991, foreign bank investment in emerging 
markets in the form of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As)31 has been higher 
than in developed markets, both in total value and deal numbers (Focarelli, 2003). The 
total value alone increased from about US$2.S billion between 1991-199S to about 
US$S1.S billion during 1996-2000 and approximately US$67.S billion from 2001 to 
12 . 200S- (DomanskI, 200S). 
Such important trends can, to a great extent, be attributed to the gradual relaxation or 
complete removal of foreign bank entry restrictions in the aftermath of crises in Latin 
American and Asian emerging markets and further privatisation in Central and Eastern 
Europe (Domanski, 200S). Compared to other market based reforms and financial 
liberalisation measures, foreign bank entry in emerging markets appears to have had 
far-reaching effects. 
First of all, foreign bank entry can improve emerging markets' macro-economic stability. 
Generally speaking, banking foreign direct investment is a relatively stable mode of 
investment because it can be quite costly to withdraw the investments or to completely 
exit the host country once the foreign bank has started operations. This may not be the 
case, however, for indirect investment such as cross-border lending, which can be more 
easily reversed. Such high exit costs for foreign banks come from not only the tangible 
assets in the host country but also their intangible assets (such as reputation or bank's 
relationships with authorities and local clients etc.). Moreover, the longer foreign banks 
operate in the host country, the higher the exit costs can be as both tangible and 
intangible assets grow over time increasing such costs. Therefore, it is relatively rare to 
witness foreign banks abandoning their operations after they have entered a host country. 
30 A Working Group established by the Bank for International Settlement's (BIS) Committee on the Global Financial 
System (CGFS) published a report on financial sector foreign direct investment and papers submitted by group 
members are dedicated to this topic in 2004. 
31 Due to the lack of comprehensive statistics on the scale of financial sector foreign direct investment in emerging 
markets, cross-border banking mergers and acquisitions (M&As) data are widely used as an indicator of such activity. 
Foreign banks' green-field investment data, however, are not included as this type of investment has not been 
expanding as rapidly as banking M&A.in many emerging markets (BIS, ~004). . 
32 This trend witnessed a sharp declme after 2001, but recovered qUickly above early 1990s levels smce 2003 
(Domanski, 2005). 
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In addition, foreign banks have, also in various cases, shown a commitment to conduct 
business over the long-term even when a host country's economy performs badly. For 
instance. Hishikawa (2003) found that banks with foreign ownership lent local currency 
to domestic clients as much as their domestic counterparts in Malaysia and Thailand 
during the 1997 South East Asian financial crisis33 . Some studies have also suggested 
that the presence of foreign banks may limit capital flight within local financial markets, 
which may ease the scale of capital shortage during periods of crises (Mathieson and 
Roldos, 2001). Also, foreign banks have incentives to develop a sounder economic 
environment (for their own benefit) by helping to develop appropriate legal, accounting 
and other systems. Some innovative financial instruments introduced by foreign banks 
may also be used not only to hedge banks' own risk, but also to lower the whole system's 
risk if other domestic banks engage in these transactions (Domanski, 2005). 
Secondly, if foreign banks choose cross-border mergers and acquisitions as the entry 
mode, they can transform acquired domestic banks into part of international 
organisations. Therefore, foreign bank entry can promote emerging market's integration 
into the global market. Foreign banks offer capital and their parent organisation's 
resources (e.g. cheaper access to international capital markets, highly trained human 
resources, reputation, sophisticated information technology, and innovative financial 
instruments etc.) when entering emerging markets in order to gain the ownership and 
managerial control of a domestic bank. As a result, the strategic decision-making and 
risk management processes of the acquired banks will be migrated to the parent 
organisation. As far as foreign banks are concerned, each acquired bank in emerging 
markets is managed as a part of an international investment portfolio. Such integration of 
foreign banks and domestic banks will gradually bring emerging markets closer to the 
global market. (Hawkins and Mihaljek, 2001; Goldberg, 2003; BIS, 2004; Domanski, 
2005). 
Thirdl y, foreign bank entry can direct! y and indirectly improve the efficiency of 
emerging markets' financial systems. Directly, foreign banks and acquired domestic 
banks tend to be more efficient compared to indigenous banks. It has been documented 
(e.g. Claessens and Laeven, 2003; Martinez Peria and Mody, 2003) that foreign bank 
33 In general, foreign banks have played an impor~ant ro~e in .domestic lending. In Latin America, the r~tio of fo~ei~n 
b k' local claims in local currency to total foreIgn claims 10creased to 60% at the end of 2004. WhIle the ratIo 10 
Can tSal and Eastern European and Asian markets amounted to 35% (Domanski, 2005). en r 68 
entry is associated with a reduction in both operational expenses and profitability for the 
domestic banking system as foreign banks and their subsidiaries exert competitive 
pressure on indigenous banks. Indirectly, the efficiency of the financial market is also 
improved in the area of capital allocation. Traditionally, in some emerging markets, 
governments direct banks' lending to support the country's development projects or 
related parties. However, the price of this type of lending is normally not adjusted 
properly to reflect the risks that banks face. Foreign banks, on the other hand, may resist 
government' pressure and use standard risk-adjusted pricing techniques instead when 
allocating credit (Agenor, 2003). Therefore, they are less likely to face the 
non-performing loans burden over the long run that is common for domestic banks in 
emerging markets (BIS, 2004). 
Although foreign bank entry has been proved beneficial to emerging markets' banking 
and financial sectors, foreign banks play considerably different roles in various markets 
(Clarke et al. 2002). On the one hand, some Central and Eastern European and Latin 
American countries have the majority of their banking sector assets controlled by foreign 
banks (e.g. Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Croatia), on the other hand, such 
progress is more modest in various Asian countries (e.g. Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Thailand and Indonesia)34, which also were affected by the financial crisis (Lardy, 2001; 
Laeven, 2005). On average, in 2005, more than half of total banking assets in Central and 
Eastern European transition countries were controlled by foreign banks. This figure was 
over 38 percent in Latin America and but below 10 percent in Asia (Berger, 2007; IMF, 
2007). 
While there are some signs of saturation in terms of foreign bank investment in Central 
and Eastern European and Latin American emerging markets35, it is still an on-going 
phenomenon in various Asian emerging markets. In particular, in two of the largest 
emerging economies, China and India, there has been a gradual relaxation of their 
foreign bank entry restrictions recently as part of these countries' commitments to 
accession of the WT036. It is expected that following decades will witness more dramatic 
34 For example, in Malaysia, foreign ownership in locally incorporated banks is still restricted. In Thailand and the 
Philippines, foreign shareholders have to reduce their s~areh~ldin~ after a certain perio? (Domanski, 2005). 
35 In Central and Eastern Europe, financial sector foreign direct mvestment (FSFDI) mflows have generally slowed 
down recently and mainly targeted countries that would gain EU membership (such as Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania). 
In Latin America, FSFDI suddenly dropped in 2002 after almost eight years of increase since the 1994 Mexican crisis 
(Domanski, 2005). ." .. . . 
36 While major policy barriers have been lIfted, some restrIctIOns still remam as both countrIes Implement the 
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changes in the Asian banking sectors. 
Responding to these important developments, the aim of this chapter is to study the 
impact of foreign bank entry on four Asian and Latin American (namely Argentina, 
Brazil, China and India) emerging banking systems competitive conditions between 
2000 and 2006. This is thought be an important issue for emerging markets as they are 
normally viewed as being relatively uncompetitive and inefficient. Foreign bank entry is, 
however, often seen as a solution to tackle these problems (BIS, 2004). This chapter 
makes a contribution to the foreign bank entry and competition in four main respects. 
Firstly, we apply the Lerner index as an indicator to measure emerging markets' 
competition37 , then examine whether foreign bank entry has improved or worsened 
competition in these emerging markets during the period studied. Secondly, a procedure 
known as the generalised method of moments (GMM) dynamic panel data estimator 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991) and fixed effects estimator are both used to estimate the 
Lerner index. The underlying reason for using both estimators is to examine whether the 
long-run equilibrium assumption imposed by the fixed effect estimator can cause 
misspecification and therefore yield different results as identified by Goddard and 
Wilson (2007). Thirdly, the existing literature that studies this issue mainly covers the 
time period prior to 2000 (e.g. Claessens and Laeven, 2003; Yildirim and Philippatos, 
2007; Gelos and Rold6s, 2002 and Yeyati and Micco, 2007). In this study, a new data set 
that covers the period from 2000 to 2006 is expected to offer more contemporary insights 
into this issue. This time period also has its own importance. As mentioned earlier, in 
Latin American markets, foreign banks' direct investments started to appear stagnant 
after 2002. Whether the impact of foreign bank presence on competition has been 
affected by this slow-down remains an interesting question. Finally, as far as we are 
aware there have been no empirical studies undertaken with respect to foreign bank entry 
and the impact on competitive conditions in China and India due to its early stage and the 
relatively small presence of foreign banks in both countries. In this study, having taken 
China and India's specific circumstances into account, the foreign ownership 
information is collected accordingly to reflect the progress of foreign bank entry and its 
opening-up of the banking sector in a phased manner. For example, in India, before March ~0~9, foreign ban~s' 
acquisition of shareholdings was only permitted by India's central bank ~ Reserve Bank of .In~l~ m selected Indian 
private sector banks. Acquisition of a controltting stake has to be ph~sed m and the overall lImit IS. 74 percent (RBI, 
2005). In China, on the other hand, since II December, 2006, .Chma has r~~oved t~e geographical .and c~stomer 
restriction of RMB business on foreign banks. However, the Chmese authorIties require three years (mcludmg two 
profitable years) waiting period for new foreign banks to obtain an RMB license (CBRC, 2007). 
37 Extant studies (e.g. Carbo and Rodriguez, 2007; Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2007) that use the Lerner 
index to examine competition in banking markets mainly focus on developed markets. 
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effects on banking system. Moreover, it is also interesting to study China and India, 
because according to Prasad and Ghosh (2005), unlike in many other Latin American and 
South East Asian markets, where foreign bank entry was mainly driven by banking 
consolidation after various financial crises, China and India provide unique samples as 
foreign bank entry coincided with the diversification of ownership of state-owned banks 
and the rapid growth of domestic private banks. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2, a literature review 
regarding the causes and implications of foreign bank entry, in particular its impact on 
competition, is presented. Section 3.3 describes the estimation of the Lerner index, data 
sample, and the determinants of the Lerner index including foreign bank ownership and 
various control variables. The estimation results are presented in Section 3.4. Finally, 
Section 3.5 concludes the chapter. 
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3.2 Foreign bank entry and its impact on competition- a brief survey 
Foreign bank entry has become an important topic in both developed and emerging 
markets since the 1980s. In particular, in the wake of foreign bank entry in emerging 
markets since the middle of 1990s, many studies have been undertaken to examine its 
causes, consequences and implications. A better understanding of the impact of foreign 
bank entry is thought to be useful for policy-makers and market participants alike as it 
helps them to evaluate the on-going progresses of liberalisation, privatisation and 
consolidation in emerging banking markets. 
Traditionally, foreign banks' investments abroad are seen as the result of economic 
integration between two countries. As non-bank foreign direct investments (FDI) and 
bilateral trade grow, banks need to serve their important home-country clients abroad and 
start to develop business networks in the host country. Many early studies have 
confirmed that foreign trade and foreign direct investments drive foreign banking 
investmene8 (Goldberg and Saunders 1981, Goldberg and Johnson 1990, Grosse and 
Goldberg 1991, Brealey and Kaplanis 1996, Yamori 1998). More recently, using a data 
set from two surveys of over 100 countries' national banking supervisors, Dopico and 
Wilcox (2001) suggest that foreign bank presence is significantly and positively related 
to the countries' openness of economy in areas like the level of international trade. Wezel 
(2004) investigates the determinants of German multinational banking groups' direct 
investment in emerging markets between 1994 and 2001. He finds that if the host country 
receives more FDI from non-bank German firms, it may tend to receive greater 
investments from German banks, which might provide some evidence that banks follow 
their clients abroad. But there is no evidence that trade between Germany and the 
recipient developing countries plays a significant role influencing the banking groups' 
investment decision-making. 
Buch and DeLong (2004), nonetheless, note that cross-border banking mergers and 
acquisitions are relatively fewer than cross-border non-financial firm mergers and 
acquisitions. This phenomenon indicates that banks may face more barriers than other 
firms. For instance, Focarelli and Pozzolo (2000) use a sample of around 2500 banks in 
38 H ever Nolle and Seth (1996) suggest the connections between foreign bank entry and FDI and trade may not be 
as cl~: as 'previously presumed because they find that foreign banks in the US allocated the majority of loans to 
non-home country clients between 1981 and 1992. 72 
29 OECD countries and state that information asymmetries and regulatory restrictions 
are possible barriers to foreign bank entry. Alibux (2007) uses a more recent data set and 
also confirms these findings. 
Like any other types of firms, information asymmetries caused by distance, differences 
in language, culture, tax and legal systems etc. sometimes can create barriers for banks 
inhibiting them from investing overseas. Buch and DeLong (2004) find that between 
1994 and 2001, US and European banks tended to acquire banks in their own continent 
(i.e. in Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe respectively) as the solution to 
reduce the costs caused by information asymmetries. Van Horen (2007) notes the 
increasing trend of banking FDI conducted by banks from developing countries and finds 
that about 27% of all foreign banks in developing countries are owned by a bank from 
another developing country, in particular from the same region. Also remarkably, 
Spanish banks' heavy investment in Latin America can be partially explained by their 
similarities in terms of language and culture stemming from Spanish colonial history in 
the region. On the other hand, a host country's regulatory environment, whether it is 
stringent regarding banks' activities in other sectors, foreign ownership etc. is found to 
explicitly affect the level of foreign bank direct investment (Aliber 1984, Hultman and 
McGee 1989, Dopico and Wilcox 2001, Weller and Scher 2001). Specifically, in 
emerging markets, relaxation and complete removal of foreign bank entry restrictions in 
the 1990s have been probably one of the most fundamental determinants of foreign bank 
entry, although the underlying reasons may vary39. Finally, EU banking sectors can be 
used as a good example to demonstrate that two important impediments (information 
asymmetries and regulatory restrictions) work jointly to affect foreign bank entry. 
Despite the fact, there has been an increased level of integration of EU banking40, the 
process is far behind the integration and harmonization of other financial markets, such 
as money, bond and equity markets (Baele et al. 2004, Manna 2004, Capiello et al. 2006). 
In EU banking, explicit regulatory barriers to entry have been completely abolished. 
However, other implicit barriers like different institutional frameworks, payment and 
settlement systems, and tax systems still remain. These latter factors still increase 
39 Domanski (2005) notes that the removal of such restrictions was often a part of banking sector restructuring 
programmes in Latin America and Asia after various financial ~rises, .~hich was hoped to allow in foreig~ capital and 
management to recapitalise troubled banks and improve systemIc stabIlIty .. In Ce~tr~l and Eu~opean emer~mg markets, 
however as the first round of privatisation of state-owned banks proved dlsappomtmg, opemng the bankmg sectors to 
foreign investors was part of governments' efforts to further privatisation and greater integration throughout the 
European Union. 
40 Papademos (2005) notes that 14 largest cross-border banking groups within the EU accounted for almost one-third 
of total EU bank assets in 2005. 
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information costs for cross-border M&A activities. Consequently, cross-border M&A in 
banking sectors, in particular in retail banking 41 , have not occurred at the scale 
previously predicted within the EU (Boot 1999, Blandon 2000, ECB 2000, Goddard et al. 
2001, Berger et al. 2003, Goddard et al. 2007, Berger 2007). 
Some studies suggest that banks that operate in markets with high levels of competition 
and low profitability (in most cases developed banking systems) may have incentives to 
search for investment opportunities overseas (Paula 2003), others believe that a banking 
sector with greater growth potential can attract more investors. Potential can be 
measured by a number of indicators including real economic growth, profitability, levels 
of taxation, overhead costs, market size, per-capita income, and relative efficiency of the 
domestic financial sector (Tschoegl 1987, Claessens et al. 2001, Focarelli and Pozzolo 
2000, Weller and Scher 2001, Buch and DeLong 2004)42. Comparatively, emerging 
markets are more likely to provide the above-mentioned growth potential than developed 
markets, which also explains the recent wave of banks' investment from developed 
markets to such markets (Claessens et al. 2001). 
Compared to the substantial literature on the determinants of foreign bank entry, there 
have only been a handful of studies that examine the impact of foreign bank entry in 
domestic markets, and more so in the case of emerging markets (Nier and Baumann 
2003). For instance, it is commonly believed that foreign bank participation reduces 
banks' risks of insolvency (Vander Vennet 1996, Berger 2000) and improves the stability 
of the banking and financial systems and therefore helps accelerate economic growth 
(Demirguc-Kunt et al. 1998). Crystal et al. (2001) in their study of seven large Latin 
American emerging markets show that foreign banks often have higher average loan 
growth rates, higher average provisioning expenses, and greater loss absorption ability, 
which all contribute to a sounder banking system. Goldberg et al. (2000) add that foreign 
banks' lending in Mexico and Argentina was less volatile and witnessed noticeable 
growth during two crises in the 1990s due to lower volatility of credit supply. Jeon and 
Miller (2002) study the performance of Korean domestic and foreign banks and show 
that domestic banks suffered more severely than foreign banks from the Asian financial 
41 Comparatively, the integration has progressed further in wholesale than in retail banking in the EU (Eppendorfer et 
al. 2002, Schuler and Heinemann 2002). . .. .. 
42 G lly these studies find that a country with higher real economic growth, larger market Size, higher profitabIlIty, enera , .. .
lower taxes, overhead costs, per-capita income and relatively mefficient financial sectors attracts more foreIgn 
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crisis. Nonetheless, other studies have noted that foreign bank entry may also increase 
risk at the same time due to moral hazard, i.e. by exploiting safety nets offered by 
regulators from either the home or host country (John et al. 1991, John et al. 2000). Also 
such cross-border transactions could complicate the bank supervision and monitoring 
processes and increase the costs of such activities (Winton 1999). 
Claessens et al. (200 1) use bank level data for 80 countries during 1988-1995 and find 
that foreign banks have higher interest margins, overhead expenses and profitability than 
domestic banks in developing countries and the opposite holds in developed countries43. 
Demirgiic-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) also find that foreign banks in emerging markets 
tend to outperform domestic banks. According to Mian (2003), however, private 
domestic banks can achieve on average the same profitability as foreign banks in 
emerging markets 44, but state-owned domestic banks perform much worse and can 
adversely impact the whole domestic banking sector's performance. Others find that 
private domestic banks are almost as healthy as foreign banks measured by financial 
ratings (Crystal et al. 2001) or have similar loan portfolios and levels of non-performing 
loans (in Argentina and Mexico, Goldberg et al. 2000). These findings may suggest that 
private ownership matters rather than the origin of the ownership. Overall, foreign bank 
entry may have exerted pressure on the domestic banking sector and improved private 
domestic banks' performance in emerging markets. This leads to another important issue, 
namely, the effect of foreign bank entry on competitive conditions in the domestic 
banking system45 . 
Some studies offer indirect evidence that foreign bank entry can improve competition. 
Generally, as the results show, more restricted foreign bank entry and higher levels of 
banking sector concentration will significantly increase the costs of financial 
intermediation. As a result, a high cost environment indicated by higher interest margins 
43 They suggest that in emerging markets, foreign banks enjoy high interest margins and profit due to efficiency, 
cheaper capital compared to their emerging markets' counterparts, but suffer from information asymmetry in their 
retail orientated business, which induces high overhead costs. On the other hand, in developed markets, foreign banks 
normally engage in wholesale markets, which are more competitive and yield relatively lower returns but also have 
lower overhead expenses. Moreover, foreign banks' efficiency advantage in developed markets may not be enough to 
compensate the disadvantage brought about by information asy~metrie~. . . 
44 He claims that private domestic banks are more profitable 10 lend10g as they have an advantage 10 lend10g to 
domestic firms that do not have publicly verifiable information. Foreign banks, on the other hand, gain more revenue 
from deposits due to their access to cheap capital. .. . . 
45 Consolidation processes in emerging banking markets have consIderably 10creased market concentratIon 10 recent 
years. According to the structure-conduct-performance ~SC~) view, a ~oncentrated market may inhibit ~ompetition, 
when analysing a market's competitiveness, concentratIOn IS another Important factor often to be consIdered apart 
from foreign bank entry (Yeyati and Micco 2007). 
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and overhead expenses may be associated with banking inefficiency and weaker 
competitive conditions in the financial sector (Claessens et al. 2001, Demirguc-Kunt et al. 
1998, Clarke et al. 2000, Levine 2002, Martinez Peria and Mody 2003, Demirguc-Kunt 
et al. 2004). 
Claessens and Laeven (2003) apply the methodology developed by Panzar and Rosse 
(1987) to estimate 50 countries' banking sector's competitive conduct. Then, they 
directly test the impact of foreign bank entry on competition. They point out that foreign 
bank entry and less entry and activity restrictions significantly improve market's 
competitiveness. They also find that market concentration has no evident negative 
impact on competition. In a similar study, Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) examine 11 
Latin American banking systems and generally find similar results, but they observe a 
decrease in the levels of competition in Brazil, Chile and Venezuela, which may be the 
result of increased concentration. According to Gelos and Rold6s (2002), in a 
cross-country study of eight emerging European and Latin American countries, it is 
suggested that a negative impact of concentration on competition may exist but they may 
be outweighed by the positive impact brought about by the foreign bank entry. In contrast, 
Yeyati and Micco (2007) find that foreign bank entry seems to have not improved 
competition in eight Latin American countries. They also note that foreign bank presence 
may achieve a more stable economic growth as excessive competition may destabilise 
the banking sector. 
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3.3 Methodology and data sample 
In this section, the procedure for estimation of the Lerner index - an indicator of 
competition is first illustrated. Moreover, the potential problems associated with the 
estimation of this measure using the fixed effects estimator are discussed. An alternative 
estimator - dynamic panel data estimator in tum is introduced in order to avoid various 
misspecification issues. Then, a cross-bank regression model is introduced to explain the 
determinants of the competitiveness of four emerging banking sectors under study. In 
particular, we concentrate on the impact of foreign bank entry. Finally, the data sample 
and various variables are described. 
3.3.1 Methodology - estimation of the Lerner index: measure of competition 
In order to directly examine the impact of foreign bank entry on banking competitive 
conditions in Argentina, Brazil, China and India, first of all, the competition of these four 
banking systems needs to be estimated. The studies that examine competitive conditions 
and foreign bank entry abovementioned typically use the H-statistic developed by Panzar 
and Rosse (1987) - a non-structural indicator of competition46 . This indicator gauges the 
degree to which changes in the average cost of bank's inputs leads to changes in average 
revenues. Therefore, the market is considered more competitive if the degree of such 
transmission is greater (Panzar and Rosse 1987). Although there has been an extensive 
literature that uses this indicator in various markets, the question has been raised whether 
the H-statistic, or rather which indicator, can portray a market's competitive behaviour 
most effectively. 
In a study that compares various structural and non-structural indicators of competition, 
Carbo et al. (2007) find that five commonly used indicators (one structural indicator -
the Hirschman-Herfindahl index, and four non-structural indicators including the net 
46 Traditionally, indicators (including market share, concentration ratios for the largest set of firms, or a 
Hirschman-Herfindahl index) that measure competitive conditions concentrate on the Structure-Conduct-Performance 
(SCP) paradigm. It is assumed that the competitive conditions can be inferred from a market's structural features 
(mainly measured by concentration) that in tum influence firm's behaviour and performance. However, recent 
empirical results suggest that the SCP paradigm does not hold significantly (Claessens and Laeven 2003, Yeyat.i and 
Micco 2007). Some studies, on the other hand, suggest that greater performance may be the result of better efficIency 
rather than market power (Berger, 1995). Moreover, various researches have found that the SCP paradigm is not able to 
explain the changes in competitive conditions brought about by the changes in market contestability or strategic 
reactions of competing oligopolies, which does not necessarily change market structure (Carbo et al. 2007). 
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interest margin/total asset ratio, the Lerner index, the H-statistic and the return on assets 
ratio) yield conflicting results about competitive conditions within and across 14 
European countries and over time (between 1995 and 2001). Therefore, these indicators 
are not interchangeable and the choice of indicator of competition may significantly 
affect the interpretation of a market's competitive conditions. It is also tentatively 
suggested that the Lerner index and the return on assets ratio are more preferable than 
other indicators because they are relatively more consistent and less affected by different 
country-specific factors when measuring within country competition in broader banking 
activity (i.e. traditional banking services as well as off-balance sheet and fee-based 
transactions ). 
Compared to the H-statistic, the Lerner index has only been recently used to determine 
trends in competitive conditions in European banking during the 1990s (see Fernandez 
de Guevara and Maudos 2004, Fernandez de Guevara et al. 2007, Carbo and Rodriguez, 
2007, Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2007). In essence, the Lerner index and the 
H-statistic are both developed from static theory of the firm models under long-run 
equilibrium conditions and belong to the so-called New Empirical Industrial 
Organisation (NEIO) literature (Carbo et al. 2007). Instead of relating input price 
changes to output prices changes as the H-statistic, the Lerner index measures the 
mark-up of price over marginal cost as a competitive benchmark. The higher the mark-up, 
the greater the realised market power (Fernandez de Guevara et al. 2005). In our study, in 
order to contribute to the existing literature of the impact of foreign bank entry on 
competition, the Lerner index is chosen as our indicator of competition to examine four 
Asian and Latin American emerging banking markets47 . 
The Lerner index is defined as the difference between price and marginal cost, divided 
by price. It measures bank's ability to set prices above marginal cost, being an inverse 
function of the elasticity of demand and of the number of banks (Freixas and Rochet, 
1997). The values of the index vary from 0 (perfect competition) to 1 (monopoly). The 
empirical approach to the Lerner index in the banking sector is mainly based on Maudos 
and Perez (2003) and Fernandez de Guevara et al. (2001). The Lerner index is 
algebraically expressed as follows: 
47 It is beyond the scope of this paper, however, to provide evidence that the Lerner index is more appropriate than the 
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p. -MC· Lerner = 1 1 
1 
Pi 
(1) 
where the pnce Pi is calculated by estimating a quotient between the total revenue 
(interest income and other operating income) and total assets. The marginal cost of 
producing an additional unit of output T A i with three inputs (labour, capital and 
deposits) is estimated based on the specification of a trans-logarithmic cost function as 
follows: 
where Ci is the bank's total costs (financial and operating costs); TAi is the total 
assets; variable Trend is used to capture the effects of technical change in the cost 
function over time; WI' W 2 and W 3' the production input prices are defined as 
follows: 
WI = price of labour: personnel costs/ total assets48 
W 2 = price of physical capital: operating costs (except personnel costs)/ fixed assets 
W 3 = price of deposits: financial costs (total interest paid on deposits) / total deposits 
Following Maudos and Perez (2003) and Fernandez de Guevara et al. (2001), the cost 
function is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) with fixed effects49. Under this 
procedure, the estimation relies upon the assumption that markets are in long-run 
48 There is no available information on the number of bank employees in the data base - 8ankScope used as the source 
of bank data in this paper, so the average price of the labour factor is proxied as a quotient between personnel costs and 
total assets. 
49 Fixed effects are introduced in order to capture the influence of variables specific to each firm (Fernandez de 
Guevara et aI., 2001). 
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equilibrium at each time when observing the data. However, this static equilibrium 
framework has been challenged recent! y. For example, Goddard and Wilson (2007) use a 
Monte Carlo simulation exercise and show that when estimating Panzar-Rosse 
H-statistics, which also imposes long-run equilibrium assumption upon the estimation, 
the markets may not be in equilibrium at all and the speed of adjustment may be far less 
than instantaneous. In contrast, a procedure known as the generalised method of 
moments (GMM) dynamic panel data estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991) is designed 
to correct for this misspecification and capture the partial adjustment towards 
equilibrium. 
As far as the GMM dynamic panel data estimator is concerned, a lagged dependent 
variable is added to the fixed effects formulation alongside the individual effects 
allowing for dynamics (i.e. partial adjustment towards equilibrium) in the specification 
of the regression model, then the formulation is first-differenced to eliminate the 
individual effects. As a result, however, there is a problem of correlation between the 
lagged first-differenced dependent variable and the first-differenced disturbance term. In 
order to solve this problem, instrumental variables are used instead that are uncorrelated 
with the disturbance term. It is, therefore, essential to ensure the validity of the 
instruments and assumption that the differenced disturbance term does not exhibit serial 
correlation in order to maintain the consistency of this estimator. Two tests proposed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991) are used to test these assumptions. A Sargan test of 
over-identifying restrictions is designated to test the validity of the instruments by 
analysing the sample analogue of moment conditions used in the estimation. A test for 
second-order serial correlation in the residuals of the estimated equation is then also 
conducted5o. 
This study applies both the OLS fixed effects estimator and the Arellano and Bond GMM 
dynamic panel data estimator to estimate bank marginal cost in order to see how the 
Lerner index can be affected by using different estimators. As usual, the restrictions of 
homogeneity in input prices and of symmetry are imposed. Once the cost function is 
estimated for each year and each bank using OLS fixed effects estimator or the GMM 
dynamic estimator, marginal cost can be estimated as follows: 
50 The disturbance term is probably first-order serially correlated by construction. It, however, should be free from 
second-order serial correlation. 
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(3) 
Two sets of Lerner indices then can be calculated separately according to Equation (1) 
depending on whether the marginal cost is estimated by the OLS fixed effects estimator 
or the GMM dynamic estimator. 
3.3.2 Methodology - cross-bank regression model 
Once our Lerner index measures of competition have been obtained, we then use a 
relatively simple cross-bank regression model to explain the determinants of the 
competitiveness of four emerging banking sectors under study. In particular, we also 
focus on the impact of foreign bank entry. The regression model used to examine the 
determinants of bank competition can be illustrated as follows: 
LERNER it = ex + ~lFOREIGNit + ~2MAKSit + ~3CR5it + ~4MARGDPit 
+ ~5INFLAit + ~6PROPERTYit + ~7GDPPCit + fit 
where dependent variable LERNER is Lerner index for each bank; 
(4) 
FOREIGN - the percentage of each bank's shares controlled by foreign investors; 
MAKS - market share variable calculated as the ratio of each bank's asset value divided 
by the whole banking sector assets; 
CR5 - a concentration ratio calculated as the sum of market shares for the largest five 
banks; 
MARGDP - the ratio of stock market capitalisation to GDP; 
INFLA - annual inflation rate; 
PROPERTY - an index of property rights from the Economic Freedom Index; 
GDPPC - The logarithm of per capita GDP of each year; 
Moreover, this regressIon model is estimated using the GMM dynamic panel data 
estimator as it is assumed that a market's competitive conditions may be characterised by 
dynamics, in other words, previous competitive conditions may to some extent affect the 
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cunent environment. Therefore, partial adjustment towards equilibrium needs to be 
captured when observing the data, rather than the static long-run equilibrium assumed by 
the OLS fixed effects estimator. 
While the competitive conditions of banking have been measured using the Lerner index, 
the status of foreign bank entry needs to be evaluated, which is used as the independent 
variable FOREIGN in Equation 4, in order to assess its impact on competition. Extant 
studies usually use two types of indicators of foreign bank entry: the percentage of 
foreign banks in terms of the number or percentage banking assets controlled by foreign 
banks in the whole system. In both circumstances, these are country-level indicators and 
foreign banks are defined as any bank that has more than 50 percent of its shares held by 
foreign investors (Claessens and Laeven, 2003; Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007; Yeyati 
and Micco, 2007). 
In this research, however, competitive conditions are examined on the bases of individual 
banks, and a bank-level foreign ownership variable is needed. So the percentage of each 
bank's shares controlled by foreign investors is used instead. Moreover, in contrast with 
previous studies, the majority (more than 50 percent) ownership criterion is relaxed: any 
percentage of foreign ownership is taken into account. As mentioned earlier, in Asian 
emerging markets, especially in the case of China and India, the removal of restrictions 
on foreign bank entry started much later and more slowly than in Latin America. While 
there are signs that foreign bank entry has slowed in Latin America, it has been an 
on-going progress in Asia over the recent years, and foreign banks tend to buy minority 
stakes first in some relatively large domestic state-owned banks then gradually increase 
their stakes at a later stage51 • Therefore, it is necessary to adjust the foreign ownership 
criterion to reflect this phenomenon. Generally speaking, it is expected that foreign bank 
involvement will increase banks' competitiveness. So a positive impact of foreign bank 
ownership on competitive conditions in the banking sector would be expected, i.e. an 
inverse relationship between the Lerner index and foreign ownership. 
Secondly, another bank-level variable is used to test whether competition is influenced 
by bank market share. Bank market share (MAKS) is captured as a ratio of each bank's 
asset value divided by the whole banking sector assets. We seek to examine the impact of 
51 For example, three out of the four largest state-owned banks in Ch.ina, namely ICBC, China Construction Bank and 
B k Of Communication have had minority stakes purchased by foreign banks (CBRC, 2007). an 82 
bank size on competitive conditions, as previous empirical studies have shown that larger 
banks can exert market power (Berger, 1995; More and Nagy, 2003; Jeon and Miller, 
2005) 
Competitive conditions, of course, can be influenced by various country-specific factors. 
As such various country variables that have been used in the previous literature are 
required to capture the effects of different market or country features. A market's 
concentration level - 5-bank concentration ratio (CR5) that is defined as the sum of 
market shares for the largest five banks is necessary to depict the structure of the banking 
market (Claessens and Laeven, 2003; Demirgiic-Kunt et aI., 2004). Higher levels of 
concentration are suggestive of less competition according to the SCP paradigm. The 
ratio of stock market capitalisation to GDP (MARGDP) is used to account for the 
competitive pressure from the non-bank financial sector (Levine and Zervos, 1998; 
Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007; Demirgiic-Kunt et aI., 2004). It is assumed that this ratio 
will have positive effects on competition since more pressure from other financial sectors 
will increase the competition in the banking sector. A country's general economic 
development and institutional framework are also controlled for. The logarithm of per 
capita GDP of each year during the sample period is used to depict economic 
development (Claessens and Laeven, 2003). An inflation rate is also included to see if a 
high inflation economy will hinder competitive conduct as prices of financial products 
will be less informative according to Claessens and Laeven (2003). As a result, this 
variable should be positively related to the Lerner index. Regarding the institutional 
framework, an index of property rights from the 2008 Index of Economic Freedom 
compiled by Heritage Foundation is used. A higher score of this index indicates better 
protection of property rights (Claessens and Laeven, 2003)52. 
52 Heritage Foundation measures 1 0 specific factors (namely busine~s freedom, trade freed?m, fiscal freedom, 
government freedom, monetary freedom, investment freedom, finanCial freedom, property nght~, freedom ~rom 
t'on labour freedom), and average them equally into a total score. Each one of the 10 freedoms IS graded usmg a corrup I , . 'fi ., 
I f 0 to 1 00 where 100 represents the maximum freedom. A score of 100 slgm les an economic environment or sca e rom , . 
set of policies that is most conducive to economic freedom. Generally, for the 2008 In?ex of Economic Freedom, data 
l' h . od covering the second half of 2006 through the first half of 2007 are exammed. However, some factors are lor t e pen . . . h d f' fl . b d h' storical information. For example, the monetary polIcy factor IS a 3-year welg te average rate 0 m atlOn 
f
ase Jon I y 1 2004 to December 31 2006 Other factors are current for the year in which the Index is published. For 
rom anuar, , " 
example, the taxation variable for this Index considers tax rates that apply to the taxable year 2007. 
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3.3.3 Data sample 
The data sample consists of Asian and Latin American banks from Argentina, Brazil, 
China and India from 2000 to 2006 is obtained from the Bankscope database. Four types 
of banks are included: commercial banks, savings banks, cooperative banks and bank 
holding companies. Bank data are extracted from the consolidated accounts, if available. 
Otherwise they are from unconsolidated accounts, so double counting is avoided. Two 
selection criteria are then applied as follows: first of all, the 1 st and 99th percentile of the 
distribution of the each variable are treated as outliers. Secondly, bank data are deleted if 
any input price is missing. As a result, the final sample is an unbalanced panel data 
sample consisting of 1106 bank-year observations. The sample composition can be found 
in Table 3.1. 
As can be seen from Table 3.1, the largest sample of banks is from Brazil, while three 
other countries have similar sample sizes. The data set is not only decomposed by 
country and year, but also by ownership status. In other words, banks are classified as 
with or without foreign ownership since this study counts minority and majority control 
by foreign investors as the indicator of foreign ownership. As expected, the two Latin 
American markets have a much higher proportion of banks with shares held by foreign 
investors compared to China and India. By 2006, although in Argentina and Brazil the 
proportion of banks with foreign ownership has remained relatively stable in our 
sample53 , it has increased in China (from 2 out of total 21 banks in 2000 to 21 out of 50 
total banks in 2006) and India (from 4 out of 41 total banks in 2000 to 16 out of 50 total 
banks in 2006). 
The results of the estimation of the Lerner index using the OLS fixed effects estimator 
and the GMM dynamic panel data estimator for Argentina, Brazil, China, and India 
between 2000 and 2006 are shown in Table 3.2. Figure 3.1-3.4 further visually illustrates 
the evolution of the average Lerner indices of the banking sectors from our sample 
markets54. 
53 There is a decrease of bank numbers in Brazil during the time period in our sample. The reason may be that there 
s a consolidation process within its banking sector, which was mainly driven by the government's privatization of 
:r:te-owned banks as well as by the three largest domestic privat~ banks' (Bradesco, Itau and Un.ibanco) ef~ort~ to 
acquire small and medium-sized private banks to compete In vanous parts of the country (HawkIns and MlhalJek, 
2001). . . I f h l' A . B ·1 54 R Its from the Sargan test all reject the over-identifying restnctlOns (p-va ues 0 t e tests lor rgentIna, razl, Chine:~d India are 0.9995, 0.2816, 0.2803 and 1.00); Results from the serial correlation test (second order) validate 
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As can be seen in Table 3.2, irrespective of the method of estimation, the Lerner indices 
for Argentina and Brazil rise after 2002, and 2001 for India, which suggest worsened 
competitive conditions, in particular for banks in Brazil; in China, on the other hand, the 
conditions stay relatively stable throughout the sample period, but China seems to have 
the least competitive bank systems compared to other three markets. Moreover, average 
marginal costs estimated by the OLS fixed effects estimator are consistently higher than 
the ones estimated by the GMM dynamic panel data estimator, which leads to lower 
Lerner indices compared to those estimated by the GMM estimator. 
Also according to Figures 3.1 to 3.4, the two sets of Lerner indices evolve in the same 
pattern for all four emerging markets over 2000 and 2006. When using the OLS fixed 
effects estimator, the Lerner indices of these markets appear relatively low compared to 
those typically found in European markets55 , except for China where the average value is 
around 0.23. When using the GMM dynamic panel data estimator, however, the Lerner 
indices tend to be higher than those typically found in developed markets apart from in 
Brazil where the average value is below 0.07 over the time period studied. Overall, it 
seems that different estimation procedures do affect the interpretation of a market's 
competitive conditions. If long-run equilibrium assumptions are not imposed, on average, 
banks tend to operate in a market with lower average marginal cost, and banks are more 
able to set prices above marginal cost. Consequently, the market appears less competitive. 
Therefore, the Lerner index estimated using the dynamic panel procedure tends to 
suggest higher levels of market power (in the countries under study) compared to those 
derived from traditional procedures. The assumption of dynamic behaviour and no 
long-run equilibrium is, we argue, more realistic, and as such we tentatively suggest that 
the dynamic procedure provides less biased results. Those estimates of the Lerner index 
in tum, will be used as our measure of competitive conditions in the banking systems 
under study. 
the use of instrumental variables and reject the serial correlations when using GMM dynamic panel data estimator 
except for Chinese bank sub-sample (p-values of the tests for Argentina, Brazil, China and India are 0.1478, 0.9142, 
0.0242 and 0.1157). . . . 
55 The Lerner indices of major European banking systems in the 1990s are usually below O.! 6 (AngelInI and Cetorellt, 
2003; Fernandez de Guevara et al., 2001; Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2004; Carbo et al., 2007; and Maudos 
and Perez, 2003). 
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Table 3.1: Sample composition by country, year and ownership status 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Argentina 
Bank number 65 69 72 67 67 65 59 
Banks with no foreign ownership -1-1 44 49 45 44 41 35 
Banks with foreign ownership 2-1- 25 23 22 23 24 24 
Brazil 
Bank number 96 III 115 107 99 92 86 
Banks with no foreign ownership 61 72 79 74 66 64 58 
Banks with foreign ownership 35 39 36 33 33 28 28 
China 
Bank number 21 27 39 48 54 62 50 
Banks with no foreign ownership 19 23 35 42 46 48 29 
Banks with foreign ownership 2 4 4 6 8 14 21 
India 
Bank number 41 44 52 58 56 55 50 
Banks with no foreign ownership 37 37 45 46 37 36 34 
Banks with foreign ownership 4 7 7 12 19 19 16 
Total 
Bank number 223 251 278 280 276 274 245 
Banks with no foreign ownership 158 176 208 207 193 189 156 
Banks with foreign ownership 65 75 70 73 83 85 89 
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Table 3.2: Summary of average Lerner indices of 4 emerging markets 2000-2006 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Argentina 
Price 0.1233 0.1560 0.2672 0.1381 0.1263 0.1383 0.1401 
Marginal Cost(FE) 0.1250 0.1535 0.2505 0.1324 0.1118 0.1164 0.1251 
Lerner Index(FE) 0.0365 0.0359 0.0081 0.0514 0.1375 0.1883 0.1130 
i\\arginal Cost (GMM) 0.1028 0.1232 0.1703 0.1124 0.0993 0.1021 0.1058 
Lerner Index (GMM) 0.2252 0.2494 0.1630 0.2221 0.2858 0.3351 0.2855 
Brazil 
Price 0.2027 0.2192 0.2974 0.2185 0.2034 0.2329 0.1981 
Marginal Cost(FE) 0.2006 0.2195 0.2987 0.2179 0.2013 0.2288 0.1790 
Lerner Index(FE) 0.0307 0.0263 0.0143 0.0309 0.0239 0.0288 0.1031 
Marginal Cost (GMM) 0.1911 0.2085 0.2823 0.2033 0.1868 0.2118 0.1702 
Lerner Index (GMM) 0.0533 0.0527 0.0580 0.0738 0.0620 0.0657 0.1225 
China 
Price 0.0471 0.0419 0.0358 0.0388 0.0421 0.0426 0.0460 
Marginal Cost(FE) 0.0360 0.0319 0.0274 0.0300 0.0325 0.0330 0.0344 
Lerner Index(FE) 0.2400 0.2351 0.2334 0.2314 0.2305 0.2311 0.2490 
Marginal Cost (GMM) 0.0287 0.0261 0.0228 0.0251 0.0267 0.0270 0.0284 
Lerner Index (GMM) 0.3739 0.3667 0.3623 0.3572 0.3644 0.3690 0.3741 
India 
Price 0.1138 0.1116 0.1157 0.1103 0.0994 0.0880 0.0849 
Marginal Cost(FE) 0.1076 0.1086 0.1097 0.1024 0.0897 0.0825 0.0797 
Lerner Index(FE) 0.0544 0.0269 0.0508 0.0716 0.0999 0.0538 0.0624 
Marginal Cost (GMM) 0.0967 0.0975 0.0977 0.0902 0.0785 0.0730 0.0697 
Lerner Index (GMM) 0.1501 0.1254 0.1559 0.1840 0.2125 0.1622 0.1793 
Note: FE - Fixed Effects Estimates; GMM - Generalised Method of Moment Estimates; 
Figure 3.1: Average Lerner index of banks in Argentina from 2000-2006 
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Figure 3.2: Average Lerner index of banks in Brazil from 2000-2006 
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Figure 3.3: Average Lerner index of banks in China from 2000-2006 
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Figure 3.4: Average Lerner index of banks in India from 2000-2006 
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The summary statistics for the independent variables of each country sample used in our 
regression analysis to examine the impact of foreign ownership on competitive 
conditions (as measured using dynamic panel estimates of the Lerner indices) are 
demonstrated in Table 3.3. The independent variables' descriptive statistics for each year, 
however, are further detailed in Appendix 3.1. 
Table 3.3 shows that while foreign ownership, which is measured by bank's shares 
controlled by foreign investors, remains stable in all Latin American markets, the pace of 
the increase in two Asian markets, China and India, has doubled from 2000 to 200656. In 
terms of bank specific control variables, Chinese banks tend to have larger market share 
than other banks. While, the market share in other three markets stays fairly unchanged, 
there is an evident decrease in China during the 7 years period. This may be, however, 
driven by the lack of small banks data in the first few years. The CR5 ratios, the proxy 
for market concentration in the banking sector, show that China has the most 
concentrated market in the data sample with more than 80% of the banking assets 
controlled by the largest five banks. Moreover, this high concentration level has not 
changed significantly since 2000. In terms of the development of the stock market, China 
and India both increased their stock markets' capitalisation considerably in 2006, which 
jumped from about 40% of their GDP over the past six years in our sample to 90%. The 
annual inflation rates use year 2000 as the base year in our study. As can be seen, two 
Latin American markets, Argentina and Brazil experience relatively higher inflation in 
their economies. China, on the other hand, has the lowest inflation rate throughout the 
time period under study. Four emerging markets have similar scores on their property 
rights protection with over 50 out of 100. Finally, Argentina and Brazil have relatively 
higher GDP per capita compared to China and India. India, however, is the poorest 
economy in our sample. In 2006, India's GDP per capita is less than half of the China's. 
56 I· t hown in Table 3 that most Argentine and Brazilian banks with foreign ownership are majority owned by 
t IS no s . h h h f'. h· foreign investors or foreign banks' branches. Chinese and Indian banks, In contrast, w en t ey ave lorelgn owners Ip, 
it is usually via a minority stake. 
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Table 3.3: Summary statistics: means of posited variables, standard deviation In 
parentheses 2000-2006 
Variable Argentina Brazil China India 
FOREIGN 0.32 0.31 0.08 0.11 
(0.460) (0.452) (0.230) (0.287) 
t\IAKS 0.0151 0.0099 0.0233 0.0197 
(0.029) (0.026) (0.074) (0.039) 
CR5 0.5194 0.5287 0.8326 0.4996 
(0.033) (0.032) (0.017) (0.064) 
MARGDpa 0.5272 0.4259 0.4589 0.4994 
(0.256) (0.129) (0.206) (0.224) 
IN FLAb 35.2 28.2 3.8 13.6 
(27.62) (20.28) (3.30) (8.99) 
PROPERTYC 61.47 59.04 52.25 50.88 
(7.870) ( 1.336) (1.661) (2.681 ) 
GDPPCa 8.9161 8.2450 7.1534 6.2650 
(0.091) (0.032) (0.160) (0.113) 
Note: FOREIGN - the percentage of each bank's shares controlled by foreign investors; 
MAKS - market share variable calculated as the ratio of each bank's asset value divided by the whole banking sector assets; 
CR5 - a concentration ratio calculated as the sum of market shares for the largest five banks; 
MARGDP - the ratio of stock market capitalisation to GDP; 
INFLA - annual inflation rate; 
PROPERTY - an index of property rights from the Economic Freedom Index; 
GDPPC - The logarithm of per capita GDP of each year 
Sources: a: World Bank World Development Indicators, Nov 2007; 
b: IMF International Financial Statistics; 
C : The Heritage Foundation, 2008 
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3.4 Empirical results 
The results of the examination of the impact of foreign bank entry on banking sector 
competitive conditions are displayed in Table 3.4. The cross-bank regression models are 
estimated using GMM dynamic panel estimation for the combined four banking systems 
and individual banking systems. 
First of all, according to the results from Sargan and serial correlation tests, the 
application of GMM dynamic panel data estimator is valid in all five regression models. 
Also, the instrumental variable LERNER(t -1) is positive and significant in four out of 
five models, which suggests the current competitive conditions are positively affected by 
previous conditions and a significant degree of dynamics is presented in these cases and 
therefore further suggests the necessity for using a dynamic modelling approach. 
As can be seen in Table 3.4, the foreign ownership variable - FOREIGN is insignificantly 
related to the Lerner index in any regression model. As a result, in Argentina, Brazil, 
China and India, foreign ownership does not appear to significantly impact on 
competition conduct between 2000 and 2006. 
The bank level variable - MAKS, the market share of a bank in terms of total assets, on 
the other hand, provides mixed evidence that individual bank market share influences 
competitive conditions. The variable is significantly positive for Argentina, which 
suggests that large bank market shares may hinder competitions7 . The opposite holds, 
however, for Brazilian and Chinese banks. 
Two country level variables - CR5 and GDPPC were both dropped in some country 
estimates (CR5 in the China estimates and GDPPC in the Argentina, Brazil and India 
estimates) due to co-linearity. The assets concentration variable - CR5, shows a positive 
and significant effect on competition for Indian banks but a negative and significant 
impact in our pooled sample. Therefore, we cannot find strong evidence to support the 
SCP paradigm that higher levels of concentration are suggestive of less competition, 
which is consistent with the results from Claessens and Laeven (2003). GDPPC, the 
57 The independent variable MAKS is also positively significant in the pooled sample regression model. This result, 
however, may be mainly driven by Argentine sample 91 
logarithm of per capita GDP, nevertheless, is not significant in any regression model 
under study. As a result, there is little evidence to support the findings of Demirguc-Kunt 
et al. (2003) that a more developed economy tends to be related to a more competitive 
banking sector. 
MARGDP, the ratio of stock market capitalisation to GDP, measures the competitive 
pressure from the non-banking financial sector as alternative financial service providers 
(the relative size of the stock market to the overall size of economy is used as a proxy). 
Table 3.4 shows that for the pooled sample and Argentina, the development of the stock 
market does improve competition in the banking sector suggesting that banks face 
significant competition from other financial sectors. Indian banking, on the other hand, 
seems to be less competitive when the stock market has a larger capitalisation, perhaps 
suggesting that bank! non-bank relationships are more collusive than competitive (maybe 
due to the role of the state). 
The property right protection indicator, PROPERTY, which measures a country's 
institutional framework, is expected to have a positive impact on competition as a more 
complete institutional framework will encourage competition. As a high score shows 
better protection, a negative sign of the coefficient of this variable should be expected. 
However, only for India, PROPERTY appears to have significantly opposite effects, and 
for China, the effects are insignificant. Two regression models for Argentina and Brazil 
yield positive and significant results. 
The results from the variable INFLA, the inflation ratio, also contradict the general 
findings of a negative relationship between inflation and competition in banking (e.g. 
Claessens and Laeven, 2003). The hypothesis is that a high inflation economy may 
worsen efforts to increase competition. In face, we generally find the opposite for the 
pooled, Argentinean and Indian samples, higher inflation seems to exert significantly 
positive effects on competition. 
Overall, foreign bank entry, as measured by bank level foreign ownership, does not 
appear to significantly influence banking sector competition. As far as Argentina and 
Brazil are concerned, both have a larger foreign presence in their banking sectors, the 
majority of existing studies that examine Argentina and Brazil show that foreign bank 
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participation does significantly and positively impact on competitive conditions in the 
late 1990s (e.g. Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007; Gelos and Rold6s, 2002 etc.)58. However, 
it seems that if the positive impact exists, it can not be captured using the approach 
applied in this study. China and India, in contrast, both have lower levels of foreign bank 
presence and various restrictions on foreign bank entry remain. It may be the case that it 
is too early to observe the impact of foreign bank entry on competition in these two 
banking systems given the time period studied59. 
Claessens and Laeven (2003) suggest that contestability of a market determines the 
competition of a market, other than the level of foreign bank presence60 and relaxing 
foreign bank entry restrictions in emerging markets enhances contestability, but there 
well may be a limit to the competitive influence of foreign banks over the short-term (as 
in our study). Therefore, foreign ownership variables may have a relatively short-term 
impact on competition. 
Over a long-term the impact of foreign bank entry, on the other hand, may be reflected 
more In individual bank's efficiency improvements, and this may exert increased 
competitive pressure upon domestic banks (Claessens and Laeven, 2003; Martinez Peria 
and Mody, 2003; Berger, 2007). As a result, the process whereby domestic banks strive 
to become more efficient in order to compete with foreign banks may be a long-term 
phenomenon not captured in the relatively short-term nature of our study. This, we 
suggest, is an area of research that deserves greater academic attention in the future. 
58 With the exception of the study carried out by Yeyati and Micco (2007) examining eight Latin American markets. 
They find that foreign bank penetration is associated with w~~ker competition.. ., . 
59 According to Dobson and Kashyap (2006), direct competitIOn be~ween f~re~gn banks and dO.mestl.c banks m Ch~na 
not increase significantly in the near future, even though major restnctlOns have been lIfted m 2006. ForeIgn 
:a
y
ks in China may focus on less developed but high margin banking business like credit cards, investment, risk 
r::nagement, private banking, which Chinese domestic banks have n?t gained adv~n.tage to ~o~pete -:vith. 
60 Claessens and Laeven (2003) use two variables - Entry fit tes~ vanable and ActIVIty restnctlOn vanable to .measure 
the status of contestability of a banking systeI?' !hese. two vana~les are extract~d from a data base establIshe~ by 
Barth et al. (2001), which provides 107 countnes bankmg data pnor to 2000. ThIS paper does not capture the dIrect 
effect from the changes of contestability due to lack of data. 
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Table 3..+: The impact of foreign bank entry on competition In emerging markets - a 
dynamic approach 
Dependent variable: Lerner index (obtained by dynamic model) 
Pooled sample Argentina Brazil China India 
LERNER (t-I) 0.1253 ** 0.1261 ** 0.0557 * -0.1631 0.4924 ** 
(0.0121 ) (0.0313) (0.0242) (0.1630) (0.0248) 
FOREIGN 
-0.1539 0.3991 0.0621 -0.0517 0.0093 
(0.2876) (1.4331 ) (0.1488) (0.0595) (0.0774) 
MAKS 2.5792 * 59.8773 ** -5.3996 ** 
-0.0741 ** 
-0.3758 
(1.0876) ( 16.4929) ( 1.8256) (0.0206) (0.3591 ) 
CR5 
-0.2744 ** 5.1956 
-5.4524 0.7216 ** 
(0.0830) (3.8336) (2.9707) (0.1040) 
l\1ARGDP 
-0.8955 ** -2.6449 ** 
-1.7034 -0.0122 0.2811 ** 
(0.1039) (0.3535) (0.8785) (0.0238) (0.0661 ) 
INFLA 
-0.0057 ** -0.0374 * -0.0217 0.0025 -0.0484 ** 
(0.0014) (0.0176) (0.0139) (0.0031 ) (0.0059) 
PROPERTY 0.0060 0.0587 ** 0.1530 * 0.0055 -0.0307 * 
(0.0032) (0.0171) (0.0733) (0.0030) (0.0039) 
GDPPC -0.1298 0.8771 
(0.1666) (1.2352) 
Constant 0.1451** 0.6856 * 0.4338 -0.0875 0.2129 
Number of observations 1113 295 445 151 215 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.2085 0.6828 0.0919 0.7935 0.7695 
Serial correlation test 0.3229 0.4012 0.4908 0.2146 0.1951 (E-value) 
Note: Dependent variable is the Lerner index of individual bank from Argentina, Brazil, China and India or a particular country, 
which is previously obtained using the GMM dynamic panel data estimator for the years 2000-2006. All regressions are estimated 
using GMM dynamic panel data estimator. Two variables: CR5 and GDPPC were dropped in each country sub-sample due to 
co-linearity. Two tests (Sargan test and Serial correlation test) results are also reported to examine the validity of the GMM estimator. 
* Significantly different from zero at 5% level 
** Significantly different from zero at 1 % level 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
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3.5 Conclusions 
This study examines the impact of foreign bank entry on banking competitive conditions 
in Argentina, Brazil. China and India between 2000 and 2006. 
We use the Lerner index to measure the banking competition. As well as using a fixed 
effects estimator, the generalised method of moments (GMM) dynamic panel data 
estimator is applied to obtain the Lerner index in order to mitigate possible 
misspecifications due to long-run equilibrium assumption imposed by the fixed effects 
estimator. The results show that different estimators do yield noticeably different Lerner 
indices. in particular. the Lerner indices for Argentina, Brazil and India using the fixed 
effects estimator suggest greater competition than those found in studies of European 
banks in 1990s, although this is not the case when we use GMM dynamic estimations to 
derive our measure of market power. In general, if the long-run equilibrium assumption 
(under the fixed effects) is not imposed, on average, banks tend to operate with lower 
marginal costs, consequently, the market appears less competitive. Our results, therefore, 
tentatively suggest that the Lerner index estimated using the dynamic procedure is the 
preferred measure of competitive conditions. We then use this measure to see if foreign 
bank ownership has the impact on competitive conditions in the Argentinean, Brazilian, 
Chinese and Indian banking systems between 2000 and 2006. 
Using a dynamic panel regressIon model, we examIne the impact of foreign bank 
presence and other bank and country specific factors on banking competition. Overall, 
our results show that foreign bank entry, as measured by bank level foreign ownership, 
does not appear to significantly influence banking sector competition. As far as 
Argentina and Brazil are concerned, both have a larger foreign presence in their banking 
sectors, the majority of existing studies that examine Argentina and Brazil show that 
foreign bank participation does significantly and positively impact on competitive 
conditions in the late 1990s. However, it seems that if the positive impact exists, it can 
not be captured using the approach applied in this study. China and India, in contrast, 
both have lower levels of foreign bank presence and various restrictions on foreign bank 
entry remain. It may be the case that it is too early to observe the impact of foreign bank 
entry on competition in these two banking systems given the time period studied. 
Therefore, there well may be a limit to the competitive influence of foreign banks over 
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the short-term (as in our study). Therefore, foreign ownership variables may have a 
relatively short-term impact on competition. 
Over a long-term the impact of foreign bank entry, on the other hand, may be reflected 
more in individual bank's efficiency improvements, and this may exert increased 
competitive pressure upon domestic banks. As a result, the process whereby domestic 
banks strive to become more efficient in order to compete with foreign banks may be a 
long-term phenomenon not captured in the relatively short-term nature of our study. This, 
we suggest, is an area of research deserve greater academic attention in the future. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: Productivity Change in Emerging Market 
Banking Systems 
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Productivity Change in Emerging Market Banking Systems 
Abstract 
This study investigates the productivity change in four emerging market banking systems, 
namely Argentina, Brazil, China and India over the period 2000-2006. We employ a 
parametric approach that follows Berger and Mester (1999, 2003) to examine banks' 
optimisation processes (cost minimisation and profit maximisation); and then decompose 
the total gross changes of variable costs and profits to measure the cost and alternative 
profit productivity change respectively. The results show that all these banking systems 
suffered a slight decrease in cost productivity (apart from India) but also enjoyed profit 
productivity gains over the same period. This suggests that banks in the countries under 
study focused more on revenue generation compared to cost minimisation over the 
period. We also find some evidence that banks may have also exerted their market power 
to improve their profit maximisation process. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Much of the academic literature focusing on improvements in banking productivity 
relates to deregulation and advances in both financial and non-financial technologies in 
developed banking systems, namely, the US and EU (Berg et aI., 1992; Berger and 
Mester, 2003; Casu et aI., 2004 etc.). Many banking systems in emerging markets have 
also embarked on the processes of restructuring and deregulation in order to create sound 
and efficient banking institutions, improve the stability of the financial systems (to 
mitigate the risks of future financial crises) and support economic growth, which form 
crucial parts of economic transformation to a more market-oriented economy 
(Koutsomanoli-Filippaki et aI., 2009). These restructuring and deregulation measures in 
emerging markets broadly include relaxation or removal of foreign bank entry 
restrictions, consolidation within the banking systems, and privatisation of state-owned 
banks (Hawkins and Mihaljek, 2001). As a result, it may be expected that banks in these 
markets have also experienced changes in their productivity as suggested by evidence 
found in developed countries. 
This chapter investigates the productivity change in four major emergIng banking 
systems, namely Argentina, Brazil, China and India over the period 2000-2006. 
Productivity developments are believed to be an important issue for policymakers alike 
in these markets. First of all, an increase in bank productivity may result in lower prices, 
better services and improved allocation of capital, which in tum may further help 
economy grow (Casu et aI., 2004). Secondly, an analysis of productivity change may 
assist policymakers to evaluate the impact of their financial reform programmes 
(Koutsomanoli-Filippaki et aI., 2009). According to Casu et aI. (2004), an analysis of 
productivity differences across countries may also help identify potential success or 
failures of policy initiatives. We choose two relatively large emerging banking systems 
from Latin America (i.e. Argentina and Brazil) and Asia (i.e. China and India) 
respectively61. In fact, Latin American banking systems initiated their banking reforms 
much earlier and in a more dramatic manner compared to their Asian counterparts 
(Hawkins and Mihaljek, 2001). China and India, on the other hand, have implemented 
policy changes in a more steady and phased manner (RBI, 2005; CBRC, 2007). 
Therefore, it is interesting to examine whether Latin American countries like Argentina 
61 The parametric approach we apply requires relatively large bank samples, in particular in the second decomposition 
process. 
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and Brazil have experienced more productivity changes as a result of their more dramatic 
reform programmes since the early 2000s compared to those in Asia. 
This chapter aims to contribute to the extant literature as it is the first study (as far as we 
are aware) that uses a parametric approach following Berger and Mester (1999,2003) to 
examine the cost and alternative profit productivity change in major emerging banking 
systems. Much of the contemporary literature on bank productivity in emerging banking 
systems apply non-parametric methodologies and focus on specific countries 62 
(Koutsomanoli-Filippaki et aI., 2009). These studies typically find that there is little 
improvement of banking productivity despite all the reform efforts in recent years63. Our 
findings, however, suggest that the improvements in terms of profit productivity are 
significant in these major emerging banking markets (except for Argentinean banks that 
experienced more modest increases) over the period under study while there is a slight 
decrease in cost productivity. We also find that market power does seem to positively 
influence banks' profit maximisation process in Argentina and India when using various 
market power indicators. 
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 presents a review of the 
bank productivity literature. Section 4.3 first describes the parametric methodology, 
which estimates cost and alternative profit productivity change and further outlines the 
decomposition of productivity processes; we then use two regression models to 
investigate the impact of market power banks in these markets may have on their 
productivity change; we finish off this section by outlining the data sample used in this 
study. The results are presented in Section 4.4 and Section 4.5 concludes the chapter. 
62 For example, Bhattacharyya et al. (1997), Sathya (2001), Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003) and .Galagedera. a~d 
Edirisuriya (2005) study Indian banking pr~ducti~ity; K~~bhak~r and, Wang ~,2007) study bankI?g prod~CtiVIty 
change in China; Leightner and Lovell (1998) investigate t,hIS Issue m ThaIland; NJI~ ~2005) a~d GhanI an,d ,Sun (2000) 
, Malaysian banking productivity; Nakane and Wemtraub (2005) study BrazIlian bankmg productiVIty, 
examme , ' 'fi d ., b d l' , 
63 The exception is that Berger and Mester (2003) find a significant mcrease m pro It pro uCtlVIty ut a ec me m cost 
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4.2 Literature on productivity change in banking 
Generally speaking, there are two strands of literature that study productivity change and 
related issues in banking. The first, and most commonly used, employs non-parametric 
methodologies, specifically, the Malmquist total factor productivity (TFP) index, which 
uses linear programming techniques to measure TFP change between two data points by 
calculating the ratio of the distances of each data point relative to a common technology 
(Shephard, 1970; Fare et aI., 1994)64. This methodology has been extensively applied by 
many researchers. One of the earliest studies in banking is Berg et ai. (1992), which 
examines the productivity of Norwegian banks during 1980-1989 and finds that 
productivity grew significantly after deregulation took place. Wheelock and Wilson 
(1999), on the other hand, study all US banks between 1984 and 1993. They find that 
productivity declined on average due to reductions in efficiency. 
Recent academic literature regarding banking systems in emerging markets also typically 
employs non-parametric methodologies. For example, Bhattacharyya et ai. (1997) 
examine the productivity of Indian commercial banks during 1986-1991. They find that 
there was a marginal increase in productivity and publicly owned banks had better 
productivity performance compared to private or foreign banks. Sathya (2001) conducts 
a similar study that covers the period 1997-1998 and finds that privately owned banks 
still perform worse than public sector and foreign banks measured by productivity. 
Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003) examine the relationship between deregulation and TFP 
growth in Indian banking over 1985-1996 that covers both pre- and post-deregulation 
periods. They find no evidence of significant productivity change. A study covering a 
later period, 1995-2002, by Galagedera and Edirisuriya (2005) also do not observe any 
significant growth in productivity measured by Malmquist index in Indian banking. As 
far as Chinese banking is concerned, Kumbhakar and Wang (2007) examine 14 of the 
largest Chinese commercial banks and find that there was an annual 4.4% TFP growth 
over the period 1993-2002. More recently, Koutsomanoli-Filippaki et ai. (2009) study 
bank efficiency and productivity change across Central and East European countries for 
the period 1998-2003. They find recent improvements in productivity, which were 
probably driven by technological change rather than efficiency change. 
64 See Grosskopf (1993) and Fare et al. (1997) for a literature survey; or Ray and Desli (1997) and Mukherjee et al. 
(200 I) for a discussion of the conceptual framework. 
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The second strand of literature uses different parametric methodologies65 . For example, 
various studies (e.g. Berger and Humphrey, 1992; Bauer et al. 1993; Humphrey, 1993; 
Humphrey and Pulley, 1997; Stiroh, 2000) use a variety of econometric specifications to 
estimate either TFP growth or technological progress in US banking during the 1980s 
and 1990s. In general, these studies find small improvements in cost productivity (or 
profit productivity) after deregulation in the banking system (1984-1988). Similar 
studies have also been conducted using European banking data, for example, Williams 
(2001) finds that deregulation appears to have improved productivity of European saving 
banks during 1990-1998. On the other hand, to our knowledge, there is only one 
parametric study by Nakane and Weintraub (2005) regarding productivity estimates in 
Brazilian banking systems. 
All the non-parametric and parametric studies abovementioned mainly focus on cost 
productivity change 66. Berger and Mester (1999, 2003), nevertheless, employ a 
parametric approach to analyse the productivity change of all US banks over the period 
1984-1997 using three different optimisation concepts - cost minimisation, standard 
profit maximisation and alternative profit maximisation. They find that while cost 
productivity worsens, US banks achieve a dramatic profit productivity gain. They also 
argue that only analysing cost productivity change may not capture unmeasured changes 
in output quality over time or the profit maximisation goal of banks. In other words, 
while banks suffer from increased costs due to offering improved services and adopting 
new technologies, banks may be able to maximise profits by charging higher prices or 
expanding or maintaining market shares. Moreover, they also suggest that it is necessary 
to measure standard and alternative profit productivity change jointly in situations like 
when banks may exert their market power over their output prices, or there are increases 
over time in scale economies, or the output prices are not accurately measured (see 
Berger and Mester, 2003 for a detailed discussion). 
65 Casu et al. (2004) use both non-parametric and parametric methodologies to measure cost productivity change in 
European banking between 1994 and 2000. They find tha~ t~o approaches generally do not yield significantly different 
results in terms of identifying the components of productiVity growth. 
66 The exception is the study by Humphrey and Pulley (1997), which estimates changes in profit using the alternative 
profit function over the period 1977-1988. 
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4.3 Methodology and data sample 
This section presents the methodology applied and data set studied in this study. The 
methodology section of this study mainly includes two parts. First of all, we use 
trans-logarithmic cost and alternative profit functional forms to examine the banks' 
optimisation processes (cost minimisation and profit maximisation); and then use the 
parametric methodology to decompose the total gross changes of variable costs and 
profits to measure the productivity change respectively. In the latter part of methodology 
section, we also examine the impact of market power in these markets on cost and profit 
producti vi ty. 
4.3.1 Cost productivity change - a decomposition of the cost function 
The cost minimisation concept assumes that firms minimise their variable costs subject 
to exogenous business conditions including quantities of outputs, prices of variable 
inputs, managerial inefficiency and random error (Berger and Mester, 2003). This 
concept is implemented using a standard cost function that relates variable costs to these 
exogenously given conditions. In this study, we use a standard trans-logarithmic 
functional form67 . Our specification of the cost function is: 
1 
InC j =cxo +cx1InYl +cx 2 InY2 +~lInwl +~2Inw2 +~3Inw3 +"281IInYIInYI 
1 11  
+ - 8 22 In Y 2 In Y 2 + - 812 In Y I In Y 2 + - Y II In W I In WI + - Y 22 In W 2 In W 2 + -2 Y 33 In W 3 In W 3 2 2 2 2 
1 1 1 
+-Y12InwIlnw2 +-Y13Inwllnw3 +-Y23Inw2Inw3 +Pllinylinw l +Pl2 In yl lnw 2 
2 
+P13 In y1Inw 3 +P2IInY2Inwl +P22InY2Inw2 +P23InY2Inw3 +Inu e Inte 
(1) 
where C j is the bank's variable costs (financial and operating costs); the YI and Y2 
.. 68 h 
are output quantItIes ; t e WI W 2 and W 3 are input prices; and the standard 
67 Berger and Mester (1997) find that the trans-logarithmic functional ~orm and the F~urier~flexible f~nctional fo.rm, 
which is a global approximation that includes a standard trans-logarIthm plus FOUrIer trIgonometrIc terms, Yield 
statistically the same average level and dispersion of mea.sured ef~ciency. . 
68 Studies focusing on developed markets normally use mformatlOn on off-balance sheet items as well as one of the 
variable bank outputs or fixed netput (Berger and Mester, 2003; Casu, et ai., 2004). In this paper, however, off-?alan~e 
sheet items are not included due to lack of relevant data. Moreover, we also argue that off-balance sheet busmess m 
erging markets is still at very early stage, which may not have had a significant impact on production process. 
em h . . ) 
Therefore we do not include a proxy for off-balance sheet items either (sue as non-mterest mcome . 
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sYlnmetry and linear homogeneity restrictions apply. When defining bank outputs and 
inputs, this study follows a variation of the intermediation approach as originally 
proposed by Sealey and Lindley (1977). This is the most common apparoch used in the 
extant literature (Berger and Mester, 1997, 1999 and 2003; Akhavein et aI., 1997; Casu, 
et aI. 2004). Thus, the output quantities and input prices are defined as follows: 
Y 1 = total loans 
Y 2 = total securities69 
w 1 = price of labour: personnel costs/ total assets 70 
w 2 = price of deposits: financial costs (total interest paid on deposits) / total deposits 
W 3 = price of physical capital: operating costs (except personnel costs)/ fixed assets 
The In lie term in the equation (1) denotes an inefficiency factor that may raise costs 
above the best practice level and In te denotes random error. In order to distinguish the 
inefficiency term from the random error term, this study uses the distribution free method 
(Berger, 1993) that assumes there is core inefficiency for each firm over time that is 
distinguished from random error. According to this method, core inefficiency IS 
persistent over time whereas the random error tends to average out over time. 
The decomposition of the cost function previously estimated takes three steps. First of all, 
we represent the cost of the banking industry at time t by the predicted cost of a bank 
with average business conditions, average inefficiency for the period and a zero random 
error. This gives exp[f Ct (XCt )] x exp[ln /-lCt ] ,where XCt gives the average values of the 
business condition regressors at time t and In /-lCt gives the average value of the 
inefficiency factor. The total gross change in cost between period t and period t +k, 
therefore, is measured by the ratio of the predicted costs in the two periods: 
~TOT ALCt,t+k == {exp[f Ct+k (XCt+k)] x exp[ln /-lCt+k]} / {exp[f Ct (XCt )] x exp[ln /-lCt]} (2) 
Then ~TOTALc can be further decomposed into the gross changes in best practice, 
69 This category is measured as gross total assets less total loans and physical capital. Therefore, all financial assets are 
included. 
70 There is no available information on the number of bank employees in the data base - BankScope used as the source 
of bank data in this paper, so the cost of the labour is proxied as a quotient between personnel costs and total assets 
following Casu, et al. (2004). 
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inefficiency and business conditions: 
~TOTALCt,t+k 
= {exp[f Ct+k (X Ct )] / exp[f Ct (XCt )]} 
x {exp[ln JlCt+k ] / exp[ln JlCt ] } 
x {exp[f Ct+k (XCt+k )] / exp[f Ct+k (XCt )]} 
(Change in best practice) 
(Change in inefficiency) 
(Change in business condition) 
== M3ESTPR Ct,t+k X ~INEFFCt,t+k x M3USCOND Ct,t+k (3) 
Thus, the total gross change in cost is decomposed into three multiplicative terms. The 
change in best practice, M3ESTPR C ' gives the change in costs due to changes in the best 
practice cost function f C (.) , since it holds business conditions and inefficiency constant. 
Similarly, ~FFc gives the contributions from changes in inefficiency and 
M3USCOND C gives the contributions from changes in business conditions. All three 
terms are measured as gross changes, therefore a value below one indicates falling costs 
and above one rising costs. 
Finally, cost productivity change is the product of the change in best practice and the 
change in inefficiency: 
&ROD Ct,t+k == M3ESTPR Ct,t+k x ~INEFFCt,t+k 
= {exp[f Ct+k (XCt )]/ exp[f Ct (XCt )] } x {exp[ln JlCt+k] / exp[ln JlCt] } (4) 
We use a version of the thick frontier method to measure M3ESTPR C (Berger and 
Humphrey, 1991). For each year, banks with residuals in the 'best' category in each 
country (i.e. 25% of banks with the lowest cost residuals) are assumed to be best practice. 
We then estimate the best practice cost function using OLS on the most efficient quartile 
ofbanks71 . 
71 Due to relatively small size of the samples under study and uncertainty involved in the estimation of the thick 
frontier as noted by Berger and Mester (2003), the decomposition of productivity into two components should be 
regarded less accurate. 
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.. 1.3.2 Profit productivity change - a decomposition of the alternative profit 
function 
There are two profit maximisation concepts, 1.e. standard and alternative profit 
maximisation, which assume that firms maximise their variable profits subject to 
exogenous business conditions. Standard profit maximisation differs from alternative 
profit maximisation in terms of the specification of business condition (Berger and 
Mester, 2003). Standard profit maximisation is implemented using a profit function that 
specifies output prices as part of the business conditions instead of the output quantities 
(total loans and total securities) specified in the cost function, while other business 
conditions remain the same. The alternative profit maximisation concept has the same 
objective as the standard profit maximisation concept, but employs the same set of 
business conditions as under the cost minimisation concept as illustrated in section 3.1. 
Due to the problem of availability of information on output prices, we, therefore, in this 
study only analyse the alternative profit maximisation process. Consequently, our 
specification of the alternative profit function is given by: 
1 
In(1tj +8)=a.o +a.1 1nY1 +a. 21nY2 +~11nw1 +~21nw2 +~3Inw3 +"28111nY11nY1 
1 1 1 1 1 
+ "2822 In Y 2 In Y 2 +"2 812 In Y 1 In Y 2 +"2 Y 11 In W 1 In W 1 +"2 Y 22 In W 2 In W 2 + 2 Y 33 In W 3 In W 3 
1 1 1 
+ - Y 12 In W 1 In W 2 + - Y 13 In W 1 In W 3 + - Y 23 In W 2 In W 3 + P 11 In Y 1 In W 1 + P 12 In Y 1 In W 2 
2 2 2 
+ P 13 In Y 1 In W 3 + P 21 In Y 2 In W 1 + P 22 In Y 2 In W 2 + P 23 In Y 2 In W 3 + In U em In tan 
(5) 
where 1t j is the bank's variable profits including all interest and fee income minus 
variable costs C j , which is used in the cost function; 8 is a scalar added to the profits 
of every bank, which remain the same in a given year (as profits may be negative, so that 
the logarithm is taken of a positive value after adding a scalar); Y 1 and Y 2 are output 
quantities that are the same as the ones defined in the cost function (equation 1); and the 
WI W 2 and W 3 are input prices that remain the same in all three optimisation 
functional forms; and the standard symmetry and linear homogeneity restrictions apply. 
Analogous to the cost function, the In u an term in the equation (5) denotes an 
inefficiency factor that is zero for best practice banks and negative for other banks, which 
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reduces their profits below best practice level, and In tan denotes random error with a 
mean of zero each year. 
The decomposition of alternative profit function is similar to the cost function case with 
minor changes due to the addition of a scalar 8. The total gross change in profit between 
period t and t+k is given by: 
~TOT ALam,t+k == {exp[f ant+k (Xam+k)] x exp[ln J.lam+k] - 8t+k } 
/ { exp[ f am (X ant )] x exp[ln J.lmtt ] - 8 t } 
(6) 
Here, a value below one indicates worsened profits and a value greater than 1 indicates 
improvement in profits. Then ~TOTALa1[ can be decomposed into the gross changes in 
best practice, inefficiency and business conditions: 
~ESTPRam,t+k = {exp[fam+k (Xam )] - 8t+k } / {exp[fam (Xam )] - 8t } 
MNEFFam,t+k = ({ exp[f am+k (Xam+k)] x exp[ln J.lam+k] - 8t+k } /{ exp[f am (Xam )] x exp[ln J.lant] - 8t) / 
({ exp[f am+k (Xmtt+k )] - 8 t+k } /{ exp[f am (Xam )] - 8t }) 
~USCOND am,t+k = {exp[f am+k (Xam+k )] - 8t+k } / {exp[f am+k (Xam )] - 8t+k } (7) 
Finally, similar to the thick frontier method used to estimate the best practice cost 
function, 25% of the banks that have the highest profit residuals are assumed as best 
practice profit function for that year. 
4.3.3 The impact of market power on banking productivity change 
After having outlined the three optimisation processes and their components that explain 
the productivity change in the US banking, Berger and Mester (2003) further investigate 
the impact of market power on output prices setting, which may contribute to the 
improved profit productivity according to their findings. We follow a similar approach 
and also examine the impact of market power on productivity by estimating the 
following simple regression models: 
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LWROD Cj =a\&ERNER i,' +a2~AKSiJ' +al~CR5, +a4TREND, +£, . . J J I 
(8) 
and 
LWROD a1t =a\&ERNER i +a2~MAKSi +a3~CR5i +a4TREND i +£i 
(9) 
where LWROD c - changes in cost productivity; LWROD a1t - changes in alternative 
profit productivity; 
&ERNER - changes in the Lerner index for each bank; 
~KS - changes of each bank's market share variable (calculated as the ratio of each 
bank's asset value divided by the whole banking sector assets); 
~CR5 - changes of a concentration ratio (calculated as the sum of market shares for the 
largest five banks); 
TREND is time trend variable used to capture the effects of technical change over time; 
As the dependent variables LWROD c and LWROD a1t measure the changes in 
productivity instead of the' level' , we use differenced independent variables accordingly. 
For example, the independent variable &ERNER is defined as the changes of each 
bank each year's Lerner index compared to its previous year (year 2000 as the base year). 
Compared to the study by Berger and Mester (2003), instead of regressing output prices 
on market power variables, we directly test the influence of market power (measured by 
the Lerner index, market share and concentration ratio jointly) on cost and profit 
productivity change during 2000-2006. Moreover, apart from using conventional market 
power indicators (market share and concentration ratio) that are similar to those used in 
Berger and Mester (2003)72, we also use a bank level indicator - the Lerner index to 
measure the competition conditions in these four emerging markets. The Lerner index is 
defined as the difference between price and marginal cost, divided by price. This index 
measures bank's ability to set prices above marginal cost, being an inverse function of 
the elasticity of demand and of the number of banks (Freixas and Rochet, 1997). The 
Lerner index for each market during 2000-2006 is obtained from estimates obtained in 
the Chapter 3 of this thesis where we use the GMM dynamic panel data procedure 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991)73. 
72 They use a concentration variable (Herfindahl index) as well as some variables that indicate the geographic 
restrictions on competition and bank merger information. 
73 When estimating the cost function in order to yield marginal cost and then the Lerner index, we apply the Arellano 
and Bond GMM dynamic panel data estimator. As far as the GMM dynamic panel data estimator is concerned, a 
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Compared to LERNER, MAKS is the assets market share of each bank and has been 
widely used in the empirical banking literature as an bank level indictor of relative 
market power. Previous studies have shown that banks with larger market share can exert 
market power (Berger, 1995; More and Nagy, 2003; Jeon and Miller, 2005). We also 
include a traditional market structure variable - the 5-bank concentration ratio (CR5) 
defined as the sum of the assets market shares for the largest five banks (Claessens and 
Laeven, 2003; Demirgtic-Kunt et aI., 2004). Banks in highly concentrated markets may 
exploit more market power according to the SCP paradigm. The data for MAKS and 
CR5 are obtained from calculations of these variables presented in the Chapter 3 for 
these four markets under study. At last, a time TREND is used to capture the effects of 
technical change over time 74. 
4.3.4 Data sample 
Our data sample is mainly drawn from the Bankscope database and consists of 289 Asian 
and Latin American banks from Argentina (71 banks), Brazil (102 banks), China (52 
banks) and India (64 banks) from 2000 to 2006. Four types of banks are included: 
commercial banks, savings banks, cooperative banks and bank holding companies 75. 
Bank data are extracted from consolidated accounts, if available. Otherwise they are 
from unconsolidated accounts, so double counting is avoided. Three selection criteria are 
then applied as follows: first of all, the 1st and 99th percentile of the distribution of the 
each variable are treated as outliers. Secondly, bank data are deleted if any input price is 
missing. Thirdly, the sample only comprises continuously operating institutions in order 
to avoid the impact of entry and exit over the time period as suggested by Stiroh (2000). 
Table 4.1 shows the summary of all variables of banks in four emerging banking systems 
from our pooled samples. As it can be seen, Argentinean banks have relatively the 
smallest balance sheets whereas Chinese banks have the largest. Brazilian banks, 
lagged dependent variable is added allowing for dynamics in the specification of th~ regr~ssio~ model, then the 
formulation is first-differenced to eliminate the individual effects. See Chapter 3 for detaIled dISCUSSIOns. 
74 For each period, TREND takes different value, which starts from TREND=I for the period 2000-2001; for the 
period 2001-2002, 2002-2003, 2003-2004, 2004:2005 an~ ~005-2006, TREND=2, 3,4,5 and 6 respect.ively. . 
75 Some previous studies focus on large banks productIVIty change. For example, Casu et ~l. examIne ba~ks WIth 
assets more than euro 450 million; Berger and Mester (2003), however, study all US commercIal banks. In thIS paper, 
we study all types of banks due to small size of the sample. 
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nevertheless, appear to be relatively larger than Indian banks in terms of their production 
processes. Moreover, Chinese banks tend to have the highest value of loans and other 
financial assets, which, however, does not generate equivalent size of profits. For 
example, Chinese banks' average value of loans is almost as much as 12 times of 
Brazilian banks' average loans according to Table 4.1, but the average value of profits of 
Chinese banks is only twice that of Brazilian banks'. Finally, Chinese and Indian banks 
all tend to have lower input prices compared to banks from two Latin American markets. 
In particular, Chinese banks have the lowest input prices of labour and deposits. Table 
4.2 further illustrates the mean values of all variables from each year. Comparatively, 
Argentinean banks seem to have achieved the poorest profits, in particular between 2001 
and 2004, with widespread losses in the industry. Other markets, on the other hand, all 
witness an improvement in terms of profitability; in particular Brazilian banks have the 
greatest improvement. Cost levels, however, have increased in all markets over the 
period. 
Ito 
Table 4.1: Summary statistics on costs, profits, output quantities and input prices (pooled 
data 2000-2006) 
Argentina 
Brazil 
China 
India 
Mean 
Stdev 
Mean 
Stdev 
Mean 
Stdev 
Mean 
Stdev 
C 
136.85 
331.55 
1330.87 
3324.43 
1933.35 
5440.01 
677.57 
1591.17 
1t 
-14.06 
108.72 
137.89 
409.31 
298.29 
1043.14 
71.34 
166.42 
443.63 
953.35 
2601.53 
6586.99 
30886.75 
85602.83 
3540.16 
7838.30 
Y2 
602.28 
1210.19 
5114.88 
13021.09 
24426.26 
71117.49 
4019.92 
9874.91 
0.0514 
0.0669 
0.0269 
0.0273 
0.0088 
0.0048 
0.0136 
0.0065 
W 2 
0.1049 
0.3616 
1.3236 
0.2590 
0.0219 
0.0120 
0.0657 
0.0169 
3.3160 
11.3790 
19.5035 
0.4680 
1.0148 
1.9078 
0.9947 
0.8723 
Note: C = variable costs (US$ mil.); 1t = variable profits (US$ mil.); Y 1 = total loans (US$ mil.); y 2 = total securities (US$ mil.); 
WI = price of labour: personnel costs/ total assets; W 2 = price of deposits: financial costs (total interest paid on deposits) / total deposits; 
W 3 = price of physical capital: operating costs (except personnel costs)/ fixed assets. 
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Table 4.2: Average costs, profits, output quantities and input prices 2000-2006 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
C Argentina 131.75 129.51 319.84 100.68 79.23 95.00 101.97 
Brazil 1101.55 1320.54 1731.73 1189.97 1176.64 1347.33 1448.32 
China 1599.66 1625.20 1667.34 1765.94 1906.11 2238.04 2731.12 
India 596.67 622.80 640.27 692.95 699.51 711.78 779.01 
Argentina 0.10 -0.68 -84.69 -29.79 -4.88 6.84 14.64 
Brazil 53.50 97.42 182.48 133.32 138.37 175.59 184.56 
China 209.51 213.91 221.10 264.47 328.49 373.96 476.61 
India 51.96 49.37 56.78 73.87 98.03 82.31 87.31 
YI Argentina 549.15 539.08 423.26 343.47 384.76 411.05 454.67 
Brazil 2058.72 2265.28 2375.39 2362.83 2625.30 3014.45 3508.76 
China 24371.07 25478.35 27182.15 30094.80 33162.19 35535.95 40382.73 
India 2645.36 2773.27 2880.15 3102.67 3513.85 4353.07 5512.77 
Y., Argentina 684.94 461.35 610.44 641.60 658.43 582.09 577.14 
Brazil 4295.29 4636.94 5085.86 4917.37 4978.01 5508.90 6381.81 
China 18195.10 19045.09 20191.56 21720.58 23557.11 31198.46 37075.94 
India 3557.93 3663.18 3721.81 3897.00 4349.14 4453.88 4496.50 
WI Argentina 0.0429 0.0538 0.0682 0.0435 0.0420 0.0456 0.0638 
Brazil 0.0308 0.0281 0.0309 0.0258 0.0236 0.0256 0.0230 
China 0.0098 0.0096 0.0088 0.0087 0.0085 0.0083 0.0079 
India 0.0148 0.0147 0.0139 0.0137 0.0129 0.0126 0.0123 
w 2 Argentina 0.0632 0.0924 0.3540 0.0821 0.0375 0.0399 0.0654 
Brazil 0.2175 0.2130 0.2877 0.1821 0.1607 0.1981 0.1704 
China 0.0268 0.0246 0.0189 0.0194 0.0186 0.0216 0.0236 
India 0.0791 0.0776 0.0767 0.0702 0.0569 0.0498 0.0494 
W3 Argentina 3.0371 3.1095 3.9714 1.6215 3.0251 4.7359 3.7116 
Brazil 15.6296 16.1658 27.0642 16.5107 2l.l305 22.4733 17.5503 
China 0.9068 0.8637 0.7294 0.9518 1.0268 1.1762 1.4488 
India 0.7681 0.7932 0.9993 1.0021 1.0405 1.1053 1.2547 
Note: C = variable costs (US$ mil.); It = variable profits (US$ mil.); Y I = total loans (US$ miL); y 2 = total securities (US$ miL); 
WI = price of labour: personnel costs/ total assets; w 2 = price of deposits: financial costs (total interest paid on deposits) / total deposits; 
W 3 = price of physical capital: operating costs (except personnel costs)/ fixed assets. 
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4.4 Empirical results 
In this section, we first present the results from the parametric methodology, which 
measures cost and alternative profit productivity change. Then we report the results from 
the regression models that show the impact of market power on cost and profit 
productivity change. 
4.4.1 Main empirical results - cost and alternative profit productivity change 
Table 4.3 and 4.4 report the total changes in costs and profits over time (~ TOTAL) and 
the decompositions of these total changes into their ~ PROD, ~ BUSCOND, 
~ BESTPR and ~ INEFF components for all banks in Argentina, Brazil, China and 
India between 2000 and 2006. The rows in the table not only show the changes over one 
year period, but also present annualised measures for the entire period with 2000 serving 
as the base year. 
According to Table 4.3, the cost (~TOTALc) fell for Argentinean banks at an annual rate 
of 7.9% over the entire 2000-2006 interval, increasing in the first two years, and then 
decreasing sharply from 2002 to 2005. Moreover, the decomposition of the cost changes 
suggests that cost productivity worsened slightly over the entire period rising at an 
annual rate of 1.85%, while the business conditions as a whole reduced cost 
(LlliUSCOND
c 
< 1). The results for Brazilian banks are somewhat similar to the results 
from Argentina. The cost declined by 3.8% over 2000 and 2006 but cost productivity 
worsened at almost the same rate. Meanwhile, business conditions do not seem to affect 
costs over all years. In China, the total cost of the average bank increased at an annual 
rate of 11 %, which was mainly caused by unfavourable business conditions 
(LlliUSCONQ > 1). The cost productivity, on the other hand, merely declined 1 % over 
these 7 years. Indian banks also experienced a decrease of total cost like Argentinean and 
Brazilian banks. However, such change was the result of improved cost productivity at a 
rate of 5%. 
Equation (4) shows that cost productivity (M>ROD c) can be further decomposed into 
LlliESTPR c and ~INEFFc. The results show that while there is no change for Brazilian 
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banks in best practice there was a minor unfavourable shift for banks in Argentina and 
China over the entire period (0.1 % and 0.08% respectively). The opposite, however, 
holds for banks from India with a 6.2% increase, while best practice does not appear to 
affect cost productivity (LlliESTc = 1 ). On the other hand, inefficiency for banks from all 
four markets has increased slightly over the seven years' period. 
Table 4.4 shows the results of decomposing gross changes in profits into vanous 
components using the alternative profit functions. In general, banks in Argentina had 
losses at an annual rate of 14.6% over the intervaC6. The profit (~TOTALarJ increased 
considerably (nearly 11 % annually from 2000 to 2006), for Indian banks mainly due to a 
favourable profit gross change between 2000 and 2001 77 . In terms of banks in Brazil and 
China, profit rose at an annual rate of about 8% over the entire period. 
After decomposing gross changes in profit into changes in profit productivity (M>ROI1n) 
and changes in business conditions (&3USCONQJ, we can find that profit productivity 
appears to contribute to the gross profit change in all four banking systems. The annual 
increase in productivity rates range from 1 % to 8.6%. Moreover, the unfavourable 
changes in gross profit in Argentina seem to be affected by the changes in business 
conditions (&3USCONVn < 1), which may be brought out by the poor economy during 
the financial crisis. Nevertheless, in the other three banking systems changes in business 
conditions also improve the profits. 
The results of further decomposition of changes in profit productivity into changes in 
best practice and inefficiency in Table 4.4 show that changes in best practice tend to 
improve profits in all these four markets over the period. Inefficiency, on the other hand, 
only slightly affects the improvement of profit productivity. 
Overall, all these emergIng banking systems suffered a slight decrease in cost 
productivity except for India, but meanwhile enjoyed some profit productivity gains over 
the time period under study. The results, therefore, are somewhat similar to the ones from 
76 Argentinean banks suffered huge losses during the financial crisis between 1999 and 2002. Only in 2005, did the 
banking sector overall make profits since the crisis sta~ed (B~RA, .2006).. . 
77 This favourable change could be driven by 19 IndIan natIOnalIsed banks In 2001, whIch on average reported a 
131.87 percent increase that were largely attributable to record gains from their treasury operations (RBI, 2002). 
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Berger and Mester (2003)78. The possible explanation may be that banks in emerging 
markets have engaged in updating technologies, offering a wider range of financial 
services, this includes offering more ATM and internet based services, expanding the 
availability of debit and credit cards etc. The adoption of new technologies is likely to 
increase banks' costs, hence the poor cost productivity. However, banks may have 
strategically focused more on revenue generation by offering a wider range of products 
and services, increasing prices and bolstering market shares. The latter two factors could 
be related to banks exerting greater market power79 , and next section may shed some 
light on this issue. 
The fact that we find conflicting results comparing cost and profit productivity suggests 
that it is necessary to consider the latter if we are to accurately evaluate the performance 
of banking systems especially as cost productivity may not capture the profit 
maximisation goal of banks. Compared to findings on US commercial banks (Berger and 
Mester, 2003)80, the profit productivity improvements found in the emerging banking 
systems under study are also relatively large (except Argentina). However, as banks in 
emerging markets are generally less efficient than those in developed markets (Hawkins 
and Mihaljek, 2001) and positive profit productivity change does not reflect the levels of 
productivity, we, therefore, argue that more investment in new technologies, services and 
management brought about by further deregulation are still needed in the future to realise 
greater profit productivity improvements in these markets. 
78 Berger and Mester (2003) find that profit productivity imp~oved over ~he entire ~eriod from 1984 to 1997 and. t,:"o 
subintervals while cost productivity deteriorated at the same time. In partIcular, dunng 1991-1997, profit productiVIty 
had substantial increase using standard and alternative profit approaches. 
79 Greater market power may be the result of substantial consolidation process in emerging banking markets since the 
iddle of the 1990s. There are a number of factors that contribute to the consolidation. For example, there were ~vernment-Ied mandatory mergers and acquisitions after financial crises (Hawkins and Mihaljek, 2001), foreign ~ ks have expanded their activities after the lifting of various entry restrictions (Berger, 2007; IMF, 2007), and major 
a.n te banks have sought to expand market share, particularly in Brazil (Gelos and Rold6s 2002). 
pnva d d I . fi d .. . I 80 Brand Mester (2003) find a 9% and 11 % increase in standar an a ternatlve pro It pro uctlvlty respectIve y. 
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Table 4.3: Measured gross changes in cost: total change, productivity change, business 
condition change, best practice frontier change and inefficiency change 
Country Year ~TOTALc M>ROQ mUSCON{: LlliESTP~ ~INEFFc 
Argentina 2000-2001 1.0135 0.9648 1.0505 0.9367 1.0300 
2001-2002 1.1148 1.2558 0.8877 1.2119 1.0362 
2002-2003 0.8924 0.7454 1.1971 0.7284 1.0234 
2003-2004 0.8909 1.3560 0.6570 1.3210 1.0265 
2004-2005 0.9173 1.2126 0.7565 1.2001 1.0104 
2005-2006 1.0203 0.7372 1.3840 0.7321 1.0070 
2000-2006 0.9210 1.0185 0.9043 1.0010 1.0175 
Brazil 2000-2001 1.0473 0.9717 1.0778 0.9502 1.0227 
2001-2002 1.0169 1.0877 0.9349 1.0702 1.0163 
2002-2003 0.8779 1.1442 0.7673 1.1356 1.0076 
2003-2004 1.0051 0.9840 1.0214 0.9657 1.0189 
2004-2005 0.9943 0.9409 1.0567 0.9336 1.0079 
2005-2006 1.0382 1.0386 0.9997 1.0266 1.0117 
2000-2006 0.9701 1.0093 0.9611 1.0000 1.0093 
China 2000-2001 1.0175 0.9763 1.0422 0.9657 1.0109 
2001-2002 0.9949 0.9707 1.0249 0.9597 1.0114 
2002-2003 1.0238 0.9620 1.0643 0.9583 1.0038 
2003-2004 1.0207 1.0286 0.9923 1.0247 1.0038 
2004-2005 1.0236 1.0901 0.9390 1.0848 1.0049 
2005-2006 1.0276 1.0206 1.0068 1.0078 1.0127 
2000-2006 l.l126 1.0100 1.1016 1.0008 1.0092 
India 2000-2001 1.0079 1.0438 0.9657 1.0378 1.0058 
2001-2002 0.9938 1.0936 0.9087 1.0879 1.0052 
2002-2003 0.9828 l.l174 0.8796 l.l005 1.0153 
2003-2004 0.9924 1.2568 0.7896 1.2467 1.0081 
2004-2005 0.9885 1.2010 0.8231 1.1666 1.0295 
2005-2006 1.0076 0.8441 1.1937 0.8323 1.0142 
2000-2006 0.9731 0.9493 1.0250 0.9385 1.0115 
Note: a number> 1 indicates an adverse shift towards higher costs; a number<l indicates a favourable shift. 
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Table 4.4: Measured gross changes in profit uSIng alternative profit function: total 
change, productivity change, business condition change, best practice frontier change 
and inefficiency change 
Year ~TOTALarr M>ROQrr LlliUSCONVrr LlliESTP~ ~INEFFarr 
Argentina 2000-2001 0.9982 1.0011 0.9971 0.9954 1.0057 
2001-2002 0.8039 0.9025 0.8907 0.9430 0.9571 
2002-2003 0.9942 1.0006 0.9936 1.0013 0.9993 
2003-2004 1.1092 1.0034 1.1054 1.0067 0.9967 
2004-2005 1.0963 1.0341 1.0601 1.0293 1.0047 
2005-2006 1.1714 1.0232 1.1448 1.0030 1.0201 
2000-2006 0.8536 1.0101 0.8451 1.0313 0.9794 
Brazil 2000-2001 0.8862 1.0200 0.8689 1.0054 1.0145 
2001-2002 0.8475 1.0011 0.8466 1.0003 1.0008 
2002-2003 1.4491 1.2346 1.1737 1.2125 1.0182 
2003-2004 1.0010 1.0000 1.0010 1.0032 0.9968 
2004-2005 0.9994 1.0005 0.9989 1.0020 0.9985 
2005-2006 0.9985 1.0010 0.9975 1.0036 0.9974 
2000-2006 1.0871 1.0521 1.0333 1.0430 1.0087 
China 2000-2001 0.9997 1.0013 0.9984 1.0034 0.9979 
2001-2002 1.0152 0.9992 1.0160 1.0007 0.9985 
2002-2003 0.9348 1.0024 0.9325 1.0113 0.9912 
2003-2004 1.0391 1.0243 1.0144 1.0430 0.9821 
2004-2005 1.0832 1.0569 1.0249 1.0326 1.0235 
2005-2006 1.0513 1.0247 1.0260 1.0593 0.9673 
2000-2006 1.0750 1.0512 1.0226 1.0421 1.0087 
India 2000-2001 1.1277 1.0550 1.0689 1.0750 0.9814 
2001-2002 0.9017 0.9895 0.9112 1.0200 0.9701 
2002-2003 1.0924 1.0001 1.0923 1.1301 0.8850 
2003-2004 1.0131 1.0003 1.0128 1.0205 0.9802 
2004-2005 0.9796 0.9732 1.0066 1.0220 0.9523 
2005-2006 0.9973 1.0064 0.9910 1.0221 0.9846 
2000-2006 1.1094 1.0866 1.0210 1.1074 0.9812 
Note: a number> 1 indicates a favourable shift towards higher profits; a number< 1 indicates an adverse shift. 
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4.4.2 Impact of market power on banking productivity 
Table 4.5 and 4.6 show the results from two regressions that investigate the effects of 
market power on cost and alternative profit productivity change. In particular, we focus 
on whether there is a positive impact on alternative profit productivity, possibly through 
price setting and market share exploitation. M'ROD c and M'ROD em estimated in 
previous section are used as dependent variables respectively. 
We find that market power only significantly improves cost and profit productivity in 
Argentina when it is measured by the Lerner index. The impact of market power, on the 
other hand, is insignificant in other three banking markets. When using market share as 
the market power indicator, however, the larger the market share Argentinean banks have, 
the lower cost and profit productivity they achieve. Therefore, the results suggest that 
large banks, in particular those expand their market share rapidly, may not be able to 
improve their productivity in Argentina. But Indian banks seem to have exploited their 
market share in order to improve their profitability. At last, when we use the CR5 ratio to 
measure the influence of banking sector concentration, it appears that a more 
concentrated banking market tends to have improved cost productivity (except Brazil) 
but lower profit productivity. These results may suggest that banks in these relatively 
concentrated emerging markets, especially for those large state-owned banks in China 
and India, may still not have the willingness to invest on information technology, 
management etc., 
Therefore, there is some evidence in these four emerging markets that market power does 
influence productivity change; in particular in Argentina and India, banks do appear to 
exert their market power to improve their profit productivity. Overall, however, the 
results appear somewhat inconsistent when we apply different market power variables81 . 
81 Our results may also indirectly suggest that various market power indicators are not interchangeable and the choice 
of indicator may significantly affect the interpretation of a market's competitive conditions as suggested by Carb6 et al. 
(2007) who find that five commonly used indi~ators (one s~ructural indicat?r - the Hirsc?man-Herfindah~ i~dex, and 
four non-structural indicators including the net Interest margIn/total asset ratIO, the Lerner Index, the H-statlstlc and the 
return on assets ratio) yield conflicting results about competitive conditions within and across 14 European countries 
and over time (between 1995 and 2001). 
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Table 4.5: Measured impact of market power on changes In cost productivity In 
Argentina, Brazil, China and India 2000-2006 
Argentina Brazil China India 
~ LERNER -0.0257 *** 0.0033 -0.0498 -0.1849 
(0.0061 ) (0.0036) (0.0450) (0.1157) 
~MAKS 6.5,,),5,,), ** 0.0353 -0.0186 -1.9945 
(3.1635) (0.5795) (0.0970) (1.2631 ) 
~CR5 -0.5188 0.6309 *** -0.9277 *** -0.4051 *** 
(0.3925) (0.1239) (0.0844) (0.1140) 
TREND -0.0144 -0.0209 *** 0.0238 *** -0.0170 *** 
(0.00900 (0.0030) (0.0014) (0.0061 ) 
constant 1.0956 *** 1.0958 *** 0.9188 *** 1.1635 *** 
Note: The dependent variable is changes in cost productivity; the independent variables are all differenced: LERNER (Lerner index), 
MAKS (market share) of individual bank, and CR5 (5-bank concentration ratio) from Argentina, Brazil, China and India are obtained 
in the previous chapter for the years 2000-2006. 
** Significantly different from zero at 5% level 
*** Significantly different from zero at I % level 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
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Table 4.6: Measured impact of market power on changes In alternative profit 
productivity in Argentina, Brazil, China and India 2000-2006 
Argentina Brazil China India 
~ LERNER 0.0028 *** 0.0015 -0.0233 0.0172 
(0.0005) (0.0046) (0.0217) (0.0160) 
~MAKS -0.6797 ** 0.0551 -0.0075 0.6388 *** 
(0.2854) (0.7265) (0.0467) (0.1743) 
~CR5 -0.7441 *** -0.8030 *** -0.3325 *** -0.0786 *** 
(0.0354) (0.1553) (0.0407) (0.0157) 
TREND 0.0094 *** 0.0040 0.0109 *** -0.0093 *** 
(0.0008) (0.0037) (0.0007) (0.0008) 
constant 0.9517 *** 1.0414 *** 0.9783 *** 1.0394 *** 
Note: The dependent variable is changes in alternative profit productivity; the independent variables are all differenced: LERNER 
(Lerner index), MAKS (market share) of individual bank, and CRS (5-bank concentration ratio) from Argentina, Brazil, China and 
India are obtained in the previous chapter for the years 2000-2006. 
** Significantly different from zero at 5% level 
*** Significantly different from zero at I % level 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
120 
4.5 Conclusions 
This study investigates the productivity change in four major emerging banking markets, 
namely Argentina, Brazil, China and India over the period 2000-2006. We employ a 
parametric approach that follows Berger and Mester (1999, 2003) to examine banks' 
optimisation processes (cost minimisation and profit maximisation); and then decompose 
the total gross changes of variable costs and profits to measure the productivity change 
respectively. 
We find that all these emerging banking systems suffered a slight decrease in cost 
productivity apart from in India, although they all enjoyed some profit productivity gains 
over the time period under study. The possible explanation for these findings may relate 
to the increased costs incurred by banks as they implement new technologies and 
broaden the array of products and services on offer. It is also likely that banks have 
strategically prioritized revenue expansion over cost minimization and that is why profit 
productivity has increased whereas cost productivity (apart from in India) has fallen. We 
also find some evidence that banks in emerging markets may have exerted market power 
to boost their profit productivity (depending on the market power indicator used). 
Overall, despite the profit productivity changes in the four emerging markets under study 
remain significant. We still argue that further reforms may be needed to try and foster 
greater productivity improvements in the future. 
Finally, there may be other factors explaining the changes in productivity in these 
banking systems that we have not empirically investigated. For instance, banks that have 
engaged in mergers and acquisitions may behave differently in terms of adopting new 
technologies and setting prices. Also, changes in the ownership features of banks may 
also influence productivity change. These areas we suggest could prove fruitful areas for 
future research. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
Having investigated mergers and acquIsItions, foreign bank entry and productivity 
change in emerging markets, this chapter concludes the thesis. The first part of the 
chapter outlines the main contribution of the thesis and highlights the findings of each 
chapter and their implications. We then identify the limitations of our work and suggest 
areas for future research. 
5.1 Contribution and overview of the main results 
The main contribution of this thesis is that it provides an exploration of recent trends in 
emerging banking systems, e.g. mergers and acquisitions, foreign bank entry and the 
impact of these trends on bank shareholders, competitive conditions and overall bank 
productivity. Our study, therefore, may help policymakers and market participants to 
evaluate the impact of reform programmes undertaken and draw useful conclusions for 
future policy making and research. As far as each individual issue is concerned, the 
contribution and main findings of each chapter in this thesis are highlighted as follows: 
In Chapter 2, we apply two event study methodologies that use the OLS market model 
and GARCH model to examine the value effects of 84 M&A transactions on bank 
shareholders in twelve emerging markets between 1998 and 2005. To our knowledge, it 
is the first study that examines both domestic as well cross-border banking M&As using 
different event study methodologies for emerging markets. The results suggest that these 
transactions are moderately successful as targets' shareholders gain significant abnormal 
returns, whereas acquirers, on the other hand, tend not to lose value. When we take 
account of time-varying beta using the GARCH model approach this provides 
statistically similar findings to the OLS market model. However, while the different 
event study methodologies tend to yield the same general results in terms of shareholder 
value creation they differ in explaining its determinants. When using CAR estimated by 
the OLS market model as the dependent variable, a transaction will create more value for 
acquirers' shareholders if the payment is paid in cash, or if an acquirer is more profitable 
and efficient than its acquiring bank. On the other hand, when using SCAR estimated by 
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the GARCH tTIodel as the dependent variable, acquirers' shareholders gain more value if 
it is a cross-border transaction or they pay the targets' shareholder in share instead of 
cash. In terms of the targets' shareholders' value, there are greater abnormal returns if 
targets are relatively larger compared to their acquirers when using either CAR or SCAR 
as the dependent variables. However, there is evidence when using SCAR as the 
dependent variable that targets' shareholders receive more returns if their per-merger 
share performance is relatively good. 
Chapter 3 examines the impact of foreign bank entry on banking competitive conditions 
in Argentina, Brazil, China and India between 2000 and 2006. We use the generalised 
method of moments (GMM) dynamic panel data estimator as well as a fixed effect 
estimator when estimating the Lerner index as the indicator of competitive conditions. 
Furthermore, the data set that covers the period from 2000 to 2006 is expected to offer 
contemporary insights into bank competitive behaviour in emerging banking markets. 
There is tentative evidence that dynamic procedure should be used to measure a banking 
system's competitive conditions compared to traditional static one using fixed effect 
estimator. Using a dynamic panel regression model, we then examine the impact of 
foreign bank presence and other bank and country specific factors on banking 
competition. Overall, our results show that foreign bank entry does not appear to 
significantly influence banking sector competition. 
Chapter 4 examines bank productivity change in Argentina, Brazil, China and India 
between 2000 and 2006. This Chapter aims to contribute to the extant literature as it is 
the first study (as far as we are aware) that uses a parametric approach following Berger 
and Mester (1999,2003) to examine the cost and alternative profit productivity change in 
major emerging banking systems. The results show that all these banking systems suffer 
a slight decrease in cost productivity (apart from India) but also enjoy profit productivity 
gains over the same period. This suggests that banks in the countries under study focus 
more on revenue generation compared to cost minimisation over the period. 
5.2 Implications of the results 
In Chapter 2, the results show that M&As in emerging markets under study create 
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significant value for targets' shareholders and modest abnormal returns to bank 
shareholders as whole, which, to a certain extent, may suggest that consolidation in 
emerging markets during and after major financial crises has enhanced performance in 
terms of creating value gains (that may reflect either greater operational efficiency or 
market power). These findings suggest that consolidation in emerging markets is likely 
to continue given the value enhancing (albeit modest) effects. Moreover, future studies 
that examine the determinants of value creation in bank M&As should use GARCH or 
similar modelling framework to cross-check the robustness/consistency of their findings. 
In Chapter 3, we find that the competitive conditions measured by the Lerner index 
(irrespective of the method of estimation) worsen in Argentina and Brazil after 2002, and 
2001 for India; China, on the other hand, has the least competitive banking systems 
compared to other sample countries and such conditions stay stable during the time 
period under study. Nevertheless, as far as China and India are concerned, further 
deregulation will take place according to their commitments to accession of the WTO, 
measures like gradually increasing foreign bank presence in these two economies by 
either taking more stakes in large state-owned banks, M&As, setting up new joint 
ventures with domestic banks or seeking 'green-house' growth. Therefore, these 
markets' competitive conditions may be affected positively as a result. Moreover, we 
tentatively suggest that the dynamic panel data estimator procedure provides less biased 
results, and we suggest that for any future study of competitive conditions measured by 
the Lerner index, a dynamic procedure seems more appropriate. Finally, despite the fact 
that we do not find any significant impact of foreign bank entry on competitive 
conditions in four emerging markets, it is suggested that there well may be a limit to the 
competitive influence of foreign banks over the short-term. Policymakers, perhaps, need 
to take account of this possibility in the context of liberalisation programmes. 
In Chapter 4, we find conflicting results comparing cost and profit productivity which 
suggests that it is necessary to consider the latter if we are to accurately evaluate the 
performance of banking systems especially as cost productivity may not capture the 
profit maximisation goal of banks. Furthermore, according to Chapter 3, China and India 
have relatively less foreign bank presence and worse competition in their banking sectors. 
However, we find that banks in China and India still enjoy productivity improvement 
between 2000 and 2006. The possible explanations may be that banks from these two 
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markets may have embarked on (to certain extent, with the assistance from their 
supervision authorities) improving asset quality, capital adequacy , customer services, 
and investment on infrastructure in order to take a better position before the banking 
sectors are fully opened to foreign competition. Additionally, in India, this result could 
also be driven by some dominant banks (domestic and foreign) mainly focusing on 
business in major cities, while not exerting competitive pressure on smaller banks in 
other parts of the country. Finally, we also find some evidence that banks may also exert 
their market power to improve profit maximisation. Policymakers may well have to trade 
off a certain degree of anti-competitive behaviour if they wish to have profit productivity 
improvements. 
5.3 Limitations of the study and suggestions for the future research 
In Chapter 2, we analyse the value effects of 84 M&As in emerging markets. We draw 
conclusions from share reactions to M&A announcements. However, stock markets in 
these emerging markets are still relatively underdeveloped. The sample of our study is 
limited to 12 emerging markets, for an eight year period and is unlikely to be exhaustive 
in term of deals reported and overall sample size. Therefore, the results may not fully 
represent the real effects of the consolidation process. Secondly, we do not adjust our 
event study methodologies for non-synchronous trading as suggested by Brown and 
Warner (1985) that the OLS market model tends to produce similar results without taking 
into account this effect82 . However, Leemakdej (2008) argues that shares are relatively 
less frequently traded in emerging markets and finds that the OLS market model is less 
able to detect abnormal returns of thin trading shares in Thailand compared to other 
non-parametric models. As a result, we suggest that the possible bias from 
non-synchronous trading in emerging markets needs further research. Finally, our study 
also does not provide unambiguous results on what are the determinants of the value 
creation of M&As when we use two sets of abnormal returns from different event study 
methodologies. Therefore, further studies are needed in this area. 
In Chapter 3, we assume that foreign bank entry may only have short-term effects on 
competitive conditions. Over the long-term the impact of foreign bank entry, on the other 
R2 To our knowledge, the event study approach that uses GARCH modelling framework has not been tested whether 
non-synchronous trading can bias the detection of abnormal returns. 
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hand, may be reflected more in individual bank's efficiency improvements, and this may 
exert increased competitive pressure upon domestic banks. As a result, the process 
whereby domestic banks strive to become more efficient in order to compete with 
foreign banks may be a long-term phenomenon not captured in the relatively short-term 
nature of our study. This, we suggest, is an area of research that deserves greater 
academic attention in the future. 
In Chapter 4, According to Berger and Mester (2003), it is necessary to measure standard 
and alternative profit productivity change jointly in situations when banks may exert 
their market power over their output prices, or there are increases over time in scale 
economies, or output prices are not accurately measured (see Berger and Mester, 2003 
for a detailed discussion). Therefore, future studies should seek to obtain output price 
data in order to study standard profit productivity change as well as alternative profit 
productivity change in emerging banking markets. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 2.1 
Calculating abnormal returns using the GARCH model83 
In order to estimate abnormal return, the expected return conditional on the realised 
market return at T +k and past realisation up to time T is needed. If the k=l, the 
conditional mean is: 
E(rit Irmt, I t-l )= (~it - ~it~mt ) + ~it rmt (A4) 
where ~it = h imt { , and the conditional variance is: /h mmt 
(AS) 
So, the k-step ahead conditional mean is: 
(A6) 
and the k-step conditional variance is: 
( ) ( I) 
cov(riT+k' rmT+k lIT Y 
var ARiT+k IrmT+k, IT = var riT+k IT - ( II) var rmT+k T 
(A7) 
Using parameters from Equation (S) and (9), two conditional means in A(6) can be 
expressed as: 
E(riT+kIIT)=aiQ(l+ail +a;l + ... +a~-I)+ailriT 
E(fmT+k IIT)= a mO (1 + amI + a~l + ... + a~ll )+ amI fmT 
(AS) 
(A9) 
The variance terms in Equation (A6) and (A7) are calculated in the same way, for 
instance from Equation (9): 
83 This process is suggested by Frame and Lastrapes (1998). 148 
Var{rmT+k lIT )= ET [rmT+k - E{rmT+k lIT )]2 (AIO) 
rmT+k - E{rmT+kIIT )= a~lIUmT+1 + a~12UmT+2 + ... + amI UmT+k-1 + UmT+k (All) 
(AIO) and (All) imply 
var{r II) - ( k-I) 2 E 2 k-2 2 2 
mT+k T - amI TUmT+1 + (amI) E Tu mT+2 + ... + a~IETU~T+k_1 + ETU~T+k (AI2) 
From Equation (11) 
(AI3) 
By the law of iterated expectations, 
ETU~T+k =ET[ET+k-IU~T+k]=EThmmT+k for all k (AI4) 
Therefore, (AI2) can be re-written as: 
(AI5) 
By iterating on (AI3), 
(AI6) 
Substituting (AI6) into (AI5) can estimate the variance of the market return conditional 
on IT . 
The similar procedure is used to estimate covariance term as: 
( II) k-I k-Ih k-2 k-2E h coy riT+k' rmT+k T =a il amI irnT+1 +aj) amI T irnT+2 
(AI7) 
Finally, Equation (15) can be written as: 
CAR iT +k = kT +1 - E{riT +IIIT )] + ... + kT +k - E{riT +k lIT )] 
- ~iT+k [rmT+I - E{rmT+IIIT )]_ ... - ~iT+k [rmT+k - E{rmT+k lIT )] (AI8) 
Accordingly, the variance of CAR in Equation (16') can be expressed as: 
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(A19) 
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Appendix 2.2 
Lists of banking M&A transactions in Asian and Latin American emerging 
markets from 1998 to 2005 
Asian sub-sample 
1. Asian sub-sample: target and acquirer both are listed firms in the M&A transaction 
Announced Target Country ACQuirer Country Value US$m 
2000-1-20 Siam Industrial Credit Thai Siam Commercial Bank Thai 8.00 
Bank of the Philippine 
1999-12-23 Islands Phil DBS Sin 291.90 
OCBC Overseas 
2005-3-29 Bank NISP Indo Investments Sin 75.20 
OCBC Overseas 
2004-12-2 Bank NISP Indo Investments Sin 112.40 
2004-3-22 Bank NISP Indo OCBC Sin 70.40 
2004-2-24 Great Eastern Holdings Sin OCBC Sin 1086.30 
2004-7-27 Bank of Asia Thai UOB Sin 100.90 
2004-5-12 Bank of Asia Thai UOB Sin 543.20 
2004-4-6 Bank Buana Indonesia Indo UOB Sin 115.00 
2003-1-28 United Overseas Insurance Sin UOB Sin 4.40 
2002-3-20 Rashid Hussain Ma Utama Banking Group Ma 190.90 
2001-7-23 Rashid Hussain Ma Utama Banking Group Ma 132.70 
2004-6-8 Utama Merchant Bank Ma MIDF Ma 7.80 
2003-11-11 Utama Merchant Bank Ma MIDF Ma 42.90 
2000-1-10 Solidbank Corp Phil Metropolitan Bank & Trust Phil 95.20 
1999-11-11 Solidbank Corp Phil Metropolitan Bank & Trust Phil 166.90 
2005-427 Bank Niaga Indo Commerce Asset-Holdings Ma 28.30 
2002-9-12 Bank Niaga Indo Commerce Asset-Holdings Ma 118.40 
LG Investment & 
2004-9-10 Securities S.Kor Woori Finance Holdings Co S.Kor 259.50 
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2. Asian sub-sample: only the acquirer is a listed firm in the M&A transaction 
Value 
Announced Target Country Acquirer Country US$m 
2000-11-20 FPB Bank Holding HK Bank of East Asia HK 560.00 
2003-12-17 Indu~trial Bank China Hang Seng Bank HK 208.80 
2003-8-21 Forti~ Bank Asia HK HK ICBC (Asia) HK 304.00 
2003-7 -5 Chekiang First Bank HK Wing Hang Bank HK 615.60 
2004-1-28 DBS Thai Danu Bank Thai Thai Military Bank Thai 512.80 
2002--\,-29 DBS Group Holdings(HK) HK DBS Group Holdings Sin 117.20 
2001--\,-11 Dao Hen~ Bank Group HK DBS Group Holdings Sin 5679.70 
1999-11-9 Far East Bank & Tru~t Phil DBS Bank Sin 90.70 
1998-12-17 K wong On Bank HK DBS Bank Sin 459.90 
2001-6-12 Keppel Capital Holdings Sin OCBC Sin 3753.90 
2001-1-31 OCBC Finance Sin OCBC Sin 28.40 
Banco de Oro Universal 
2005-5-6 United Overseas Bank (Phil) Phil Bank Phil 11.10 
2005-2-3 UOB Radanasin Bank Thai UOB Sin 77.10 
2002-9-26 Bank UOB Indonesia Indo UOB Sin 10.50 
2002-3-15 Overseas Union Tntst Sin UOB Sin 82.50 
2001-6-29 Overseas Union Bank Sin UOB Sin 5463.90 
1999-10-7 Radanasin Bank Thai UOB Sin 382.50 
2005-11-24 Affin Merchant Bank Ma Affin Holdings Ma 45.00 
2000-1-12 Credit Corp(Ma) Ma Hong Leong Bank Ma 132.90 
2000-8-30 Phileo Allied Bank(Ma) Ma Maybank Ma 342.2 
1999-9-17 Pacific Bank Ma Maybank Ma 
329.00 
2000-6-26 Hock Hua Bank Ma Public Bank Ma 
221.70 
2001-4-23 Bank Utama(Ma) Ma RHB Bank Ma 474.50 
2000-6-28 Perdana Merchant Bankers Ma Southern Bank 
Ma 2.10 
2000-1-6 United Merchant Finance Ma Southern Bank 
Ma 110.50 
1999-10-13 Ban Hin Lee Bank Ma Southern Bank 
Ma 284.20 
1999-7-9 Ban Hin Lee Bank Ma Southern Bank 
Ma 98.00 
Bank of the Philippine 
2005-7-27 Prudential Bank Phil Islands 
Phil 19.40 
Bank of the Philippine 
1999-10-21 Far East Bank & Tntst Phil 
Islands Phil 1216.00 
2004-2-17 Adira Dinamika Multifinance Indo 
Bank Danamon Indo 101.20 
2000-12-22 H&CB S.Kor 
Kookmin Bank S.Kor 2172.90 
2003-6-19 Chohul1Q: Bank S.Kor Shinhan Financial Group 
S.Kor 2824.10 
2004-4-12 Chohung Bank S.Kor 
Shinhan Financial Group S.Kor 291.40 
Good Morning Shinhan 
Shinhan Financial Group S.Kor 188.00 
2004-9-17 Securities S.Kor 
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3. Asian sub-sample: only target is a listed firm in the M&A transaction 
Announced Target Country Acquirer Country Value US$m 
Korea Exchange Export-Imp0l1 Bank of 
2000-12-19 Bank S.Kor Korea S.Kor 330.80 
1999-5-7 Dah Sing Financial HK Mitsui TI1Ist & Bankin!! Japan 17.90 
Siam Commercial 
1999-5-7 Bank Thai Sanwa Bank Japan 135.40 
,X4, Note. ASIan country names are abbrevIated as follows. HK (Hong Kong ), Indo (indoneSIa), Ma (MalaysIa), Sm (Smgapore), S.Kor 
(South Korea), Thai (Thailand) and Phil (the Philippines) 
84 Hong Kong is a special administrative region of the People's Republic of China. 153 
Latin American sub-sample 
1. Latin American sub-sample: target and acquirer both are listed firms in the transaction 
Announced Target Country Acquirer Country Value US$m 
2001-8-8 Banco De A Edwards Chile Banco de Chile Chile 942.90 
200S-2-18 Corfinsura Corp Colombia Bancolombia SA Colombia 356.90 
Banco de Credito dd 
2002-2-18 Peru Peru Crcdicorp Ltd Bermuda 33.50 
2. Latin American sub-sample: only the acquirer is a listed firm in the M&A transaction 
Value 
Announced Target Country Acquirer Country US$m 
200S-12-21 Banco do Estado do Ceara Bra Banco Bradesco Bra 303.40 
200S-4-18 Banco Morada Bra Banco Bradesco Bra 30.70 
2003-11-7 Banco Zogbi Bra Banco Finasa Bra 226.90 
2003-1-13 BBvA Brasil Bra Banco Bradesco Bra 812.20 
2002-2-20 Banco Cidade Bra Banco Bradesco Bra 14S.60 
2002-1-14 Banco Mercantil de Sao Paulo Bra Banco Bradesco Bra 542.00 
2000-11-21 Banco Espinto Santo Portugal Banco Bradesco Bra 72.80 
2000-4-28 Boavista Inter-Atlantico Bra Banco Bradesco Bra 517.70 
1999-6-22 Banco do Estado da Bahia Bra Banco Bradesco Bra 146.70 
2002-11-29 Banco Fiat Bra Banco Itau Bra 248.40 
2000-10-17 Banco do Estado do Parana Bra Banco Itau Bra 868.40 
1998-S-19 Banco del Buen Ayre Arg Banco ltau Bra 225.00 
1998-4-3 Banco America do Sui Bra Banco Sudameris Brasil Bra 190.50 
Banco Financiero E Industrial De 
2000-12 20 Investimentos Bra Unibanco Bra 245.50 
2000-7-4 Banco Bandeirantes Bra Unibanco Bra 606.90 
2000-2-29 Banco Credibanco Bra Unihanco Bra 84.50 
Banco de Credito e 
2003-11-19 Banco Conosur Chi Inversiones Chi 100.00 
2004-7-31 Banco Aliadas Col Banco de Occidente Col 39.90 
Banco de Credito del 
2002-1 I-IS BSCH Peru Pe Peru Pe 49.20 
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3. Latin American sub-sample: only target is a listed firm in the M&A transaction 
Yalue 
Announced Target Country Acquirer Country US$m 
Banco de GaliL'la y Buellos 
2000-5-23 Aires Arg Grupo Financiero Galicia Arg 950.70 
2000-12-14 Banco Rio de la Plata Arg Men-ill Lynch & Co US 261.20 
2000-2-10 Banco Rio de la Plata Arg BSCH Spain 675.40 
2003-1-2 BBY Banco Frances Arg BBYA Spain 159.6 
2001-1-9 BBY Banco Franecs Arg BBYA Spain 15.40 
2000-9-29 BBYA Banco Ganadcro Col BBYA Spain 248.60 
Notc: Latm Arnencan country names are abbreViated as follows: Arg (Argentma), Bra (Braztl), Chi (Chile), Col (Columbia), and Pe 
(Peru). 
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Appendix 2.3 
A two-step LM test for diagnosing the GARCH effects of the time series85 
1. First step 
A time series of 291 days returns of each firm's share or market index (41 days in the 
event window and 250 days prior to the event window) is needed for a AR(I) regression 
model as follows: 
For the firm's share returns rit 
(A20) 
F or the index returns r mt 
(A21) 
A set of residuals obtained from each model are saved and denoted as e t • 
2. Second step 
Estimate the following auxiliary regression: 
e; =00 +01e;-1 + ... oqe;_q +v t (A22) 
In this case, q= 12 is chosen for the estimation. Therefore, the null hypothesis is that no 
GARCH effect can be found if: Ho: 01 = O2 = ... = 012 = 0 
The test statistic is 't = TR 2 - X 2 (12) 
85 This test is modified based on Brooks (2002). 156 
Appendix 3.1: 
Summary statistics of main independent variables by country and year 
FOREIGN 
Argentina 
Brazil 
China 
India 
Awrage 
MAKS 
Argentina 
Brazil 
China 
India 
Average 
CR5 
Argentina 
Brazil 
China 
India 
Average 
Argentina 
Brazil 
China 
India 
Average 
Argentina 
Brazil 
China 
India 
Average 
PROPERTYC 
Argentina 
Brazil 
China 
India 
Average 
GOPPCa 
Argentina 
Brazil 
China 
India 
2000 
0.3600 
0.3600 
0.0800 
0.0700 
0.2175 
0.015--1-
0.0104 
0.0476 
0.0244 
0.0245 
0.5419 
0.5411 
0.8814 
0.4121 
0.5941 
0.5843 
0.3509 
0.4848 
0.3217 
0.4354 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
74.12 
57.20 
54.09 
45.75 
57.79 
7702.89 
3706.91 
949.18 
452.98 
2001 
0.3500 
0.3400 
0.0800 
0.1300 
0.2250 
0.0145 
0.0090 
0.0370 
0.0227 
0.0208 
0.4984 
0.5084 
0.8227 
0.3902 
0.5549 
0.7164 
0.3372 
0.3955 
0.2308 
0.4200 
-1.1 
6.8 
0.5 
3.7 
2.5 
70.54 
57.95 
50.60 
47.12 
56.55 
7288.48 
3701.93 
1020.52 
468.93 
2002 
0.3100 
0.3000 
0.0600 
0.1300 
0.2000 
0.0139 
0.0087 
0.0256 
0.0192 
0.0169 
0.5525 
0.5265 
0.8159 
0.5924 
0.6218 
1.0137 
0.2447 
0.3185 
0.2579 
0.4587 
24.5 
15.9 
-0.3 
8.2 
12.1 
64.86 
58.82 
51.21 
51.38 
56.57 
6430.98 
3746.85 
1105.96 
478.91 
2003 
0.3000 
0.2800 
0.0500 
0.1100 
0.1850 
0.0149 
0.0093 
0.0208 
0.0172 
0.0156 
0.5647 
0.5154 
0.8489 
0.5156 
0.6112 
0.3004 
0.4246 
0.4151 
0.4637 
0.4010 
41.3 
32.9 
0.9 
12.4 
21.9 
55.53 
60.29 
51.13 
51.55 
54.63 
6932.45 
3737.39 
1209.00 
511.42 
2004 
0.3100 
0.3000 
0.0500 
0.1400 
0.2000 
0.0149 
0.0101 
0.0185 
0.0179 
0.0154 
0.5128 
0.4925 
0.8367 
0.4853 
0.5818 
0.3032 
0.4977 
0.3312 
0.5574 
0.4224 
47.5 
41.7 
4.8 
16.6 
27.7 
53.04 
58.66 
51.02 
51.77 
53.62 
7486.24 
3836.97 
1323.14 
546.13 
2005 
0.2900 
0.2700 
0.1000 
0.1200 
0.1950 
0.0154 
0.0109 
0.0161 
0.0182 
0.0152 
0.4939 
0.5249 
0.8220 
0.5129 
0.5884 
0.3356 
0.5379 
0.3480 
0.6864 
0.4770 
61.7 
51.4 
6.7 
21.5 
35.3 
54.02 
58.99 
52.37 
54.36 
54.94 
8094.17 
3958.09 
1448.78 
588.45 
Average 3202.99 3119.97 2940.68 3097.57 3298.12 3522.37 
2006 
0.3200 
0.3000 
0.1500 
0.0900 
0.2150 
0.0169 
0.0116 
0.0200 
0.0200 
0.0171 
0.4631 
0.6059 
0.8236 
0.5539 
0.6116 
0.3725 
0.6658 
0.9094 
0.9036 
0.7128 
79.4 
57.8 
8.3 
28.6 
43.5 
57.30 
61.71 
55.41 
52.29 
56.68 
8694.83 
4054.84 
1594.87 
633.74 
3744.57 
Note: FOREIGN - the percentage of each bank's shares controlled by foreign investors; . 
MAKS - market share variable calculated as the ratio of each bank's asset value divided by the whole bankmg sector assets; 
CRS - a concentration ratio calculated as the sum of market shares for the largest five banks; 
MARGOP - the ratio of stock market capitalisation to GOP; 
INFLA - annual inflation rate; 
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PROPERTY - an index of property rights from the Economic Freedom Index; 
GDPPC - The logarithm of per capita GOP of each year 
Sources: a: World Bank World Development Indicators, Nov 2007; 
b: 1M F International Financial Statistics; 
C : The Heritage Foundation, 2008 
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